How (and where) does moral judgment work?

Moral psychology has long focused on reasoning, but recent evidence suggests that moral judgment is more a matter of emotion and affective intuition than deliberate reasoning. Here we discuss recent findings in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, including several studies that specifically investigate moral judgment. These findings indicate the importance of affect, although they allow that reasoning can play a restricted but significant role in moral judgment. They also point towards a preliminary account of the functional neuroanatomy of moral judgment, according to which many brain areas make important contributions to moral judgment although none is devoted specifically to it.     

Genetic Counseling for Fragile X Syndrome: Updated Recommendations of the National Society of Genetic Counselors

These recommendations describe the minimum standard criteria for genetic counseling and testing of individuals and families with fragile X syndrome, as well as carriers and potential carriers of a fragile X mutation. The original guidelines (published in 2000) have been revised, replacing a stratified pre- and full mutation model of fragile X syndrome with one based on a continuum of gene effects across the full spectrum of FMR1 CGG trinucleotide repeat expansion. This document reviews the molecular genetics of fragile X syndrome, clinical phenotype (including the spectrum of premature ovarian failure and fragile X-associated tremor-ataxia syndrome), indications for genetic testing and interpretation of results, risks of transmission, family planning options, psychosocial issues, and references for professional and patient resources. These recommendations are the opinions of a multicenter working group of genetic counselors with expertise in fragile X syndrome genetic counseling, and they are based on clinical experience, review of pertinent English language articles, and reports of expert committees. These recommendations should not be construed as dictating an exclusive course of management, nor does use of such recommendations guarantee a particular outcome. The professional judgment of a health care provider, familiar with the facts and circumstances of a specific case, will always supersede these recommendations.     

Identity and moral responsibility of healthcare organizations

In this paper the moral responsibility of a Healthcare Organization (HCO) is conceived as an inextricable aspect of the identity of the HCO. We attempt to show that by exploring this relation a more profound insight in moral responsibility can be gained. Referring to Charles Taylor we explore the meaning of the concept of identity. It consists of three interdependent dimensions: a moral, a dialogical, and a narrative one. In section two we develop some additional arguments to apply his concept of personal identity to organizations. The final section works out the relationship of three dimensions of identity to some actual issues in contemporary HCOs: the tension between care and justice, the importance of dialogues about the diversity of goods, and the relevance of becoming familiar with the life-story of the HCO. Identity of an HCO is established and developed in commitments to and identification with certain goods that are central for a HCO. However, many of these goods are interwoven with everyday practices and policies. Therefore, moral responsibility asks for articulation of goods that often stay implicit and should not be reduced to a merely procedural approach. However difficult this articulation may be, if it is not tried at all HCOs run the risk of drifting away from their very identity as healthcare institutions: to offer care to patients and to do this in accordance with demands of social justice.     

Peter Singer’S Argument for Utilitarianism

The paper begins by situating Singer within the British meta-ethical tradition. It sets out the main steps in his argument for utilitarianism as the ‘default setting’ of ethical thought. It argues that Singer’s argument depends on a hierarchy of reasons, such that the ethical viewpoint is understood to be an adaptation – an extension – of a fundamental self-interest. It concludes that the argument fails because it is impossible to get from this starting-point in self-interest to his conception of the ethical point of view. The fundamental problem is its mixing the immiscible: the Humean subordination of reason to interest with the Kantian conception of reason as universal and authoritative.     

我国小学生品德发展关键期研究的述评与展望

关于小学生品德发展关键期的研究是德育心理学研究领域的重要的组成部分之一。本文综述了国内20多年的研究资料,探讨了我国小学生品德发展的关键期、测查工具,阐述了研究中存在的不足,并提出了研究的思路和方向。     

The morality of weapons research

I ask whether weapons research is ever justified. Weapons research is identified as the business of the engineer. It is argued that the engineer has responsibility for the uses to which the tools that he designs can be put, and that responsibility extends to the use of weapons. It is maintained that there are no inherently defensive weapons, and hence there is no such thing as ‘defensive’ weapons research. The issue then is what responsibilities as a professional the engineer has in regard to such research. An account is given to ground the injunction not to provide the means to harm as a duty for the engineers. This account is not, however, absolutist, and as such it allows justifiable exceptions. The answer to my question is thus not that weapons research is never justified but there must be a strong assurance that the results will only be used as a just means in a just cause.     

A psychological model that integrates ethics in engineering education

Ethics has become an increasingly important issue within engineering as the profession has become progressively more complex. The need to integrate ethics into an engineering curriculum is well documented, as education does not often sufficiently prepare engineers for the ethical conflicts they experience. Recent research indicates that there is great diversity in the way institutions approach the problem of teaching ethics to undergraduate engineering students; some schools require students to take general ethics courses from philosophical or religious perspectives, while others integrate ethics in existing engineering courses. The purpose of this paper is to propose a method to implement the integration of ethics in engineering education that is pedagogically based on Kohlberg’s stage theory of moral development.     

霍夫曼虚拟内疚理论述评

该文从涵义及类型、发生机制和影响因素等方面,介绍了霍夫曼的虚拟内疚理论,并对其理论意义进行了评述。该文认为。霍夫曼的虚拟内疚理论不仅拓展了内疚研究的心理学领域。而且深化了人们对道德情感在个体道德发展中的地位和作用的认识。     

The Morality System with and without God

What I set out to do is to cast some doubt on the thesis that, in Bernard Williams's words, any appeal to God in morality either adds nothing at all, or it adds the wrong sort of thing. A first conclusion is that a morality of real, inescapable and (sometimes) for the agent costly obligations, while being at home in a theistic metaphysic, does not sit easily with metaphysical, atheistic naturalism. The second conclusion is that Christine Korsgaard's impressive ethical project which is neutral towards theism and atheism fails in giving a satisfying account of such obligations. My final claim is that a theistic account in terms of a strong divine command theory might succeed where non- and atheistic accounts seem to founder.     

Morally Relevant Features

This article summarizes the account of morality presented in Morality: Its Nature and Justification (Oxford, 1998), with emphasis on that aspect of morality that deals with justifying violations of the moral rules. Such justification requires a two-step procedure; the first is describing the situation using only morally relevant features. I list these features, noting how diverse they are, and describe their characteristics. The second step is estimating the consequences of publicly allowing a violation with the same morally relevant features, that is, allowing a violation when everyone knows that it is allowed to violate the rule in the same circumstances, and comparing this to the estimated consequences of not publicly allowing that kind of violation. I then explain why fully informed, impartial rational persons can sometimes disagree about whether a violation should be publicly allowed and note that such weakly justified violations are the controversial cases.