The role of examples in moral philosophy

Contemporary moral philosophy for the most part relegates examples to a negative role, as counter-examples. In this essay a view is articulated according to which the example has a much more positive and more fundamental role to play in the argumentation of moral philosophy: according to this view, examples may provide grounding for general moral principles. Some of the philosophical implications or presuppositions of such a view of examples are examined.     

A TALE OF TWO CONTROVERSIES: DISSONANCE IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF RATIONALITY

Abstract. The relation between rationality in science and rationality in moral discourse is of interest to philosophers and sociologists of science, to educators and moral philosophers. Apparently conflicting conceptions of rationality can be detected at the core of two current socio-educational controversies: the creationievolution controversy and that concerning "moral education." This paper takes as its starting point the recorded views of participants in these controversies; exhibits the contradictions and their effect on the public; relates these contradictions to developments in the philosophy and history of science; and suggests, in a preliminary way, one approach for dealing with the problem.     

The Cards that are Dealt You

Various philosophers have argued that in order to be morally responsible, we need to be the "ultimate sources' of our choices and behavior. Although there are different versions of this sort of argument, I identify a "picture' that lies behind them, and I contend that this picture is misleading. Joel Feinberg helpfully suggested that we scale down what might initially be thought to be legitimate demands on "self-creation,' rather than jettison the idea that we are truly and robustly responsible. I follow Feinberg in rejecting various "inflated' demands on "origination,' "initiation,' or ultimate sourcehood.     

Experimentation on humans and nonhumans

In this article, I argue that it is wrong to conduct any experiment on a nonhuman which we would regard as immoral were it to be conducted on a human, because such experimentation violates the basic moral rights of sentient beings. After distinguishing the rights approach from the utilitarian approach, I delineate basic concepts. I then raise the classic “argument from marginal cases” against those who support experimentation on nonhumans but not on humans. After next replying to six important objections against that argument, I contend that moral agents are logically required to accord basic moral rights to every sentient being. I conclude by providing criteria for distinguishing ethical from unethical experimentation.     

Relations between episodic memory, suggestibility, theory of mind, and cognitive inhibition in the preschool child

The development of episodic memory, its relation to theory of mind (ToM), executive functions (e.g., cognitive inhibition), and to suggestibility was studied. Children (n= 115) between 3 and 6 years of age saw two versions of a video film and were tested for their memory of critical elements of the videos. Results indicated similar developmental trends for all memory measures, ToM, and inhibition, but ToM and inhibition were not associated with any memory measures. Correlations involving source memory was found in relation to specific questions, whereas inhibition and ToM were significantly correlated to resistance to suggestions. A regression analysis showed that age was the main contributor to resistance to suggestions, to correct source monitoring, and to correct responses to specific questions. Inhibition was also a significant main predictor of resistance to suggestive questions, whereas the relative contribution of ToM was wiped out when an extended model was tested.     

The ethic of care development: a longitudinal study of moral reasoning among practical-nursing, social-work and law-enforcement students

The study investigated changes in care-based moral reasoning, in the context of justice development over the 2-year period among practical-nursing, bachelor-degree social-work and law-enforcement students (N = 59). Main measures were Skoe's Ethic of Care Interview and Colby et al.'s Moral Judgment Interview. Of the participants 34% progressed in care reasoning, and 48% in justice reasoning. Social-work and nursing students progressed in care reasoning, and all groups progressed in justice reasoning. One participant (1.7%) regressed in care reasoning. Care and justice reasoning were parallel in terms of internal consistency, and they were positively related to each other. Findings suggest that care reasoning follows a developmental sequence, involving three main and two transitional levels, as suggested by Gilligan (1982). Main levels include self-concern (Level 1), caring for others (Level 2), and balanced caring for self and others (Level 3).     

Rethinking the Divide: Modules and Central Systems

In this paper I argue that the cognitive system is best viewed as a continuum of cognitive processing from modules to central systems rather than having these as discrete and wholly different modes of cognitive processing. I rely on recent evidence on the development of theory of mind (ToM) abilities and the developmental disorder of autism. I then turn to the phenomenology of modular processes. I show that modular outputs have a stronger force than non-modular or central system outputs. I then evaluate social cognitions and show them to occupy a middle ground with respect to phenomenal strength between modular and non-modular outputs. The evidence presented then seems to indicate a continuum of cognitive processing rather than the traditional division between modules and central systems.

Treating the “Wise Baby”

In a previous examination of Ferenczis concept of the Wise Baby (1996), I had noted both its applications and its limitations in the analytic treatment of an unusually intelligent adult. Ferenczis concepts of the origin of intellect in trauma and of the wise baby have often left the indistinct impression of being interrelated phenomena. In this paper, I regard as arguable the notion that very high intelligence is pathological when it is precocious. This return visit to the territory of the wise baby extends Ferenczis ideas about the origin and use of the intellect to include a consideration of what may constitute effective treatment for those who suffer from giftedness.Judith E. Vida, M.D. edits On the Arts for this journal. She is a Founding Member and Faculty of the Institute of Contemporary Psychoanalysis in Los Angeles, CA, a member of both American and International Psychoanalytic Associations, and of the Sándor Ferenczi Society of Budapest. Her private practice is in Pasadena, CA.Address correspondence to Judith E. Vida, 301 S. Fair Oaks Ave., Suite 406A, Pasadena, CA 91105, USA; e-mail: jvida@spence.net     

The place of the 17th century in Jung's encounter with China

After recounting several dreams and related alchemical interests of Jung's tied to the 17(th) century, a contextualizing look at select scientific and philosophical developments of that century is presented. Several precursors of the contemporary debates on the mind/body relation are noted, with special reference to the work of Antonio Damasio. This in turn leads to a reconsideration of the work of the 17(th) century polymath Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, which Jung read as a major precursor to his formulation of synchronicity (via Leibniz's concept of 'pre-established harmony'). Leibniz was the first philosopher to articulate the mind/body relationship in terms of supervenience, sharing an accord with those contemporary philosophers and scientists who see the mind as being an emergent property of the body-brain. Similarly, these ideas are also consistent with a reformulation of synchronicity in terms of emergence. Tracing Leibniz's interest in China reveals another set of links to Jung and to emergentism. Jung's use of Taoist concepts in developing the synchronicity principle is well known. According to scholars, Leibniz was the first major Western intellect to study the I-Ching, through the assistance of a Jesuit missionary in Beijing, Fr. Joachim Bouvet. Some details of the Leibniz-Bouvet correspondence are discussed here. Despite Helmut Wilhelm's presenting aspects of this correspondence at an Eranos conference, Jung does not appear to have integrated it into his writing on synchronicity--a possible reason for this omission is suggested.     

John Dewey on Educating the Moral Self

Despite the affirmation below from a chapter entitled “The Moral Self” in his Ethics (1932), Deweyseems not to have used the term “moralself” outside that context. Perhaps he didn’t think it that crucial in his overall philosophy. I argue, on the contrary, that the concept ofthe moralself is fundamental to Deweyan moral psychology and that it provides an illuminating lens through which to view his philosophy of education. This paper explicates Dewey’s perspective on moral education as education of the moral self.