5～9岁儿童内疚情绪理解的特点

选取87名5、7、9岁儿童探讨儿童对违规行为的道德评价对其内疚情绪理解的影响。以期揭示儿童在同伴条件下,对内疚情绪的理解特点。结果发现(1)5～9岁的儿童对违规行为都给出了消极的道德评价,他们已经具备了产生内疚情绪的认知能力,但尚不能进行道德情感推理,即不认为违规者会产生内疚情绪。(2)三个年龄段的儿童大部分对于内疚情绪还不能很好地理解,他们更多地是从行为产生有利于违规者的结果来理解违规者的情绪。     

Grounding Rights in Social Practices: A Defence

This paper defends a social practiceconception of moral rights possession againstwhat many of its critics take to be a decisiveobjection, namely that such a conceptionprevents us from using moral rights forcritical purposes.     

6～10岁儿童道德移情特点的研究

道德移情是近期日益受重视和研究的一种重要情感形式。本研究以6、8、10岁的176名儿童为样本,参照M.L Hoffiman关于道德移情的理论观点,运用个别交谈法以道德情境故事为材料探究了儿童的道德移情特点。结果表明：我国6－10岁儿童面临道德情境时作出的道德移情反应随年龄的增长而提高;他们对集体的道德移情反应强于对个人的道德移情反应;他们对声誉损害的道德移情反应最强、其次是对人身伤害的、最后是对财物损坏的;他们在相同感、内疚感、气愤感诸不同情感上的移情反应与Hoffman的设想既有相同点,也有不同处。     

21世纪仍然需要大力弘扬和培育雷锋精神——纪念“向雷锋同志学习”题词发表40周年

新的时代需要雷锋精神,雷锋精神也完全能够同改革开放、发展市场经济,全面建设小康社会,加快社会主义现代化建设,开创中国特色社会主义事业新局面的时代要求结合起来。     

法治与德治互动之社会机制引论

贯彻江泽民同志提出的“法治”与“德治”相结合的思想,必须把“法治”和“德治”的互动与结合具体落实在国家治理和社会秩序规范的机制创建之中。社会主义法治和德治互动的社会机制包括宏观机制,中观机制和微观机制。这三个层面的机制有机地统一在社会主义法治和德治的互动过程之中。     

Moral Lumps

Can all goods or bads be broken down into smaller and smaller pieces? Can all goods or bads be added together with some other good or bad to get a larger amount? Further, how does moral significance track the disaggregation and the aggregation of moral goods and bads? In Part 1, I examine the limits placed on aggregation by moderate deontological moral theories. This paper focuses in particular on the work of Judith Thomson and T.M. Scanlon as well as on some of my own past work on the question of aggregation in the context of overriding rights. In Part 2, I examine consequentialist criticism that harms and benefits can be broken down into smaller pieces than the deontological theory allows and the argument that the moderate deontological view is too permissive since it allows aggregation of benefits within a single person's life. In Part 3 I suggest how a moderate deontological moral theory might respond to the criticisms. I cast my answer in terms of the existence of lumpy goods and bads. I argue that consequentialist critics of deontology are wrong to insist that all goods and bads can be disaggregated and aggregated at will. Instead, I offer the suggestion that most, or many, goods and bads come in morally significant lumps. That said, it will not always be obvious what those lumps are. Determining the texture of moral value is a substantive project in normative ethics. All I have hoped to do in this paper is suggest that two standard positions on how to group moral value are mistaken and give hope that we need not adopt one of the two. Part 4 of the paper responds to an objection and sets the stage for further work in value theory.     

Choice, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities

Is choice necessary for moral responsibility? And does choice imply alternative possibilities of some significant sort? This paper will relate these questions to the argument initiated by Harry Frankfurt that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility, and to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's extension of that argument in terms of guidance control in a causally determined world. I argue that attending to Frankfurt's core conceptual distinction between the circumstances that make an action unavoidable and those that bring it about that the action is performed – a distinction emphasised in his recent restatement – provides a new route into an analysis of Frankfurt's argument by showing how it depends on a person's ‘decision to act’ involving the exercise of choice. The implicit reliance of Frankfurt's argument on this notion of choice, however, undermines his claim that the example of the counterfactual intervener strengthens the compatibilist case by providing a counter-example to the principle of alternative possibilities. I also argue that Frankfurt's reliance on the exercise of choice for moral responsibility is also evident in the Fischer/Ravizza argument, and that a close analysis of both arguments shows that such exercise of choice is not available if causal determinism is true.     

家——中华传统道德之根

中华传统道德重要的社会根源是家,其道德意识和范畴体系的起点是家。认识传统道德的局限进而批判其消极因素,要抓住家这个关键和出发点,更为重要的是,在弘扬中华道德的优良传统、建设社会主义新道德的时候,我们也要从家出发,以家为重要的起点。     

论大众道德

大众道德是指既满足个人自身的基本心理需求、价值需要和个人正当利益诉求,同时主观上没有损害他人、社会的故意,客观上没有造成他人、社会的损害后果的行为方式,在某种程度上该行为方式也常常是对他人和集体有利的。大众道德是时代的需要,也是道德榜样的基础。它非常重视道德义务与道德权利有效整合,并将其融汇在个体的工作和生活之中。     

国有企业经营者道德风险:深层导因及对策研究

我国国有企业经营者出现道德风险行为的原因主要来自这样几个方面:国有企业产权制度本身的缺陷、法人治理结构的缺陷、国有企业经营者人力资本与其报酬的不对称、对国有企业经营者难以进行有效的监督。要消除国有企业经营者道德风险行为,需要从建立健全企业经营者的激励机制、建立健全公司内部的权利制衡机制、建立严格的约束机制、完善公司治理结构、加强监督等方面采取防范对策。