A Cognitive Prototype Model of Moral Judgment and Disagreement

Debates about moral judgments have raised questions about the roles of reasoning, culture, and conflict. In response, the cognitive prototype model explains that over time, through training, and as a result of cognitive development, people construct notions of blameworthy and praiseworthy behavior by abstracting out salient properties that lead to an ideal representation of each. These properties are the primary features of moral prototypes and include social context interpretation, intentionality, consent, and outcomes. According to this model, when the properties are uniform and coherent, they depict a promoral or immoral prototype, relative to the orientations of the properties. A promoral prototype is represented by an action that is supported by the culture, intentionally benevolent or other-regarding, consensual, and resulting in positive outcomes. An immoral prototype is an action that is condemned by the culture, intentionally malevolent or self-serving, lacking consent, and resulting in negative outcomes. It is hypothesized that moral prototypes will result in a high level of agreement and require effortless processing. Alternatively, when properties conflict or the situation deviates from the prototype, a nonprototype will result. It is hypothesized that nonprototypical situations will act as a source of moral disagreement and may require more effortful processing.     

Functional Psychopathy in Morally Relevant Business Decisions

Literature addressing organizational ethical behavior has focused intensely on cognitive moral development, and more recently the automatic and natural moral inclinations (i.e., moral intuitions). Research addressing the incapacity for moral reasoning, such as psychopathy, is rarely addressed in organizational behavior (Smith & Lilienfeld, 2013; Stevens, Deuling, & Armenakis, 2011). Our first aim is to develop a construct definition for functional psychopathy that is appropriate for organizational science and theoretically consistent with the extensive previous clinical and criminal research in this field. Second, we apply two versions of a scale not previously used in business research relative to moral judgments. This scale is a self-reported measure of functional psychopathy and is useful for its relationships with ethically relevant business decisions. Further, we examine which factors emerge as having the highest relationship with ethical decision making. Third, we seek to advance the usefulness of this construct by more precisely placing psychopathy within its nomological network. With these goals in mind, a combined sample of business school seniors (N = 418) participated in three studies. Findings indicate a significant influence of psychopathy over a range of ethically relevant business decisions, as well as negative correlations with factors of the Moral Approbation (Ryan & Riordan, 2000) and the Moral Awareness (Reynolds, 2006a) scales. We conclude with directions for future research and considerations for practice.     

The Mediating Role of Resiliency in the Relationship Between Temperament and Posttraumatic Growth

The purpose of the research is to investigate the mediating role of resiliency in the relation between temperamental traits and posttraumatic growth. Data of 74 persons who have experienced the death of someone close were analyzed. The range of age of the participants was 21–74 years (M = 38.4; SD = 15.5). The Posttraumatic Growth Inventory (PTGI), the Formal Characteristics of Behavior–Temperament Inventory (FCB-TI), and the Resiliency Assessment Scale were used in the study. Resiliency plays a mediating role among four traits of temperament (Briskness, Emotional Reactivity, Endurance, and Activity) and posttraumatic growth. Resiliency seems to modify the direct impact of temperamental traits on positive posttraumatic changes.     

A New Set of Moral Dilemmas: Norms for Moral Acceptability,Decision Times,and Emotional Salience

At the present time, the growing interest in the topic of moral judgment highlights the widespread need for a standardized set of experimental stimuli. We provide normative data for a sample of 120 undergraduate students using a new set of 60 moral dilemmas that might be employed in future studies according to specific research needs. Thirty dilemmas were structured to be similar to the Footbridge dilemma (“instrumental” dilemmas, in which the death of one person is a means to save more people), and thirty dilemmas were designed to be similar to the Trolley dilemma (“incidental” dilemmas, in which the death of one person is a foreseen but unintended consequence of the action aimed at saving more people). Besides type of dilemma, risk‐involvement was also manipulated: the main character's life was at risk in half of the instrumental dilemmas and in half of the incidental dilemmas. We provide normative values for the following variables: (i) rates of participants' responses (yes/no) to the proposed resolution; (ii) decision times; (iii) ratings of moral acceptability; and (iv) ratings of emotional valence (pleasantness/unpleasantness) and arousal (activation/calm) experienced during decision making. For most of the dependent variables investigated, we observed significant main effects of type of dilemma and risk‐involvement in both subject and item analyses. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Freud's psychoanalysis: A moral cure

That psychoanalytical treatment in its classical Freudian sense is primarily a moral or ethical cure is not a very controversial claim. However, it is far from obvious how we are to understand precisely the moral character of psychoanalysis. It has frequently been proposed that this designation is valid because psychoanalysis strives neither to cure psychological symptoms pharmaceutically, nor to superficially modify the behaviour of the analysand, but to lead the analysand through an interpretive process during which he gradually gains knowledge of the unconscious motives that determine his behaviour, a process that might ideally liberate him to obtain, in relation to his inner desires, the status of a moral agent. There resides something appealing in these claims. But it is the author's belief that there is an even deeper moral dimension applying to psychoanalytical theory and praxis. Freudian psychoanalysis is a moral cure due to its way of thematizing psychological suffering as moral suffering. And this means that the moral subject – the being that can experience moral suffering – is not primarily something that the psychoanalytical treatment strives to realize, but rather the presupposition for the way in which psychoanalysis theorizes psychological problems as such.     

中国传统伦理对医院道德管理之贡献

随着经济的腾飞,儒家管理思想在文化、伦理道德层面上给予医院经营管理以深刻影响。在医院道德管理的建设中,中国传统儒家伦理起着重要的作用,“仁”是医院经营发展的中心,“义”是医院经营立足的根本,“礼”是医院经营成功的保证,“智”是医院经营腾飞的关键,“信”是医院经营兴旺的标志。     

Naturalizing Ethics: the Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency

Moral agency is a central feature of both religious and secular conceptions of human beings. In this paper I outline a scientific naturalistic model of moral agency making use of current findings and theories in sociobiology,developmental psychology, and social cognitive theory. The model provides answers to four central questions about moral agency: (1) what it is, (2) how it is acquired, (3) how it is put to work, and (4) how it is justified. I suggest that this model can provide religious and secular moral theories with a basis for a common understanding of moral agency.     

结肠癌组织中血管内皮生长因子-C表达与淋巴转移的关系

探讨结肠癌组织中血管内皮生长因子-C（VEGF-C）表达与淋巴管、血管生成及淋巴转移、临床病理参数之间的关系。结论为VEGF-C高表达而淋巴转移阴性的患者亦有很强的淋巴结转移倾向,甚至可能已发生淋巴结微转移。VEGF-C主要通过调控结肠癌组织中微淋巴管的生成而影响结肠癌的淋巴结转移。     

道德虚伪：一种机会主义的适应策略

道德虚伪在个体层面是指人们言行不一, 在人际层面是指人们持有双重标准。心理学家通常从道德动机、认知失调以及精神分析的角度考察道德虚伪。诱发道德虚伪通常会促使个体做出跟他们公开承诺相一致的行为。作为一种机会主义的适应策略, 道德虚伪可能起源于群体适应情境下的自我谋利需要, 带有欺骗他人和自欺的特点。除了情绪、权力等因素之外, 未来研究需要考察自恋、羞耻、社会操纵能力、情商、文化因素对道德虚伪的影响。     

Sinnott-Armstrong,Walter, ed., Moral Psychology,Volume 3. The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion,Brain Disorders,and Development,Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008, pp. xix + 569, US $30 (paperback)

Many take the claim that you cannot ‘get’ an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ to imply that non-moral beliefs are by themselves incapable of justifying moral beliefs. I argue that this is a mistake and that the position that moral beliefs are justified exclusively by non-moral beliefs—a view that I call moral inferentialism—presents an attractive non-sceptical moral epistemology.