厌恶情绪与消费者行为

厌恶与其他消极情绪存在差异, 不同类型的厌恶也不完全相同。可以采用不同的方法来诱发消费者的不同类型的厌恶。产品与服务、宣传、组织行为等均可能导致消费者产生不同类型的厌恶。不同类型的厌恶又会影响消费者行为, 如产品评价、购买意向、支付意愿、延迟决策、口碑、产品消费等。未来可以对厌恶与其他消极情绪对消费者行为影响的差异、不同类型的厌恶对消费者行为影响的差异、厌恶的前因变量与结果变量进行更深入的探索。     

道德情绪在道德隐喻映射中的作用及其神经机制

道德隐喻的加工, 实质上是从始源域的身体感知觉经验映射到目标域, 表征抽象道德概念的过程。新近研究从认知神经科学角度揭示道德隐喻加工的神经机制, 进而探讨情绪因素在道德隐喻映射中的作用。道德隐喻映射机制是在具体道德情境中身体感知经验与情绪体验、认知加工相互作用的结果。未来研究应拓展道德隐喻映射的维度和方向, 在社会交互环境中丰富和完善研究范式, 提高生态效度和跨文化效度。     

“Athl-Ethics”: Virtue Training in Mencius and Aristotle

The late Zhou of China and the Classical age of Greece both saw great impetus in intellectual thought and were marked by intense warfare. Being closely linked to warfare in antiquity, sports was a vital, commonplace activity whose jargon and practices naturally informed philosophical discourses. One can thus observe convergences between athletics and ethics in texts which took shape in these times and places, a phenomenon which I shall refer to as “athl-ethics.” In this paper, I separately examine and then compare athl-ethic phenomenon in Mencius and in the Nicomachean Ethics. Both texts are rife with sports metaphors. I regard the use of sports-derived imagery as a thin form of athl-ethicism. Sports, however, did more than inspire useful analogies. Physical training and competition were considered occasions for nourishing and practicing virtue. This generated thicker forms of athl-ethicism.     

An Understanding of Character from Holistic Thinking: What Asian Psychology Teaches Us about the Debate on Situationism

The situationist challenge to virtue has convinced many philosophers to adopt an empirically grounded methodology. I argue that this methodology requires us to reconsider conceptualizations of and evidence on character from experiments involving Asian subjects because it is precisely in these experiments that we see a remedy for the problems exposed by situationism. Since both situationists and defenders of virtue fall short of abiding by the part of their methodological commitment associated with remediation, evidence from the experiments is relevant for most participants in the debate. I show that the evidence indicates something important about remediation: the point is not to avoid the concept of virtue or character, but to deploy a holistic thinking style that has been observed among some populations in Asia. Holistic thinking involves (a) a tendency to explain behavior in terms of the interaction between person and situation variables and (b) an incremental understanding of character. The paper ends with a brief sketch of an account of character from holistic thinking that also highlights the role of social support in managing situations.     

Off Belay! The Morality of Free-soloing*

In this paper, we use qualitative and quantitative research, along with reference to current philosophical literature to consider the question of whether the sport of free-soloing is inherently immoral given the unavoidable extreme risk taken by the climber and imposed upon others not directly participating in the sport. The first thing we look at is what kind of values climbers see in free-soloing and show, through interviews we conducted with soloers and through a review of the literature on the philosophy of extreme sports, that climbers derive what might be called ‘higher pleasures’ from free-soloing. We then argue that despite its inherent riskiness, free-soloers ought to be allowed the autonomy and freedom to choose to engage in the sport, provided they are doing so in a conscientious manner. To show that they are, we again appeal to interviews we conducted to demonstrate that soloers decide to attempt a free-solo in a thoughtful manner, as prescribed by philosophers who work on the morality of decision-making under uncertainty. We finally use data that we collected through quantitative research to show that free-soloing does not make those athletes who participate in the sport into risk-taking personalities. Thus, we conclude that the sport of free-soloing is not inherently immoral.     

Is this America? Unfinished business with the U.S. national imaginary,religion and violence

This article first proposes definitions and raises questions about what it means to be a nation. I then analyze the national imaginary of the United States, and suggest that at its deepest core we find “substitute ultimates” regarding America's sacrificial war‐culture. This cultural violence perpetuates destructive consequences, including the phenomena of “U.S. war‐culture,” and “moral injury” among military servicemembers and veterans. But widespread legitimation of the imaginary largely inhibits citizens from awareness about their own reality. Lastly, I inquire about the role of prophetic public theology to address nationalism, and engage in a thought experiment with an imagined community of diverse partners.     

The Cost of Consequentialization

Consequentializers suggest that for all non‐consequentialist moral theories, one can come up with a consequentialist counterpart that generates exactly the same deontic output as the original theory. Thus, all moral theories can be “consequentialized.” This paper argues that this procedure, though technically feasible, deprives consequentialism of its potential for normative justification. By allowing purported counterexamples to any given consequentialist moral theory to be accommodated within that theory’s account of value, consequentializers achieve a hollow victory. The resulting deontically equivalent consequentalist counterpart that results from absorbing originally non‐consequentialist moral intuitions can now no longer explain, in a theoretically illuminating way, why certain actions are wrong and others right. The paper explains why traditional consequentialist theories did not embrace the procedure, and sketches how consequentialism can consequentialize without incurring the same cost.     

Nonassertive Moral Abolitionism

Proponents of moral abolitionism, like Richard Garner, qualify their view as an “assertive” version of the position. They counsel moral realists and anti‐realists alike to accept moral error theory, abolish morality, and encourage others to abolish morality. In response, this paper argues that moral error theorists should abolish morality, but become quiet about such abolition. It offers a quietist or nonassertive version of moral abolitionism. It does so by first clarifying and addressing the arguments for and against assertive moral abolitionism. Second, it develops novel criticisms of assertive moral abolitionism and offers nonassertive moral abolitionism in response. Third, it discusses how various metaethical views might respond to nonassertive moral abolitionism. Its basic claim is that nonassertive moral abolitionism provides superior therapeutic benefits over assertive moral abolitionism and other conserving and reforming approaches to moral discourse.     

What is a Thing?

“Thing” in the titular question of this paper should be construed as having the utmost generality. In the relevant sense, a thing just is an entity, an existent, a being. The present task is to say what a thing of any category is. This task is the primary one of any comprehensive and systematic metaphysics. Indeed, an answer provides the means for resolving perennial disputes concerning the integrity of the structure in reality—whether some of the relations among things are necessary merely given those relata themselves—and the intricacy of this structure—whether some things are more or less fundamental than others. After considering some reasons for thinking the generality of the titular question makes it unanswerable, the paper propounds the methodology, original inquiry, required to answer it. The key to this methodology is adopting a singular perspective; confronting the world as merely the impetus to inquiry, one can attain an account of what a thing must be. Radical ontology is a systematic metaphysics—broadly Aristotelian, essentialist, and nonhierarchical—that develops the consequences of this account. With it, it is possible to move past stalemate in metaphysics by revealing the grounds of a principled choice between seemingly incommensurable worldviews.     

The Meta-Ethical Issue of the Nature of Lying: Implications for Moral Education

I argue that lying has many dimensions, hence, some putativecases of lying may not match our intuitions or acceptedmeanings of lying. The moral lesson we should teach must be that lying is not a simple principle or feature, buta cluster of features or spectrum of shades, where anythingin the spectrum or cluster is considered lying. I argue thatthe view regarding lying as a single principle or featurehas problematic meta-ethical implications. I do a meta-ethicalanalysis of the meaning of lying, not only to indicatesuch problems, but also the need to teach the act ofrational discussion and meta-ethical analysis. I arguethat the process of meta-ethical analysis and rationaldiscussion should be part of moral education, in that itmay help to develop critical thought about the abilityand practice of making good and rational moral judgments.