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161.
Christian Coseru 《Zygon》2020,55(2):461-473
The problem of free will is associated with a specific and significant kind of control over our actions, which is understood primarily in the sense that we have the freedom to do otherwise or the capacity for self-determination. Is Buddhism compatible with such a conception of free will? The aim of this article is to address three critical issues concerning the free will problem: (1) what role should accounts of physical and neurobiological processes play in discussions of free will? (2) Is a conception of mental autonomy grounded in practices of meditative cultivation compatible with the three cardinal Buddhist doctrines of momentariness, dependent arising, and no-self? (3) Are there enough resources in Buddhism, given its antisubstantialist metaphysics, to account for personal agency, self-control, and moral responsibility? 相似文献
162.
TODD STEWART 《Metaphilosophy》2007,38(1):23-43
Abstract: What is the point of developing an epistemology for a topic—for example, morality? When is it appropriate to develop the epistemology of a topic? For many topics—for example, the topic of socks—we see no need to develop a special epistemology. Under what conditions, then, does a topic deserve its own epistemology? I seek to answer these questions in this article. I provide a criterion for deciding when we are warranted in developing an epistemological theory for a topic. I briefly apply this criterion to moral epistemology and argue that some approaches to moral epistemology should be abandoned. I also argue that we can develop an epistemology for a topic without committing ourselves to a specific substantive theory of justification, such as reliabilism or coherentism, if we work within a suitably neutral framework. 相似文献
163.
Jakobus M. Vorster 《The Journal of religious ethics》2006,34(4):685-707
Many indigenous communities were dispossessed of their land during the period of colonial rule. This long process resulted in forced demographic removals and perennial poverty. Nowadays these communities, especially Third World groups, seek redress of this situation through legal processes of land restitution. This process is met by resistance from landowners in these countries, the colonial powers of old, as well as from big corporations that benefited from the dispossession. The investigation undertaken in this article addresses the ethics of land reform from a Christian ethical perspective. The policy of land restitution in South Africa is used as a case study, but the results of this research are also applicable to other parts of the world where land restitution is considered. The article first evaluates the biblical teachings of land and land reform and their implications for modern ethics. In the light of these issues, the article addresses the question of whether land ownership can be considered as a fundamental human right. The article also focuses on the legality of expropriation and dispossession of land for the purposes of restitution. Moreover, guidelines for fair and legal restitution within the context of Christian ethics and legal philosophical principles are proposed. 相似文献
164.
165.
Ki Joo Choi 《The Journal of religious ethics》2010,38(2):269-296
This essay provides an interpretation of Jonathan Edwards's moral thought that calls attention to the motif of perception in his conception of true virtue. The aim is to illumine the extent to which Edwards's virtue ethics can be included in and contribute to prevailing approaches to virtue in contemporary theological ethics. To advance this proposal, this essay attends to the question of moral agency that Edwards's reflections on charity, the new spiritual sense, and religious affections raise. This procedure offers an acute sense of the significance of perception for Edwards's virtue ethics, which in turn allows for a constructive Edwardsean entry into current theological discussions on the narrative character of virtue. 相似文献
166.
William Schweiker 《The Journal of religious ethics》2018,46(3):479-495
In this essay, I ask what the precise relation is between Laudato si's theology and its claims about our individual and corporate responsibility for the environment and the plight of the poor. To do so, I first clarify the relationship between the theological claims and its account of moral norms, situating the text within the history of western ethical theory. I then turn to reconstruct the submerged theology of the encyclical, focusing on Pope Francis's accounts of the techno‐economic paradigm and the possibility of an “integral ecology” paradigm. I end by assessing the text in terms of the coherence and plausibility of its argument as an ethical and theological statement. 相似文献
167.
Jaimie C. Northam Nadezhda Kurukulasuriya Caroline Hunt David J. Hawes 《The British journal of developmental psychology》2022,40(2):306-319
Relatively little is known about features of moral reasoning among young children with callous-unemotional (CU) traits (e.g., lack of guilt and empathy). This study tested associations between CU traits and emotion attributions (i.e., identification of others’ emotional states) and justifications (i.e., explanations for those emotional states), across social scenarios involving discreet versus salient distress cues. The participants were boys aged 6-to-10 years (N = 50; Mage = 7 years 7 months), who were interviewed about 12 hypothetical scenarios (eight with discreet and four with salient distress cues). Regression models indicated that CU traits, in interaction with high levels of antisocial behaviour, were associated with reduced emotion attributions of fear in discreet but not salient immoral scenarios. Higher CU traits were also associated with reduced justifications referencing others’ welfare in discreet scenarios, and increased references to action-orientated justifications in salient scenarios. These findings suggest that CU traits are associated with early moral reasoning impairments and that salience of distress may be important to these processes. 相似文献
168.
Darlene Fozard Weaver 《The Journal of religious ethics》2013,41(4):710-726
Jennifer Herdt's Putting On Virtue argues for the theological and normative superiority of noncompetitive accounts of divine and human agency. Although such accounts affirm the indispensability and sovereignty of divine grace they also acknowledge human agents as active participants in their own moral change. Indeed, Herdt contends we cannot coherently describe the human telos as entailing a transformation of character without affirming that human agents meaningfully contribute to that change. Nevertheless, a recurrent worry in Putting On Virtue is that persons may view their growth in virtue as a personal achievement and that the pleasure of positive self‐regard will displace disinterested—and hence truly virtuous—moral aspiration. This discussion of Herdt's volume sympathetically canvasses her argument. It then looks briefly at the reflexive structure of human agency to consider the relationship between the human telos and the transformation of character, and to encourage a more generous attitude toward positive self‐regard. 相似文献
169.
抑郁症患者倾向于在网络社交平台上发布带有抑郁信号的推文。基于这些文字信息,借助自然语言处理进行分析,提取归纳用户的语言特征,可以预测潜在用户的抑郁症状况。由于隐私信息的敏感、相关技术的不成熟等原因,出现了诸如信息获取与隐私侵犯、算法偏见与信息误判、信息权利与信息利益、责任界定与权限模糊等现实问题,成为进一步发展的掣肘。进行算法技术升级、完善法律法规、加强行业伦理约束等是避免道德风险的重要措施。 相似文献
170.
Moral dumbfounding occurs when people maintain a moral judgment even though they cannot provide reasons for it. Recently, questions have been raised about whether dumbfounding is a real phenomenon. Two reasons have been proposed as guiding the judgments of dumbfounded participants: harm-based reasons (believing an action may cause harm) or norm-based reasons (breaking a moral norm is inherently wrong). Participants in that research (see Royzman, Kim, & Leeman, 2015), who endorsed either reason were excluded from analysis, and instances of moral dumbfounding seemingly reduced to non-significance. We argue that endorsing a reason is not sufficient evidence that a judgment is grounded in that reason. Stronger evidence should additionally account for (a) articulating a given reason and (b) consistently applying the reason in different situations. Building on this, we develop revised exclusion criteria across three studies. Study 1 included an open-ended response option immediately after the presentation of a moral scenario. Responses were coded for mention of harm-based or norm-based reasons. Participants were excluded from analysis if they both articulated and endorsed a given reason. Using these revised criteria for exclusion, we found evidence for dumbfounding, as measured by the selecting of an admission of not having reasons. Studies 2 and 3 included a further three questions relating to harm-based reasons specifically, assessing the consistency with which people apply harm-based reasons across differing contexts. As predicted, few participants consistently applied, articulated, and endorsed harm-based reasons, and evidence for dumbfounding was found. 相似文献