中国体育市场伦理规范的缺损与重构

中国体育市场的法律规范与伦理规范本身具有依存性,中国体育市场现阶段发展主要不是法制缺乏,而是需要重构伦理规范并给法制规范以新的支撑点的问题。     

关于我国新道德建设的思考

当前我国新道德建设应遵循与市场经济相适应,与社会主义法律规范相协调等七个原则,并要注意与人重建的融会及建设的层次性与多元性、原则性与灵活性。     

企业核心竞争力与企业伦理品质

企业真正的核心竞争力来自企业伦理品质所产生的道德实力。企业的道德实力是企业遵循与市场经济理性相适应的道德准则,它一贯尊重和尽力满足利益相关人利益,并与利益相关人和谐交往共同发展而产生的道德凝聚力和影响力。与企业经营实力一样,企业道德实力是可以描述和量度的客观状态。具体可以从顾客忠诚度、员工忠诚度、股东忠诚度、融资资信度、同行联系度、供销稳定度、社区融洽度和社会美誉度等八个方面进行考量。     

无性生育的伦理考量

从有性生育到无性生育,这是人类生育方式的重大变革。无性生育是从细胞水平上对人类生育方式的干预。无性生育技术的出现及其实验,并不意味“人类的自然生育方式将要终结”,它只是有性生育的必要补充。无性生育技术的滥用和无性生育的泛滥有可能导致人类尊严的彻底丧失和以人的尊严为基础的人类明的倒退。对无性生育技术的研究和应用必须实施社会控制。     

论权力滥用的伦理惩罚

权力有被滥用的危险,权力滥用原因很多,但其人性原因在于人性中非善良部分即自私与任性等因素。由于社会正义和个体心理情感的必然要求,权力滥用除受法制、行政等制裁外,必遭伦理惩罚。其惩罚具有广域性、深城性、差异性、株连性等特征。其方式分内惩和外惩两种,即有良心的谴责、社会排恶引起的孤独感、舆论抨击引起的恐惧感、幸福消失的悲观感、权力丧失的危机感、发展受阻引起的失落感等。     

Globalization in Light of Luther's Eucharistic Economic Ethics

This article suggests that Christ “filling all things,” and abiding in a special way in the assembly of believers, offers moral agency for faithful response to economic structures that gravely threaten Earth's regenerative capacities. That claim is explored through Luther's theology of Christ indwelling creation held together with his eucharistic economic ethics, his call to certain practices, his refusal to minimize the pervasiveness of human sin, and his insistence that in brokenness and defeat the saving God is present and calls forth power. The trends designated by the term “globalization,” as used in this essay, are clarified. Dangers posed to the Earth community by that constellation of trends are illustrated.     

Transzendentalpragmatik und Diskursethik. Elemente und Perspektiven der Apelschen Diskursphilosophie

Transcendental Pragmatics and Discourse Ethics. Elements and Perspectives of Apel's Discourse-Philosophy. The author follows Apel's intellectual biography and shows the conception of a critique of meaning qua ‘reflection upon the discourse within the discourse’ to be the centre of Apel's language-pragmatic ‘Transformation of Philosophy’ (Frankfurt a.M. 1973). Beginning with an explication of the situation of a speaker/thinker, especially of the situation of a philosophising speaker/thinker, Apel reconstructs a two fold apriori of communication: Every thought is situated within the context of a particular, historically evolved, community of language and interaction. At the same time, however, the validity-claims of thoughts transcend the context of their origin towards an unlimited community of argumentation. On the basis of the first apriori Apel criticises the methodical solipsism as well as the objectivism of modern philosophy and theory of science. Drawing upon the second apriori he develops a universalist critique of meaning of relativism and contextualism. In the sixties and seventies Apel worked out a differentiated theory of the – more or less – communicatively cognizing humanities and set it apart from the theory of the causal-explanatory natural sciences, thus challenging the objectivism of a Theory of Unified Science. Building upon this work Transcendental Pragmatics, as developed by Apel and others, sets philosophy primarily two tasks: firstly, a (fallible) internal reconstruction of argumentative discourse as the (logical) situation of speech and thought which seeks to elucidate the conditions of the meaningfulness, i. e. the presuppositions, of discourse. These presuppositions comprise, thus Apel with Habermas, the four validity-claims to intelligibility, sincerety/credibility, truth and normative rightness/legitimacy. Their moral content consists, thus Apel, not only in the recognition of the equality of all beings capable of discursive reasoning but also in their recognition of a co-responsibility for the realizability of discourses and of responsibility. The author argues that the existence of a co-responsibility of this kind is indisputable because the discursive claims to validity are intertwined with a set of ‘primordial promises of dialogue’. Only with the elucidation and explication of these promises can the reconstruction of the internal conditions of discourse be completed.The second task of a pragmatics of argumentation isthe strict resp. actual reflection of the thinker upon the presuppositions of the discourse in which he currently engages. This reflection has a Socratic character and can only be done in the form of discussion and debate (‘Auseinandersetzungen’, Apel, Frankfurt a.M. 1998) with critics of the reconstruction. In this context, the author proposes a method of Socratic reflection upon the presuppositions of dialogue which suspends the usual, theoretically oriented, attitude of the scientist and the philosopher in favour of an actual reflective attitude. Within a dialogue with a sceptic who doubts one of the results of the internal reconstruction of dialogical presuppositions, say X, it is tested whether his doubt as to the unrestricted validity of X can be understood as a sincere contribution to the current dialogue or whether this particular sceptical thesis does not make sense, because it is incompatible with the role of a sincere participant of argumentation which, after all, the sceptic cannot refuse to claim for himself.Finally the author explains Apel's characterization of the tension between “Discourse and Responsibility” (Frankfurt a.M. 1988). In the course of discussions with Max Weber, Lawrence Kohlberg, Hans Jonas et al., Apel formulates and justifies an ethics of responsibility and gives an affirmative answer to the crucial question of whether the fulfilment of the moral obligations connected with the recognition of co-responsibility can be demanded within the non-dialogical circumstances of social reality. Apel's answer employs the idea of counter-strategies which are morally legitimate in virtue of their being worthy of argumentative consensus. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

环境伦理学中的道德客体与正义取向

本文尝试通过分析现今较为流行的几种环境伦理观倡导的环境义务对象及其理论根据,指出其合理因素和缺陷所在,进而提出价值共同体的概念,以此阐明人类在环境义务对象上的多样性和复杂性,并提出一种兼顾多层次对象的环境正义观。     

Reflective equilibrium and moral objectivity

Ever since the introduction of reflective equilibrium in ethics, it has been argued that reflective equilibrium either leads to moral relativism, or that it turns out to be a form of intuitionism in disguise. Despite these criticisms, reflective equilibrium remains the most dominant method of moral justification in ethics. In this paper, I therefore critically examine the most recent attempts to defend the method of reflective equilibrium against these objections. Defenders of reflective equilibrium typically respond to the objections by saying that either reflective equilibrium can in fact safeguard moral objectivity or alternatively, even if it cannot, that there simply are no reasonable alternatives. In this paper, I take issue with both responses. First, I argue that given the non-foundationalist aspirations of reflective equilibrium, moral objectivity cannot be maintained. Second, I argue that reflective equilibrium is not the only game in town once intuitionism has been discarded. I argue that given their own normative ambitions, combined with their rejection of intuitionism, proponents of reflective equilibrium have reason to take alternative methods of moral justification, and more specifically transcendental arguments, more seriously than they have done so far. I end by sketching the outlines of what this alternative methodology might look like.     

Non-Cognitivism and Fundamental Moral Certitude: Reply to Eriksson and Francén Olinder

Accommodating degrees of moral certitude is a serious problem for non-cognitivism about ethics. In particular, non-cognitivism has trouble accommodating fundamental moral certitude. John Eriksson and Ragnar Francén Olinder [2016] have recently proposed a solution. In fact, Eriksson and Francén Olinder offer two different proposals—one ‘classification’ account and one ‘projectivist’ account. We argue that the classification account faces the same problem as previous accounts do, while the projectivist account has unacceptable implications. Non-cognitivists will have to look elsewhere for a plausible solution to the problem of accommodating fundamental moral certitude.