First steps toward an understanding of procedural fairness

In four experiments, we tested whether 20‐month‐old infants are sensitive to violations of procedural impartiality. Participants were shown videos in which help was provided in two different ways. A main character provided help to two other agents either impartially, by helping them at the same time, or in a biased way, by helping one agent almost immediately while the other after a longer delay. Infants looked reliably longer at the biased than at the unbiased help scenarios despite the fact that in both scenarios help was provided to each beneficiary. This suggests that human infants can attend to departures from impartiality and, in their second year, they already show an initial understanding of procedural fairness.     

Toward ethical cognitive architectures for the development of artificial moral agents

New technologies based on artificial agents promise to change the next generation of autonomous systems and therefore our interaction with them. Systems based on artificial agents such as self-driving cars and social robots are examples of this technology that is seeking to improve the quality of people’s life. Cognitive architectures aim to create some of the most challenging artificial agents commonly known as bio-inspired cognitive agents. This type of artificial agent seeks to embody human-like intelligence in order to operate and solve problems in the real world as humans do. Moreover, some cognitive architectures such as Soar, LIDA, ACT-R, and iCub try to be fundamental architectures for the Artificial General Intelligence model of human cognition. Therefore, researchers in the machine ethics field face ethical questions related to what mechanisms an artificial agent must have for making moral decisions in order to ensure that their actions are always ethically right. This paper aims to identify some challenges that researchers need to solve in order to create ethical cognitive architectures. These cognitive architectures are characterized by the capacity to endow artificial agents with appropriate mechanisms to exhibit explicit ethical behavior. Additionally, we offer some reasons to develop ethical cognitive architectures. We hope that this study can be useful to guide future research on ethical cognitive architectures.     

勿以恶小而为之：滑坡效应的心理机制及预防策略

滑坡效应是指个体的不道德程度有随时间推移而逐渐加剧的倾向, 即不道德行为具有反复性和渐进性。它广泛存在于个体自身层面以及人际互动过程中, 会影响个体正常社会交往, 甚至阻碍社会和谐健康发展。滑坡效应的研究方式包括实验者操纵法和自发性欺骗法, 心理机制包括道德推脱、内隐偏差、自我非人化等, 对应的干预措施包括提升预防定向动机和塑造积极的描述性社会规范。未来研究可从心理过程和生理机制的角度进一步探讨滑坡效应的适用范围、神经干预方式等。     

道德“沾光”效应：道德评价对道德自我知觉及道德行为的影响

人们喜欢关注道德事件并表达自己的立场。以往研究发现回忆自己(而非他人)的道德行为能影响个体的道德自我知觉和道德行为。本研究关注参与道德评价是否会对个体的道德自我和道德行为产生影响。2个研究共同发现：(1)存在道德“沾光”效应：评价支持他人的道德事件,或反对他人的不道德事件,能提升个体的道德自我知觉;(2)道德评价通过提升道德自我知觉,进一步增加个体的道德行为。     

精神分析视域下的身心观

身心关系问题是人类长期探究的重要议题。精神分析学家对身心关系具有诸多独特见解,具体表现为：身体是心理的基础,身体是心理的象征,身体与心理的交织。此三种观点不仅反映出不同精神分析学家在方法论、认识论以及本体论上的差异,也蕴含着精神分析不同流派的理论脉络。厘清精神分析视域下的身心观,既有助于自然科学心理学与人文科学心理学在精神分析中寻求一种主客交织的研究视角,也可为心理学和其他学科领域研究身心关系问题提供新的切入点。     

具身视角下道德概念净脏隐喻的特征、影响因素与未来展望

摘 要 基于概念隐喻理论与具身认知理论,身体净脏与道德概念存在隐喻联结;道德概念净脏隐喻具有心理现实性,并对道德判断产生一致性和补偿性效应;道德概念净脏隐喻的中介因素有厌恶情绪和道德自我意象,调节因素有身体敏感性和道德敏感性;未来研究应在道德概念净脏隐喻的神经机制、情境性、指向性、干预机制、文化差异等方面进行丰富和完善。     

权力感对道德困境判断的影响：基于CNI模型的分析

采用道德困境判断的CNI（consequence, norm, inaction）模型,通过两个实验考察权力感对道德困境判断的影响。实验1探讨个人权力感对道德困境判断的影响,结果显示高个人权力感显著增加被试对规则的敏感,促使个体做出道义论的道德判断。实验2考察回忆任务启动的权力感对道德困境判断的影响,发现相对于低权力感启动的被试,高权力感启动的被试在进行判断时更关注行为的结果,对规则更不敏感,这说明启动的权力感促进功利主义的道德判断,抑制道义论的道德判断。结果表明,不同类型的权力感对道德困境判断的影响存在差异。     

What do you think I think you think?: Strategic reasoning in matrix games

In reasoning about strategic interpersonal situations, such as in playing games, an individual's representation of the situation often includes not only information about the goals and rules of the game, but also a mental model of other minds. Often such mental models involve a hierarchy of reflexive reasoning commonly employed in social situations ("What do you think I think you think..."), and may be related to the developmental notion of 'theory of mind'. In two experiments, the authors formally investigate such interpersonal recursive reasoning in college-age adults within the context of matrix games. Participants are asked to predict the moves of another player (experimenter's confederate) in a two-choice, sequential-move game that may terminate at various stages with different payoffs for each player. Participants are also asked to decide optimally on their own moves based on the prediction made. Errors concerning the prediction, or translation of those predictions into decisions about one's action, were recorded. Results demonstrate the existence of a "default" mental model about the other player in the game context that is dynamically modified as new evidence is accumulated. Predictions about this other player's behavior are, in general, used consistently in decision-making, though the opponent tends to be modeled, by default, to behave in a myopic fashion not anticipating the participant's own action.     

How (and where) does moral judgment work?

Moral psychology has long focused on reasoning, but recent evidence suggests that moral judgment is more a matter of emotion and affective intuition than deliberate reasoning. Here we discuss recent findings in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, including several studies that specifically investigate moral judgment. These findings indicate the importance of affect, although they allow that reasoning can play a restricted but significant role in moral judgment. They also point towards a preliminary account of the functional neuroanatomy of moral judgment, according to which many brain areas make important contributions to moral judgment although none is devoted specifically to it.