肝移植的伦理学问题

肝脏移植和其它器官移植一起实现了人类长期以来渴望生命再生的梦想,并成为终末期肝病的有效治疗方法。器官移植也面对许多伦理道德方面的难题。供体,特别是活体器官的摘取,受体的选择等,都受到社会道德观的制约。从伦理道德角度来分析如何制定相关的法律法规,成为当前社会关注的热点。从受体的利益、人体科研的道德规范以及相关制度的伦理学要求等方面,较为详细的阐述肝移植伦理学的基本原则。     

Identity and moral responsibility of healthcare organizations

In this paper the moral responsibility of a Healthcare Organization (HCO) is conceived as an inextricable aspect of the identity of the HCO. We attempt to show that by exploring this relation a more profound insight in moral responsibility can be gained. Referring to Charles Taylor we explore the meaning of the concept of identity. It consists of three interdependent dimensions: a moral, a dialogical, and a narrative one. In section two we develop some additional arguments to apply his concept of personal identity to organizations. The final section works out the relationship of three dimensions of identity to some actual issues in contemporary HCOs: the tension between care and justice, the importance of dialogues about the diversity of goods, and the relevance of becoming familiar with the life-story of the HCO. Identity of an HCO is established and developed in commitments to and identification with certain goods that are central for a HCO. However, many of these goods are interwoven with everyday practices and policies. Therefore, moral responsibility asks for articulation of goods that often stay implicit and should not be reduced to a merely procedural approach. However difficult this articulation may be, if it is not tried at all HCOs run the risk of drifting away from their very identity as healthcare institutions: to offer care to patients and to do this in accordance with demands of social justice.     

具身道德:道德心理学研究的新取向

具身道德是指身体及其活动方式与道德心理和行为的相互作用。迄今为止, 具身道德研究主要采用道德Stroop范式、内隐联想测验范式、情境操纵范式和心境诱发范式。具身道德的研究内容主要包括身体解剖学结构、知觉经验及身体与环境的嵌入作用与道德心理及行为的相互作用, 且在广泛的知觉经验内容中包涵了身体厌恶与道德的关系、自我洁净-道德纯洁隐喻、道德-明度隐喻、道德-颜色隐喻、道德的空间维度与时间维度等多个内容。未来的研究需从研究内容的丰富性与全面性、隐喻效应的文化差异与一致性效应、研究方法技术的科学性与多样性等几个方面着手。     

Children's utilization of emotion expectancies in moral decision‐making

This study investigated the relevance of emotion expectancies for children's moral decision‐making. The sample included 131 participants from three different grade levels (M = 8.39 years, SD = 2.45, range 4.58–12.42). Participants were presented a set of scenarios that described various emotional outcomes of (im)moral actions and asked to decide what they would do if they were in the protagonists' shoes. Overall, it was found that the anticipation of moral emotions predicted an increased likelihood of moral choices in antisocial and prosocial contexts. In younger children, anticipated moral emotions predicted moral choice for prosocial actions, but not for antisocial actions. Older children showed evidence for the utilization of anticipated emotions in both prosocial and antisocial behaviours. Moreover, for older children, the decision to act prosocially was less likely in the presence of non‐moral emotions. Findings suggest that the impact of emotion expectancies on children's moral decision‐making increases with age. Contrary to happy victimizer research, the study does not support the notion that young children use moral emotion expectancies for moral decision‐making in the context of antisocial actions.     

Rethinking Moral Agency in Markets: A Book Discussion on Behavioral Economics

Recent work in behavioral economics and psychology provides valuable resources for religious ethicists. This book discussion examines contributions by Cass Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton, Uri Gneezy and John A. List, and Douglas Hough. This literature raises important questions about ethical decision‐making, moral agency and responsibility, and the ethics of life in global capitalism. It also opens up promising areas for interdisciplinary dialogue between economics and religious studies. This book discussion concludes that religious ethicists have much to contribute to the conversations about moral anthropology that are now being held in behavioral economic research, and to the broader political economic debates in which this research participates.     

Children's understanding of equity in the context of inequality

In the context of a pre‐existing resource inequality, the concerns for strict equality (allocating the same number of resources to all recipients) conflict with the concerns for equity (allocating resources to rectify the inequality). This study demonstrated age‐related changes in children's (3–8 years old, N = 133) ability to simultaneously weigh the concerns for equality and equity through the analysis of children's judgements, allocations, and reasoning in the context of a pre‐existing inequality. Three‐ to 4‐year‐olds took equity into account in their judgements of allocations, but allocated resources equally in a behavioural task. In contrast, 5‐ to 6‐year‐olds rectified the inequality in their allocations, but judged both equitable and equal allocations to be fair. It was not until 7–8 years old that children focused on rectifying the inequality in their allocations and judgements, as well as judged equal allocations less positively than equitable allocations, thereby demonstrating a more complete understanding of the necessity of rectifying inequalities. The novel findings revealed age‐related changes from 3 to 8 years old regarding how the concerns for equity and equality develop, and how children's judgements, allocations, and reasoning are coordinated when making allocation decisions.     

Moral Worth and Doing the Right Thing by Accident

Kantian conceptions of moral worth are thought to enjoy an advantage over their rivals in virtue of accommodating two plausible intuitions—that the praiseworthiness of an action is never accidental, and that how an agent might have acted in other circumstances does not determine the moral worth of her actual conduct. In this paper, I argue that neither the Kantian nor her rivals can adequately accommodate both intuitions, in as much as non-accidentality presupposes counterfactual robustness. If we are to adequately accommodate both claims, then we must reconsider the kind of non-accidentality that really matters to moral worth. I propose that the kind of non-accidentality worth caring about requires only that the agent who does what is right acts competently from morally relevant concerns. Under this account, both the Kantian and (some of) her rivals can ensure that the praiseworthiness of an action is never accidental without counting the behaviour of non-actual agents as being relevant to assessments of moral worth.     

Abusive supervision,leader-member exchange,and moral disengagement: A moderated-mediation model of organizational deviance

This paper draws from social exchange theory and social cognitive theory to explore moral disengagement as a potential mediator of the relationship between abusive supervision and organizational deviance. We also explore the moderating effect of leader-member exchange (LMX) on this mediated relationship. Results indicate that employees with abusive supervisors engaged in moral disengagement strategies and subsequently in organizational deviance behaviors. Additionally, this relationship was stronger for those higher in LMX. Important implications for management research and practice are discussed.     

Hope as an irreducible concept

I argue for a novel answer to the question “What is hope?”. On my view, rather than aiming for a compound account, i.e. analysing hope in terms of desire and belief, we should understand hope as an irreducible concept. After criticizing influential compound accounts of hope, I discuss Segal and Textor's alternative of describing hope as a primitive mental state. While Segal and Textor argue that available developments of the standard definition do not offer sufficient conditions for hope, I question the deep‐seated idea that desire and belief are even necessary conditions for hope. My suggestion is that we should take seriously the fact that we hope in a great variety of ways and should question the search for elements that are common to all cases. A promising alternative follows the Wittgensteinian idea that cases of hope are related in terms of family resemblance, i.e. are multiply realizable on the ontological level while falling under the non‐definable concept of hope.