小康社会与公民道德断想

应当把社会伦理关系的变革和主体道德人格的完善列为全面建设小康社会的基本的价值目标 ,不仅要切实理顺经济伦理关系 ,而且必须逐步建立起与社会主义市场经济体制相适应的、公正的政治伦理关系和文化伦理关系。小康社会的道德要求包括经济交往中的效率与公平、政治生活中的正义与民主、文化领域中的服务与奉献。小康社会的人格理想将以追求人性的自我完善和人格的自主、自觉、自由为基本特点。小康社会也将使人们的行为方式发生这样或那样的变化。     

Aesthetics of Surrender: Levinas and the Disruption of Agency in Moral Education

Education has long been charged with the taskof forming and shaping subjectivity andidentity. However, the prevailing view ofeducation as a project of producing rationalautonomous subjects has been challenged bypostmodern and poststructuralist critiques ofsubstantial subjectivity. In a similar vein,Emmanuel Levinas inverts the traditionalconception of subjectivity, claiming that weare constituted as subjects only in respondingto the other. In other words, subjectivity isderivative of an existentially priorresponsibility to and for the other. Hisconception of ethical responsibility is thusalso a radical departure from the prevailingview of what it means to be a responsible moralagent. In this paper, I use jazz improvisationas a metaphor to focus on three interrelatedaspects of ethical responsibility on Levinas'saccount: passivity, heteronomy, andinescapability. I then point toward some waysin which reframing responsibility andsubjectivity along this line might offer newpossibilities for conceiving subjectivity andmoral agency in education.     

王充的教育心理思想研究

该文系统研究了王充的教育心理思想,内容包括基本观点、学习心理思想、德育心理思想、差异与教师心理思想等。     

Gender Differences in Attributions and Emotions in Helping Contexts

Gender differences in the provision and receipt of emotional support may result from differences in the formation of responsibility and effort attributions in support-seeking interactions. Participants (N = 1,211, primarily middle-class, European American college students) read support-seeking scenarios that varied in support-seeker gender, responsibility for the problem, and effort to resolve the problem, as well as the problem itself, and completed measures of responsibility, effort attributions, and emotions (anger, sympathy). Results indicated qualified and subtle gender differences in attributions, emotions, and attribution--emotion associations, which are broadly consistent with the application of gendered moral orientations and instrumentality norms. These findings are discussed with respect to theorizing about gender differences in attribution processes and emotional support behavior.     

From Biology to Consciousness to Morality

Abstract. Social animals are provisioned with prosocial orientations that operate to transcend self‐interest. Morality, as used here, describes human versions of such orientations. We explore the evolutionary antecedents of morality in the context of emergentism, giving considerable attention to the biological traits that undergird awareness and our emergent human forms of mind. We suggest that our moral frames of mind emerge from our primate prosocial capacities, transfigured and valenced by our symbolic languages, cultures, and religions.     

Gauthier and the Capacity for Morality

In Morals by Agreement, David Gauthier tries to provide a justification of morality from morally neutral premises within the constraints of an instrumental conception of reason. But his reliance on this narrow conception of reason creates problems, for it suggests that moral motivation is self-interested. However, Gauthier holds that to act morally is to act for the sake of morality and others, not oneself. An individual who so acts has what he calls an affective capacity for morality. He attempts to reconcile the tension between the self-interested account of moral behaviour and the affective capacity for morality by showing that the latter could develop from the former without violating the constraints of instrumental rationality. I argue, first, that his account is incomplete and assumes what it has to demonstrate; and, second, that this cannot be remedied with any plausibility. Finally, I argue that Gauthier covertly relies on a substantive claim about human good that is inconsistent with the instrumental conception of reason. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Alternative Possibilities, Luck, and Moral Responsibility

I first question whether genuinealternatives are necessary for moralresponsibility by assessing the assumption thataccessibility to such alternatives is vital tohaving the kind of control required forresponsibility. I next suggest that theavailability of genuine alternatives courtsproblems of responsibility-subverting luck foran important class of libertarian theories. Isummarize one such problem and respond torecent replies it has elicited. I then proposethat if this ``luck objection' against theidentified class of libertarian theories ispersuasive, a similar objection appears toafflict compatibilist theories as well.Finally, I show that reflections on luck maywell take some bite out of variousFrankfurt-type examples. These are examplesdesigned to establish that an agent can bemorally responsible for an action despiteacting with libertarian free will in theabsence of genuine or pertinent alternatives.     

Why Naturalism?

My goal in this paper is to explain what ethical naturalism is, to locate the pivotal issue between naturalists and non-naturalists, and to motivate taking naturalism seriously. I do not aim to establish the truth of naturalism nor to answer the various familiar objections to it. But I do aim to motivate naturalism sufficiently that the attempt to deal with the objections will seem worthwhile. I propose that naturalism is best understood as the view that the moral properties are natural in the sense that they are empirical. I pursue certain issues in the understanding of the empirical. The crux of the matter is whether any synthetic proposition about the instantiation of a moral property is strongly a priori in that it does not admit of empirical evidence against it. I propose an argument from epistemic defeaters that, I believe, undermines the plausibility of a priorism in ethics and supports the plausibility of naturalism.     

关于儿童道德情绪判断的研究进展

该阐释了道德情绪的基本概念,论述了关于儿童道德情绪判断的近期研究结论及其影响因素。3～10岁儿童的道德情绪判断经历了一个从不高兴到高兴再到不高兴的发展过程,这一进程受到儿童的内在社会认知能力(儿童能否理解愿望是一种主观的心理特性、考虑道德因素的能力、观点采择能力,对犯过人格特质的理解等)及其所处的外在情境因素(所面临情境或事件的性质、情境的不一致性等)的影响。最后,作对该领域的研究趋向做出了展望。     

社区心理辅导实验模型的建构及其价值

建立实验模型,探索社区心理辅导的路径、具体实施的方法及其价值,为居民的心理健康和社区精神文明工作提供心理学理论和实践的依据;方法：采用症状自评量表(SCL-90)评估辅导前和辅导后社区居民的心理状况并进行自身比较;结果：l、辅导前居民的心理卫生存在问题较多;2、辅导后居民的心理卫生出现显著的变化;3、与辅导前比较,辅导后的居民心理卫生有明明显进步,特别在敌对的人际关系、偏执的认知方式和焦虑、抑郁的情绪等方面改变最为突出。结论：l、开展社区心理辅导是促进精神文明建设的全新理念和有效方法。2、建立、健全社区心理辅导网络对提高居民心理素质,减少心理疾病的发生、发展具有重要而又深远的作用。3、社区心理辅导实验模型的建立为广泛开展有关工作提供了理论和实践依据。