Complementarity of Linguistic and Prosodic Processes in the Intact Brain

Despite considerable speculation in the research literature regarding the complementarity of functional lateralization of prosodic and linguistic processes in the normal intact brain, few studies have directly addressed this issue. In the present study, behavioral laterality indices of emotional prosodic and traditional linguistic speech functions were obtained for a sample of healthy young adults, using the dichotic listening method. After screening for adequate emotional prosody and linguistic recognition abilities, participants completed the Fused Rhymed Words Test (FRWT; Wexler & Halwes, 1983) and the Dichotic Emotion Recognition Test (DERT; McNeely & Netley, 1998). Examination of the difference in ear asymmetries for these measures within individuals revealed a complementary pattern in 78% of the sample. However, the correlation between laterality quotients for the FRWT and DERT was near zero, supporting Bryden's model of "statistical" complementarity (e.g., Bryden, 1990).     

In Defense of Individualism

This paper offers a programmatic philosophical articulation of moral and political individualism. This individualism consists of two main components: value individualism and rights individualism. The former is the view that, for each individual, the end which is of ultimate value is his own well-being. Each individual's well-being has ultimate agent-relative value and the only ultimate values are these agent-relative values. The latter view is that individuals possess moral jurisdiction over themselves, i.e., rights of self-ownership. These rights (along with other rights individuals may come to possess) constrain the manner in which agents may pursue value. For this reason, the articulated individualism is an constrained individualism. Sketches of arguments are offered for both value and rights individualism. And it is argued that the sole legitimate function of legal/political institutions is to further delineate and protect the rights of individuals. However, the paper is also concerned to indicate why this radical moral and political individualism does not have many of the features or implications that are commonly ascribed to it. In this connection, I seek to show how this social doctrine accords with individuals' having concern for the well-being of others, with the emergence of relationships among individuals that have both instrumental and non-instrumental value, with a degree of responsibility for self and others that is often thought to be antithetical to individualism and, in general, with a flourishing of civil order.     

Life-Prolonging Killings and their Relevance to Ethics

What makes killing morally wrong? And what makes killing morally worse than letting die? Standard answers to these two questions presuppose that killing someone involves shortening that person's life. Yet, as I argue in the first two sections of this article, this presupposition is false: Life-prolonging killings are conceivable. In the last two sections of the article, I explore the significance of the conceivability of such killings for various discussions of the two questions just mentioned. In particular, I show why the conceivability of life-prolonging killings renders Frances M. Kamm's attempt to provide an answer to the second question problematic.     

Moral Responsibility, Determinism, and the Ability to do Otherwise

In his classic paper, The Principle of Alternate Possibilities, Harry Frankfurt presented counterexamples to the principle named in his title: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. He went on to argue that the falsity of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) implied that the debate between the compatibilists and the incompatibilists (as regards determinism and the ability to do otherwise) did not have the significance that both parties had attributed to it -- since moral responsibility could exist even if no one was able to do otherwise. I have argued that even if PAP is false, there are other principles that imply that moral responsibility entails the ability to do otherwise, and that these principles are immune to Frankfurt-style counterexamples. Frankfurt has attempted to show that my arguments for this conclusion fail. This paper is a rejoinder to that reply; I argue that he has failed to show this.     

Faulty Judgment,Expert Opinion,and Decision-Making Capacity

An assessment of decision-making capacity is the accepted procedure for determining when a person is not competent. An inferential gap exists between the criteria for capacity specific abilities and the legal requirements to understand relevant information and appreciate the consequences of a decision. This gap extends to causal influences on a person'scapacity to decide. Using a published case of depression, we illustrate that assessors' uses of diagnostic information is frequently not up to the task of bridging this inferential gap in a justifiable way. We then describe cases of faulty judgement which challenge the understanding of diagnostic causal influences. These cases help to clarify the nature of the expertise required for capacity assessments. In practice, the requirements of decision-making capacity are often abandoned to other considerations due to a lack of requisite expertise. The legal policy supporting decision-making capacity as a means to protective intervention is justified only if the requisite expertise is developed. We propose the requisite expertise to be developed in the long term as a distinct multidisciplinary endeavour.     

ON MARTIN EGER'S "A TALE OF TWO CONTROVERSIES"

Abstract. Criticisms are presented against Eger's challenge to the demarcation between the natural sciences and ethics. Arguments are given both against his endorsement of the "new" philosophy of science and against his rejection of the fact-value dichotomy. However, his educational recommendations are reinforced rather than weakened by these criticisms     

Influence of expressed emotion and perceived criticism on cognitive-behavioral therapy for social phobia

This study examined significant others' expressed emotion (EE) and a closely related construct, perceived criticism, as predictors of cognitive-behavioral therapy outcome in a sample of 40 patients with social phobia (social anxiety disorder). Patients enrolled in group therapy for social phobia completed pre- and post-treatment questionnaire measures of perceived criticism and anxious and depressive symptoms. Designated significant others were assessed for the components of high EE (criticism, hostility and emotional overinvolvement) using the Camberwell Family Interview. It was hypothesized that these high-EE components and patients' perceived criticism would be associated with poorer treatment outcome, and results ran counter to these expectations. Controlling for initial social phobia severity, lower levels of perceived criticism predicted treatment dropout. There was also a nonsignificant trend for participants with a significant other rated as high in emotional overinvolvement to show less change on a composite symptom measure. Findings from this study suggest that close relationships impact the outcome of cognitive-behavioral interventions for social phobia.     

New developments in emotion regulation with an emphasis on the positive spectrum of human functioning

There is converging evidence from several psychological fields on the ways in which individuals engage in specific strategies to modify, alter, or accept their emotional experiences to obtain more desirable outcomes. The current Special Issue is dedicated to a series of examinations on how these self-regulatory strategies can promote resilience, create and sustain positive moods and intrinsic motivation, and aid in the repair of different negative emotions. The content of these articles are briefly reviewed in the context of additional ideas for scientific advancements in understanding and developing positive health.     

Reasons-Responsive Compatibilism and the Consequences of Belief

John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza offer a theory of moral responsibility which makes responsibility dependent upon the way in which moral agents view themselves. According to the theory, agents are responsible for their actions only if they think of themselves as apt candidates for praise and blame; if they come to believe they are not apt candidates for praise and blame, they are ipso facto not morally responsible. In what follows, I show that Fischer and Ravizza’s account of responsibility for consequences is inconsistent with this subjective element of their theory, and that the subjective element may be retained only if they are willing to implausibly restrict their account of responsibility for consequences. I end by discussing the broad significance of the failure of the subjective element for their overall approach to moral responsibility.     

牟宗三先生以"自律道德"的理论诠释儒学之蠡测

Mou Zongsan uses the highest moral principle “autonomy” to interpret Confucius’ benevolence and Mencius’ “inherent benevolence and righteousness”, focuses on the self-rule of the will. It does not do any harm to Mencius’ learning, on the contrary, it is conducive to the communication between Chinese and Western philosophies. If we stick to Kant’s moral self autonomy and apply it to interpreting Zhu Xi’s moral theory, similarly we will discover the implications of Zhu Xi’s “autonomy” in his moral learning. Therefore, it is inappropriate for Mou Zongsan to say that Zhu Xi’s ethics belongs to the autonomous one. __________ Translated from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2005, (6): 33–39