Barry Taylor

I respond to an argument made by Gunnar Björnsson and Ragnar Francén Olinder against motivational internalism. Björnsson and Olinder present a hypothesis in which all of us are selfishly motivated to act in accordance with our moral judgments. The conceivability of such a possibility, they argue, rules out motivational internalism. I argue that this is not the case, and that, according to one dominant view about moral judgments, the agents in the hypothesis do not make genuine moral judgments. One therefore cannot argue decisively against motivational internalism without arguing against this view about moral judgments.     

Quality of Reasons and Degrees of Responsibility

Traditionally, theories of moral responsibility feature only the minimally sufficient conditions for moral responsibility. While these theories are well-suited to account for the threshold of responsibility, it’s less clear how they can address questions about the degree to which agents are responsible. One feature that intuitively affects the degree to which agents are morally responsible is how difficult performing a given action is for them. Recently, philosophers have begun to develop accounts of scalar moral responsibility that make use of this notion of difficulty [Coates and Swenson 2013; Nelkin 2016]. In this paper, I argue that these accounts, although innovative, are incomplete. The degree to which agents are morally responsible is determined not only by the difficulties that agents face but also by the quality of the reasons for which they act.     

Physiological Age and School Entrance

We examined the ability of second and fifth graders to detect subtle order violations in simple, single-event stories, patterned after the “story-grammar” of Stein and Glenn (1979). Children read and listened to several stories in which one element (either the internal response or the consequence) was disordered and were prompted with a series of increasingly suggestive hints to spot and explain the order violation. Although the older students did significantly better than the younger ones in spotting the order violations and explaining the problem, the second graders performed these tasks quite well in an absolute sense. The younger children also performed well when asked to spontaneously order a mixed up set of propositions.     

How has Philosophical Applied Ethics Progressed in the Past Fifty Years?

Applied ethics is relatively new on the philosophical scene, having grown out of the various civil rights movements of the 1950s and 1960s, as well as the student demand that college courses be relevant. Even today, there are those who think that there are no philosophically interesting practical ethical questions, and that applied ethics is not a branch of philosophy at all. This article rejects that view, both because some of the most interesting and respectable philosophers in the world have worked in applied ethics and because applied ethics has been the source of many difficult conceptual questions in theoretical ethics and even metaphysics. These include the grounds for moral status, human identity, how to conceive rights in general and the right to life in particular, the question whether existence itself can be a harm (the nonidentity problem), and the nature of moral principles.     

Ethicists’ and Nonethicists’ Responsiveness to Student E‐mails: Relationships Among Expressed Normative Attitude,Self‐Described Behavior,and Empirically Observed Behavior

Do professional ethicists behave any morally better than other professors do? Do they show any greater consistency between their normative attitudes and their behavior? In response to a survey question, a large majority of professors (83 percent of ethicists, 83 percent of nonethicist philosophers, and 85 percent of nonphilosophers) expressed the view that “not consistently responding to student e‐mails” is morally bad. A similarly large majority of professors claimed to respond to at least 95 percent of student e‐mails. These professors, and others, were sent three e‐mails designed to look like queries from students. Ethicists’ e‐mail response rates were not significantly different from the other two groups’. Expressed normative view correlated with self‐estimated rate of e‐mail responsiveness, especially among the ethicists. Empirically measured e‐mail responsiveness, however, was at best weakly correlated with self‐estimated e‐mail responsiveness; and professors’ expressed normative attitude was not significantly correlated with empirically measured e‐mail responsiveness for any of the three groups.     

Naturalizing Moral Justification: Rethinking the Method of Moral Epistemology

The companion piece to this article, “Situating Moral Justification,” challenges the idea that moral epistemology's mission is to establish a single, all‐purpose reasoning strategy for moral justification because no reasoning practice can be expected to deliver authoritative moral conclusions in all social contexts. The present article argues that rethinking the mission of moral epistemology requires rethinking its method as well. Philosophers cannot learn which reasoning practices are suitable to use in particular contexts exclusively by exploring logical relations among concepts. Instead, in order to understand which reasoning practices are capable of justifying moral claims in different types of contexts, we need to study empirically the relationships between reasoning practices and the contexts in which they are used. The article proposes that philosophers investigate case studies of real‐world moral disputes in which people lack shared cultural assumptions and/or are unequal in social power. It motivates and explains the proposed case study method and illustrates the philosophical value of this method through a case study.     

Moral Orientation as a Component of Ethical Decision Making

Morals are foundational to professional and ethical counseling practice. Moral orientation may play an integral role in ethical decision making. The authors review the literature regarding moral orientation and discuss the connection to ethical decision making. Implications for counselor preparation and practice are addressed.     

BUDDHISM,FREE WILL,AND PUNISHMENT: TAKING BUDDHIST ETHICS SERIOUSLY

In recent decades, there has been growing interest among philosophers in what the various Buddhist traditions have said, can say, and should say, in response to the traditional problem of free will. This article investigates the relationship between Buddhist philosophy and the historical problem of free will. It begins by critically examining Rick Repetti's Buddhism, Meditation, and Free Will (2019), in which he argues for a conception of “agentless agency” and defends a view he calls “Buddhist soft compatibilism.” It then turns to a more wide-ranging discussion of Buddhism and free will—one that foregrounds Buddhist ethics and takes seriously what the various Buddhist traditions have said about desert, punishment, and the reactive attitudes of resentment, indignation, and moral anger. The article aims to show that, not only is Buddhism best conceived as endorsing a kind of free will skepticism, Buddhist ethics can provide a helpful guide to living without basic desert moral responsibility and free will.     

The Self‐Ambivalence Measure: A psychometric investigation

The purpose of this study was to assess the psychometric properties of the Self‐Ambivalence Measure and its subscales developed by Bhar and Kyrios. The factor structure, reliability, and validity of the measure were examined utilising a non‐clinical sample of 415 participants who completed self‐report measures of aspects of the self. Results indicated that the Self‐Ambivalence Measure exhibited levels of internal consistency and convergent and divergent validity, warranting its use in further research. In contrast to earlier research finding a two‐factor structure, a three‐factor structure was found to best fit the current sample and the factors were labelled Self‐Worth Ambivalence, Moral Ambivalence, and Public Self‐consciousness. This solution separated internal aspects of self‐ambivalence from social aspects which were conceptualised as an aspect of lovability. A discussion of implications is provided.