Kant and Hegel on purposive action

This essay discusses Kant and Hegel’s philosophies of action and the place of action within the general structure of their practical philosophy. We begin by briefly noting a few things that both unite and distinguish the two philosophers. In the sections that follow, we consider these and their corollaries in more detail. In so doing, we map their differences against those suggested by more standard readings that treat their accounts of action as less central to their practical philosophy. Section 2 discusses some central Kantian concepts (Freedom, Willkür, Wille, and Moral Law). In Section 3, we take a closer look at the distinction between internal and external action, as found in Kant’s philosophy of morality and legality. In Section 4, we turn to Hegel and his distinctions between abstract right (legality), morality, and ethical life, as well as the location of his account of action within his overall theory of morality. We discuss the distinction between Handlung and Tat, and non-imputable consequences. The overall aims of our essay are to shed light on some puzzles in Kant and Hegel’s conceptions and to examine where their exact disputes lie without taking a stand on which philosophy is ultimately the most satisfactory.     

Raising the Virtuous Bar: The Underlying Issues of Genetic Moral Enhancement

From the perspective of virtue ethics, is it possible and permissible to enhance moral behavior through gene modification? In preparation to answer this question, we must ask five questions: (1) What may we assume regarding genetic inheritance and human nature? (2) Can specific genes predispose behavior related to the moral virtues? (3) What kind of genetic enhancement would be useful for moral enhancement? (4) Should there be a distinction between somatic and germline gene modification? (5) Is genetic modification best approach to moral enhancement? This article concedes that genetic engineering has the capacity to enhance the human disposition to moral behavior, but gene editing cannot create virtue because virtues are stable, habituated dispositions, acquired over time. That being said, gene editing for purposes of enhancing moral behavior is permissible.     

方言对社会决策及情绪的影响——-来自电生理的证据

方言是心理学本土化研究的新方向,本研究旨在考察语言类型（方言、普通话）对群体和个体社会决策的影响。实验1通过改编的公共物品博弈范式,发现方言条件下信任与合作水平、主观评定积极情绪和心率的变化值更大,皮肤电无显著变化;普通话条件下信任在主观消极情绪评定和合作行为间发挥着完全中介作用。实验2利用改编的最后通牒博弈范式,发现不公平的￥2-￥8分配方案下方言条件的接受率显著高于普通话条件,提议越公平接受率越高。结果表明方言会影响人们认知、情绪和决策行为,研究为语言和决策领域的探索提供了新思路。     

自我损耗、情绪动机对冲动决策的影响

以大学生为被试,探讨自我损耗、情绪动机对冲动决策的影响。采用2×2×2的混合实验设计,组内变量为自我损耗,组间变量为情绪动机方向和强度,使用双任务范式操作自我损耗,使用情绪动机图片启动被试的情绪动机,使用延迟折扣任务的指标k值测量冲动决策。结果发现,高趋近动机的k值大于低趋近动机,高回避动机的k值大于低回避动机。结果表明,自我损耗、情绪动机对冲动决策有明显影响。     

道德信息对面孔吸引力判断的无意识调节

抽象语言信息是否能够影响知觉?本研究在审美领域对此进行考察,探索无意识获取的道德信息是否影响个体对相应面孔吸引力的知觉判断。结果发现个体对面孔吸引力的知觉判断受到内隐道德信息的调节,且调节效应与面孔本身吸引力水平无关; 另外,面孔审美判断的反应时受到道德美丑和面孔吸引力的共同影响,尤其当两类信息相矛盾时被试需要更长的时间进行判断。研究结果表明抽象的社会道德信息可以对面孔吸引力的知觉判断产生自上而下的调节。     

Psychometric Properties of a Chinese Version of the Moral Attentiveness Scale

This study focuses on the reliability and validation of the Chinese version of the Moral Attentiveness Scale. Factor analysis confirmed that the scale includes two factors: perceptual moral attentiveness and reflective moral attentiveness. Moral attentiveness is negatively correlated with normlessness and positively associated with internalization and symbolization, moral identity, and other academic dishonesty behaviors. Reflective moral attentiveness moderated the relationship between formalism and unethical decision making. All results showed that the Chinese version of the Moral Attentiveness Scale has satisfactory psychometric properties and is a valid and reliable measurement of moral attentiveness in the Chinese population.     

Characteristics Associated With Individuals’ Caring,Just, and Brave Expressions of the Tendency to Be a Moral Rebel

Extending previous research on the characteristics associated with adolescents’ general tendency to be a moral rebel (Sonnentag & Barnett, 2016), the present study examined the roles of moral identity and (general and situation-specific) moral courage characteristics on 3 (i.e., caring, just, and brave) expressions of the tendency to stand up for one’s beliefs and values despite social pressure not to do so. Results revealed that general and situation-specific moral courage characteristics are important motivators of individuals’ caring, just, and brave expressions of the tendency to be a moral rebel, especially when they possess a relatively strong moral identity.     

Moral (dis)engagement with anthropogenic climate change in online comments on newspaper articles

Anthropogenic climate change (ACC) is widely acknowledged to be morally significant, but little is known about everyday moralising around ACC. We addressed this gap via quantified thematic analysis of 300 online comments to British newspaper articles on ACC, drawing on Bandura's moral disengagement theory. Moral disengagement through denial of ACC was widespread. Other disengagement strategies, such as palliative comparison and diminishing agency, occurred less often. There was also some moral engagement, most often through assertions of the existence of ACC and/or its harmful effects. Moral disengagement was significantly more common in comments on right wing than left wing newspapers, whereas the opposite was true of moral engagement. Although Bandura's framework provided a useful starting point to make sense of ACC moralising, it did not capture moral concerns that extended beyond its “harm/care” remit. In particular, many “denial” comments included a “dishonesty” discourse, whereby ACC proponents were accused of deception for ulterior motives. To classify this discourse as moral disengagement obscures its engagement with a different set of moral issues around trust and honesty. We suggest that Bandura's theory represents one possible “moral landscape” around ACC and could be extended to encompass a broader range of moral concerns.     

Counter‐intuitive moral judgement following traumatic brain injury

Several neurological patient populations, including traumatic brain injury (TBI), appear to produce an abnormally ‘utilitarian’ pattern of judgements to moral dilemmas; they tend to make judgements that maximize the welfare of the majority, rather than deontological judgements based on the following of moral rules (e.g., do not harm others). However, this patient research has always used extreme dilemmas with highly valued moral rules (e.g., do not kill). Data from healthy participants, however, suggest that when a wider range of dilemmas are employed, involving less valued moral rules (e.g., do not lie), moral judgements demonstrate sensitivity to the psychological intuitiveness of the judgements, rather than their deontological or utilitarian content (Kahane et al., Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7, 2011, 393). We sought the moral judgements of 30 TBI participants and 30 controls on moral dilemmas where content (utilitarian/deontological) and intuition (intuitive/counter‐intuitive) were measured concurrently. Overall TBI participants made utilitarian judgements in equal proportions to controls; disproportionately favouring utilitarian judgements only when they were counter‐intuitive, and deontological judgements only when they were counter‐intuitive. These results speak against the view that TBI causes a specific utilitarian bias, suggesting instead that moral intuition is broadly disrupted following TBI.