Patenting humans: Clones,chimeras, and biological artifacts

The momentum of advances in biology is evident in the history of patents on life forms. As we proceed forward with greater understanding and technological control of developmental biology there will be many new and challenging dilemmas related to patenting of human parts and partial trajectories of human development. These dilemmas are already evident in the current conflict over the moral status of the early human embryo. In this essay, recent evidence from embryological studies is considered and the unbroken continuity of organismal development initiated at fertilization is asserted as clear and reasonable grounds for moral standing. Within this frame of analysis, it is proposed that through a technique of Altered Nuclear Transfer, non-organismal entities might be created from which embryonic stem cells could be morally procured. Criteria for patenting of such non-organismal entities are considered. An earlier version of this paper was presented at an international conference, “The Ethics of Intellectual Property Rights and Patents,” held in Warsaw, Poland on 23–24 April, 2004.     

Directed Altruistic Living Organ Donation: Partial but not Unfair

Arguments against directed altruistic living organ donation are too weak to justify a ban. Potential donors who want to specify the non-related person or group of persons to receive their donated kidney should be accepted. The arguments against, based on considerations of motivation, fairness and (non-)anonymity (e.g. those recently cited by an advisory report of the Dutch Health Council), are presented and discussed, as well as the Dutch Governments response. Whereas the Government argues that individuals have authority with regard to the allocation of their organs, partial considerations have not been sufficiently explored. In addition, it is argued that partial relationships govern human life, are significant and should be valued highly. These relationships are at the core of accepted living kidney donation between relatives (family members, partners, friends). Respecting the particular act of living donation goes beyond respect for autonomy; it touches upon our personal and social identity. Donation, e.g. of a kidney, is not undertaken strictly for the benefit of the recipient, but also to meet the moral standards we wish to set for ourselves. This consideration, rooted in a view of moral identity, provides the basis for many forms of directed donation that are both partial and justified. If the importance of this is not recognized, social policies can be neither adequate nor effective.     

Tragic-Remorse–The Anguish of Dirty Hands

This paper outlines and defends a notion of tragic-remorse. This moral emotion properly accompanies those actions that involve unavoidable moral wrongdoing in general and dirty hands scenarios in particular. Tragic-remorse differs both phenomenologically and conceptually from regret, agent-regret and remorse. By recognising the existence of tragic-remorse, we are better able to account for our complex moral reality which at times makes it necessary for good persons to act in ways that although justified leave the agent with a moral stain and a particular emotional response.     

Reasonable Partiality and Animal Ethics

Moral psychology is often ignored in ethical theory, making applied ethics difficult to achieve in practice. This is particularly true in the new field of animal ethics. One key feature of moral psychology is recognition of the moral primacy of those with whom we enjoy relationships of love and friendship – philia in Aristotles term. Although a radically new ethic for animal treatment is emerging in society, its full expression is severely limited by our exploitative uses of animals. At this historical moment, only the animals with whom we enjoy philia – companion animals – can be treated with unrestricted moral concern. This ought to be accomplished, both for its own sake and as an ideal model for the future evolution of animal ethics.     

Yoga-integrated psychotherapy for emotion dysregulation: A pilot study

Aims & Objectives

Yoga has been evidenced as beneficial for physical and mental health. This study sought to pilot the acceptability and feasibility of a yoga-integrated psychotherapy (YiP) intervention, aimed at alleviating difficulties in emotion regulation. A further aim was to explore the perceived effectiveness of YiP in alleviating depression, anxiety and improving well-being.

Methods

Seven participants who scored significantly on the Difficulties in Emotion Dysregulation Scale (DERS) took part in a psychological assessment session followed by six weekly one hr therapy sessions. Participants completed self-report measures in each session to quantify the effects of each YiP session on emotion regulation, well-being, depression and anxiety. Following seven sessions, five participants completed qualitative follow-up interviews to explore subjective experiences of YiP and any perceived impacts.

Findings

An ANOVA that contained data from seven participants who completed all six sessions revealed that DERS scores were significantly lower, and well-being scores were significantly higher, at both mid and end-points than at baseline. Thematic analysis of qualitative interviews identified five themes: “YiP assists the client's psychological and emotional processing,” “YiP improves insight and focus,” “YiP is culturally sensitive,” “the body facilitates regulation and resilience” and “YiP is acceptable & impactful.”

Conclusion

The study presents promising findings for the integration of yoga into psychotherapeutic practice and indicates that YiP may have beneficial effects on emotion regulation and psychological well-being. Future research should use randomised controlled methodologies to examine the ability of YiP to alleviate a wide range of affective symptoms using a larger sample of participants.     

Why history matters for moral responsibility: Evaluating history-sensitive structuralism

Is moral responsibility essentially historical, or does an agent's moral responsibility for an action depend only on their psychological structure at that time? In previous work, I have argued that the two main (non-skeptical) views on moral responsibility and agents’ histories—historicism and standard structuralism—are vulnerable to objections that are avoided by a third option, namely history-sensitive structuralism. In this paper, I develop this view in greater detail and evaluate the view by comparing it with its three dialectical rivals: skepticism about moral responsibility, historicism, and standard structuralism. Each comparison includes discussion of new work on moral responsibility and agents’ histories, and along the way I offer new arguments for preferring history-sensitive structuralism, paying special attention to the view's explanatory power.     

善良人格与道德需要满足的关系：交叉滞后研究

道德需要被认为是独立于自主、胜任和关系需要（ACR）的基本心理需要,通过对两个时间段的纵向数据分析（N = 1,187）,使用交叉滞后模型,研究探讨了善良人格与道德需要满足之间的关系。结果发现,善良人格与道德需要满足存在一定程度的跨时间稳定性;在控制了ACR和人口学信息后,善良人格与道德需要满足存在双向预测关系。研究在中国文化下为道德需要的存在提供了证据,扩展了基本心理需要相关理论,并为道德教育和人格培养提供理论依据。     

Defensive emotions and evaluative judgements: Sensitivity to anger and fear predicts moral judgements,whereas sensitivity to disgust predicts aesthetic judgements

Aesthetic and moral evaluations engage appetitive and defensive emotions. While the role played by pleasure in positive aesthetic and moral judgements has been extensively researched, little is known about how defensive emotions influence negative aesthetic and moral judgements. Specifically, it is unknown which defensive emotions such judgements tap into, and whether both kinds of judgement share a common emotional root. Here, we investigated how participants' individual sensitivity to disgust, fear, anger and sadness predicted subjective judgements of aesthetic and moral stimuli. Bayesian modelling revealed that participants who were more sensitive to anger and fear found conventional and moral transgressions more wrong. In contrast, participants who were more sensitive to disgust disliked asymmetrical geometric patterns and untidy rooms more. These findings suggest that aesthetic and moral evaluations engage multiple defensive emotions, not just disgust, and that they may rely on different defensive emotions as part of their computational mechanism.     

Permitting immoral behaviour: A generalized compensation belief hypothesis

When are we more likely to permit immoral behaviours? The current research examined a generalized compensation belief hypothesis that individuals, as observers, would morally tolerate and accept someone paying forward unfair treatment to an innocent person as a means to compensate for the perpetrator's previously experienced mistreatment. Across five experiments (N = 1107) based on economic games (Studies 1–4) and diverse real-life scenarios (Study 5), we showed that participants, as observing third parties, were more likely to morally permit and engage in the same negative act once they knew about previous maltreatment of the perpetrator. This belief occurred even when the content of received and paid-forward maltreatment was non-identical (Study 2), when the negative treatment was received from a non-human target (Study 3) and when the maltreatment was intangible (e.g. material loss) or relational (e.g. social exclusion; Study 5). Perceived required compensation mediated the effect of previous maltreatment on moral permission (Studies 4 and 5). The results consistently suggest that people's moral permission of immoral behaviours is influenced by perpetrator's previous mistreatment, contributing to a better understanding of the nature and nuances of our sense of fairness and contextualized moral judgement.     

Paradox explored: Climate shame,moral agency,the church,and the birds

This article explores shame and moral agency in relationship to the climate catastrophe, and the moral situation of the world's relatively high-consuming people who are implicated in greenhouse gas emissions that cause climate change. The author complexifies that situation in the conundrums of climate colonialism, climate racism, structural sin, and the moral ambiguities they raise, including such questions as: “What are the moral demands of climate sin grounded in historically rooted economic systems that one did not create but upon which the material conditions of one's life depend? To what extent, if any, is the individual morally accountable for the social structures of which one is a part and from which one benefits?” From there, the essay moves to its central question. It is whether shame theory might help to enable moral agency for what is desperately needed now by people of climate privilege and economic privilege in the North Atlantic world—wise and courageous action to address climate change and climate injustice. The article probes shame theory for clues to what disables moral agency and what catalyzes it. The author finds in shame theory pathways for transforming shame-based moral inertia into moral agency. Those pathways suggest vital roles for the church.