Questions for a Millennium: Religion and Science from the Perspective of a Scientist

This essay addresses a series of eight questions about what religion can do for science. It explores the secular role of religion in contemporary science and the need for greater synthesis between science and religion. It concludes that, for survival in the twenty-first century, religion cannot exist without acknowledging and using the enormous information pool of science, and science can no longer shun or ignore religion. Humankind will always need the large, synthetic explanations that religion provides of why we are here and what we ought to do and believe. The world needs to mark this new millennium with a sense of respect, cooperation, and even synthesis between science and religion.     

Buddhism and Science: Allies or Enemies?

Buddhist teachings and modern science are analogous both in their approach to the search for truth and in some of the discoveries of contemporary physics, biology, and psychology. However, despite these congruencies and the recognized benefits of science, Buddhism reminds us of the dangers of a tendency toward scientific reductionism and imperialism and of the sciences' inability to deal with human moral and spiritual values and needs. Buddhism and science have human concerns and final goals that are different, but as long as the boundaries between them are not trespassed, they can be mutually corrective and allied to benefit humankind. Buddhism must be open to the discoveries of science about the physical world as must all religions today, but no matter how much it may have to modify some of its ancient beliefs, its basic truths—the truths about human suffering and its release—will remain untouched.     

Interpersonal Moral Conflicts Between Couples: Effects of Type of Dilemma, Role, and Partner's Judgments on Level of Moral Reasoning and Probability of Resolution

Forty-two male–female couples completed Kohlberg's test of moral development and made moral judgments about the most recent interpersonal moral conflict they had experienced in their everyday lives. Participants made lower stage moral judgments about their interpersonal moral conflicts than about the dilemmas on Kohlberg's test. The type of interpersonal moral conflict participants experienced and their role in the conflict were related to the types of moral judgments they made. Participants who reported philosophical conflicts made more mature moral judgments than participants who reported antisocial conflicts, especially if their role in the antisocial conflict was that of a transgressor. Conflicts were most likely to be resolved when partners' moral judgments about their conflict were similar in moral maturity. The implications of these findings for models of moral judgment are discussed.     

Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Sanity and Weakness of Will

This essay evaluates John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza'smature semi-compatibilist account of moral responsibility, focusingon their new theory of moderate reasons-responsiveness as a model of``moral sanity.' This theory, presented in Responsibility andControl, solves many of the problems with Fischer's earlier weakreasons-responsiveness model, such as its unwanted implication thatagents who are only erratically responsive to bizarre reasons can beresponsible for their acts. But I argue that the new model still facesseveral problems. It does not allow sufficiently for non-psychoticagents (who are largely reasons-responsive) with localized beliefsand desires incompatible with full responsibility. Nor does it take intoaccount that practical ``fragmentation of the self' over time may alsoreduce competence, since moral sanity requires some minimum level ofnarrative unity in our plans and projects. Finally, I argue that actual-sequenceaccounts cannot adequately explain sane but weak-willed agency. This isbecause without libertarian freedom, such accounts have no way to modelthe perverse agent's determination to be irrational or weak.     

Hume on the Standard of Virtue

Among those sympathetic to Hume'smoral philosophy, a general consensus hasemerged that his first work on the topic,A Treatise of Human Nature, is his best. Hislater work, An Enquiry Concerning thePrinciples of Morals, is regarded as scaleddown in both scope and ambition. In contrastto this standard view, I argue that Hume'slater work offers a more sophisticated theoryof moral evaluation. I begin by reviewing theTreatise theory of moral evaluation tohighlight the reasons why commentators find socompelling Hume's account of the corrections wemake to our moral sentiments. The method isendorsed by philosophers such as Henry DavidAiken and Annette C. Baier because, theyallege, it shows that moral sentiments reflecta process of judgment that includes thepossibility of corrigibility and ofjustification. But Hume's method of correctionfalls short and does not establish why thesentiments conforming to the standard of virtueshould count as moral judgments. In the secondEnquiry, Hume lays out a different set ofcriteria, including not only the need forcertain virtues of good judgment but attentionto the particular cultural and historicalorigins of the norms governing the virtues ofgood judgment. Hume's attention to diversityin evaluative outlook in his more matureposition takes seriously the relation betweenmoral authority and public debate.     

Parental Responsibility and the Morality of Selective Abortion

It is now a common opinion in Western countries that a child's impairment would probably place an unexpected burden on her parents, a burden that the parents have not committed themselves to dealing with. Therefore, selective abortion is in general a morally justified option for the parents. I argue that this view is based on biased information about the quality of life of individuals with impairments and their families. Also, a conscious decision to procreate should bring about conscious assent to assuming obligations as a parent. This implies a duty of caring for any kind of child. Consequently, if the child's condition is not such that it would make its life not worth living, and if the parents live in an environment where they are able to provide their child and themselves an adequate well-being, they do not have a morally sufficient reason to terminate the pregnancy on the grounds of fetal abnormality.     

论天人合德与道德价值的定位

中国传统伦理道德的天人合德为伦理道德价值提供了本体上的根据,这是道德价值的根本定位。其把道德价值定位于整体利益,就是定位于超越的绝对本位。这与现代伦理道德价值定位于人类个体利益一样,都存在理论和实践上的失误。伦理道德的逻辑发展,必将从此引申出集体利益与个体利益和谐一致的集体主义原则。     

经济活动中的道德理性

经济活动不仅是人们的物质生产活动,也是人们“理性化”的认知活动和实践活动。它既体现了人类主体对技术、工具手段的认知理性,又体现了人类主体“合理性”、“合目的性”的价值理性。而道德价值理性是一切合理有序的经济活动的价值标矢和理性基础。     

传统本体论哲学的终结和马克思哲学变革的实质

本文从讨论Ontology的译名开始,主张严格区分作为一门哲学分支学科的“存在论”,和作为一种特定哲学理论形态的“本体论”两个概念;通过对传统西方哲学所代表和象征的哲学理念的把握,揭示了其基本特征和历史命运;进而从马克思哲学与传统西方哲学的否定性关系视角,阐明了马克思哲学变革的实质和意义。作者认为,马克思哲学在哲学史上最具深远意义的革命变革,就在于它通过对传统本体论哲学的批判和超越,开创了哲学发展的新方向．奠定了哲学发展新形态的基础。     

善的两种冲突

冲突一词在语言表达中其实有两个很不相同的意义和用法。一种用法是：冲突的命题不能同时为真的逻辑真理性冲突;另一种用法是：冲突的价值欲望不能同时满足的现实选择性冲突。本文对冲突的两种意义及用法进行了区别,分析了这两种冲突的意义和用法在道德善恶判断中的联系和混用,并对道德相对主义与道德多元主义提出了批评。