What is the Problem with Fundamental Moral Error?

Quasi-realists argue that meta-ethical expressivism is fully compatible with the central assumptions underlying ordinary moral practice. In a recent paper, Andy Egan has developed a vexing challenge for this project, arguing that expressivism is incompatible with central assumptions about error in moral judgments. In response, Simon Blackburn has argued that Egan's challenge fails, because Egan reads the expressivist as giving an account of moral error, rather than an account of judgments about moral error. In this paper I argue that the challenge can be reinstated, even if we focus only on the expressivist's account of judgments about moral error.     

蝴蝶效应与临床思维——一例多器官衰竭患者诊疗反思

多器官衰竭或多器官功能障碍综合征在临床中尤其是急诊及重症监护室内常见,各种病因所致的疾病进展到一定程度均可导致多器官衰竭。在本案例中,一例老年男性患者,以急性腹泻起病,后短时间内进展为多器官衰竭。通过对该例患者病史总结、病理生理机制的探讨,以及对整个诊疗过程的反思,结合“蝴蝶效应”理论,总结出一种新的临床思维,并探讨“蝴蝶效应”理论在对该例患者的诊断、治疗甚至医患沟通方面所起到的作用,以期通过参考该案例,对以后的临床工作起到一定帮助。     

论西方主流伦理理论的前提错误——兼论道德无力症与冷漠症对医疗的影响

从“畏死的恐惧”出发重塑扎根生命的道德基础,即道德行为和“生-生”式的道德关系是人的本真需要,道德权威性的根据是人类生命共同体这一“内在永恒大我”和人的本真存在方式的需要。这拯救了道德相对主义,也使个体作为潜在的人类生命共同体而能以“与永恒相关的生命意义”推开恐惧。进而,道德行为是出于内在自由而达于实在的自由的。道德主体应具备的道德实践能力包括独立能力、通达能力和勇气。生存性境况中的原子式个体不具备道德实践能力,生命境况中的“超个体的个体”才有此能力。由此,人类道德无力症和道德冷漠症的根源是西方主流伦理理论的前提错误,即以原子式个体充任道德主体。它是医疗纠纷和暴力频发的原因。     

康德实践理性的事实概念及其对自由的证明

康德实践理性的事实概念指的是道德律或道德律的意识,而道德律本身实际上是道德律的意识。道德律是某种自身肯定的东西,它作为事实肯定了纯粹实践理性的客观实在性,并通过理性的这一积极的概念,证明了它自身在实践上的客观实在性。正是通过道德律这一事实,在思辨哲学那里只具有消极性的自由的原因性的概念,在实践哲学中获得了积极的规定,也成为了一个“事实”。     

IS MY FEELING YOUR PAIN BAD FOR OTHERS? EMPATHY AS VIRTUE VERSUS EMPATHY AS FIXED TRAIT

The purpose of this article is to (1) critique the primary arguments given by Paul Bloom and Jesse Prinz against empathy, and (2) to argue instead that empathy is best understood as a virtue that plays an important but complicated role in the moral life. That it is a virtue does not mean that it always functions well, and empathy sometimes contributes to behavior that is partial and unfair. In some of their writings, both Bloom and Prinz endorse the view that empathy is a fixed trait, but there is little reason to think this, and the studies that they cite do not support this view. Further, a number of recent studies suggest the opposite: our empathic reactions are malleable and subject to environmental effects and learning. Although our capacities for cognitive and emotional empathy are clearly not sufficient for being moral, I argue that they are functionally necessary traits that, like other virtues, must be cultivated correctly.     

Engineering ethics, individuals, and organizations

This article evaluates a family of criticism of how engineering ethics is now generally taught. The short version of the criticism might be put this way: Teachers of engineering ethics devote too much time to individual decisions and not enough time to social context. There are at least six version of this criticism, each corresponding to a specific subject omitted. Teachers of engineering ethics do not (it is said) teach enough about: 1) the culture of organizations; 2) the organization of organizations; 3) the legal environment of organizations; 4) the role of professions in organizations; 5) the role of organizations in professions; or 6) the political environment of organizations. My conclusion is that, while all six are worthy subjects, there is neither much reason to believe that any of them are now absent from courses in engineering ethics nor an obvious way to decide whether they (individually or in combination) are (or are not) now being given their due. What we have here is a dispute about how much is enough. Such disputes are not to be settled without agreement concerning how we are to tell we have enough of this or that. Right now we seem to lack that agreement—and not to have much reason to expect it any time soon. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2005 conference, Ethics and Social Responsibility in Engineering and Technology, Linking Workplace Ethics and Education, co-hosted by Gonzaga University and Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, CA, USA, 9–10 June 2005.     

FEELING WITHOUT THINKING: LESSONS FROM THE ANCIENTS ON EMOTION AND VIRTUE-ACQUISITION

Abstract: By briefly sketching some important ancient accounts of the connections between psychology and moral education, I hope to illuminate the significance of the contemporary debate on the nature of emotion and to reveal its stakes. I begin the essay with a brief discussion of intellectualism in Socrates and the Stoics, and Plato's and Posidonius's respective attacks against it. Next, I examine the two current leading philosophical accounts of emotion: the cognitive theory and the noncognitive theory. I maintain that the noncognitive theory better explains human behavior and experience and has more empirical support than the cognitive theory. In the third section of the essay I argue that recent empirical research on emotional contagion and mirroring processes provides important new evidence for the noncognitive theory. In the final section, I draw some preliminary conclusions about moral education and the acquisition of virtue.     

RECONCILIATION AND REPARATIONS

Abstract: This article provides an account of the meaning of reparations and presents a brief explanation as to why African Americans believe they are entitled to reparations from the United States government. It then goes on to explain why reparations are necessary to address the distrust that is thought to exist between many African Americans and their government. Finally, it rejects the belief that reparations require reconciliation.     

孙中山的伦理思想述要——纪念孙中山诞辰140周年

孙中山的伦理思想是在近代中国人民反帝反封建的斗争中形成的,其形成标志着中国近代民族资产阶级伦理思想的成熟。他的基于“民生史观”的道德起源和本质论;张扬“自由、平等、博爱”的道德观;“为主义而奋斗”的人生观;包含着许多合理积极宝贵内容,值得认真地继承与弘扬。