Why are there no objective values?

Using the mathematical frameworks of economic preference ranking, subjective probability, and rational learning through empirical evidence, the epistemological implications of teleological ethical intuitionism are pointed out to the extent to which the latter is based on cognitivist and objectivist concepts of value. The notions of objective value and objective norm are critically analysed with reference to epistemological criteria of intersubjectively shared valuative experience. It is concluded that one cannot meaningfully postulate general material theories of morality that could be tested, confirmed or refuted by intersubjective empirical evidence of preferences and values, however loosely the empirical evidence of values may be interpreted. This situation is explained with reference to the ways in which preceived values become systematically influenced by the concomitants of individual valuative experience, but which have nothing to do with contingent subjective interests.     

An Ecologically Differentiated, Multifactor Model of Adolescent Network Orientation

The paper presents a test of an ecologically differentiated model of social network orientation for adolescents that distinguished between different social network reference groups (family, peers, and nonfamily adults). The model was tested in two consecutive studies. Study 1 describes initial model development (N = 120). Study 2 presents a confirmatory factor analysis with a second sample (N = 430) to replicate the factor structure developed in Study 1. Results supported a three-factor model of network orientation that differentiated between network reference groups. Analyses of concurrent and predictive validity indicated that orientation to network reference groups was differentially related to the perceived quality and frequency of support from members of respective social network groups. Group differences (gender, race) regarding network orientation to different network reference groups were consistent with studies of other social network processes. Implications for the study of the network orientation and the study of social networks more generally are discussed.     

结果预期与结果反应对儿童意图认知和道德判断的影响

考察了结果预期与结果反应对儿童意图认知和道德判断的影响。结果表明,结果预期影响幼儿园和小学儿童的意图认知,结果反应仅影响幼儿园儿童的意图认知;结果预期和结果反应显著地影响幼儿园和小学儿童的道德判断,但结果预期对小学儿童道德判断的影响要比结果反应大。     

Freud's early metaphors and network of enterprise: Insight into a journey of scientific self-discovery

This paper examines Freud's evolving network of enterprise from 1876 to 1900 and the ensemble of metaphors which he used in the development of his theory (1888–1900). It will be shown that, in spite of Freud's obligatory change of career at age 26, there is no sharp break between Freud's early scientific work and his psychological research. Many signs of continuity between the two periods can be found. Freud's journey of scientific self-discovery only progressively led him to the frontiers of the unknown and his ultimate challenge: exploring the secrets of sexuality. Freud's avowed commitment to the study of the unconscious may have happened as late as 1899 as his metaphors celebrate an intimate fusion between the creator and his creation.     

澳门人的风险知觉与赌博行为

采用匿名问卷法,调查澳门人的风险知觉与赌博行为。结果显示：（1）赌场的劝世文既无劝勉也无劝阻人们赌博的作用;（2）社会关系网的钱财支援不影响实际赌博次数;（3）多次性博弈与一次性博弈所采用的是不同的机制,一次性博弈不是由期望值所决定的;（4）相互监视和制裁系统会影响赌博：受法律制裁约束的职业者比不受法律制裁约束的职业者更不好赌;自估在赌场遇见认识人的机会与赌博次数呈负相关;（5）性别及母语等“本质趋向”差异表明,所谓澳门人不好赌有其渊源并可能是在长期的文化沉淀中形成的;（6）受教育程度是影响赌博的有效预测变量。这些发现的理论含义一并进行了讨论。     

Merit,fit, and basic desert

Basic desert is central to the dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists over the four-case manipulation argument. I argue that there are two distinct ways of understanding the desert salient to moral responsibility; moral desert can be understood as a claim about fitting responses to an agent or as a claim about the merit of the agent. Failing to recognize this distinction has contributed to a stalemate between both sides. I suggest that recognizing these distinct approaches to moral desert will help clarify a central source of disagreement between compatibilists and incompatibilists and assist both sides in resolving the current stalemate.     

Do emotions play an essential role in moral judgments?

The past few decades of moral psychology research have yielded empirical anomalies for rationalist theories of moral judgments. An increasing number of psychologists and philosophers argue that these anomalies are explained well by sentimentalism, the thesis that the presence of an emotion is necessary for the formation of a sincere moral judgment. The present review reveals that while emotions and moral judgments indeed often co-occur, there is scant evidence that emotions directly cause or constitute moral judgments. Research on disgust, anger, sympathy, and guilt indicates that people only reliably experience emotions when judging conduct that is relevant to the welfare of the self and valued others. Moreover, many recent studies have either failed to replicate or exposed crucial confounds in the most cited evidence in support of sentimentalism. Moral psychologists should jettison sentimentalism, and focus instead on how considerations of harm and welfare—the core concepts of rationalist theories— interact with empirical beliefs to shape moral judgments.     

Multiple Religious Belonging among visitors of Dominican spiritual centers in the Netherlands

ABSTRACT

In the religiously pluralized Western world, a trend called ‘Multiple Religious Belonging’ (MRB) has been identified. Although it is a much theologically debated concept, empirical research on the practice of MRB is limited. The present research project therefore explores the phenomenon of MRB among visitors of Dominican spiritual centers in the Netherlands (n=472). It investigates to what extent and in which ways such visitors combine elements from more than one religious tradition in their lives and what they perceive to be the benefits of combining elements. It links this information to their views on religion, the resources they draw from, their (religiously diverse) networks, and their motivations for attending spiritual activities. The results indicate that respondents who combine elements from more than one religious tradition (‘combiners’) are more likely than ‘non-combiners’ to: a) see religion as something that is constantly changing during the life course; b) have networks which are religiously diverse; c) place importance on nature, in-depth conversations, personal rituals or practices, and theological, philosophical, and spiritual texts as resources; d) be motivated to attend spiritual centers because of a focus on self-exploration.     

A tale of two processes: On Joseph Henrich’s the secret of our success: How culture is driving human evolution,domesticating our species,and making us smarter

We situate Henrich’s book in the larger research tradition of which it is a part and show how he presents a wide array of recent psychological, physiological, and neurological data as supporting the view that two related but distinct processes have shaped human nature and made us unique: cumulative cultural evolution and culture-driven genetic evolution. We briefly sketch out several ways philosophers might fruitfully engage with this view and note some implications it may have for current philosophic debates in moral and political theory and over the nature of extended cognition. We end by noting how Henrich’s view of the source of cultural design and innovation, and the prominence of place he gives to the extended process of cultural evolution, cuts against a cluster of broad but common views about human minds, recasting putative bugs as features and indicating that many of the distinctive features of our individual minds evolved to allow them to be effective cogs in the larger, more productive cultural machine.