以德治国与中国社会资本的重建

当今中国社会道德水准和社会资本的下降,已经是不可回避的现实。在改革开放和发展市场经济的过程中,寻找一种方式能够使政府、社会和公民的力量相互协调并都能得到充分发挥,从而消弭潜在的社会危机爆发的可能性和克服社会资本进一步下降的可能性,是实现社会“善治”的根本要求。社会资本建立和积累的基础在于具有富足的社会道德资源,“以德治国”为当代中国重新整合国家、社会和个人的道德资源提供了前提。它有利于中国社会的道德资源富足与协调,从而使政府、社会与个体能够协调有效地实现各自的行动目标。     

企业核心竞争力与企业伦理品质

企业真正的核心竞争力来自企业伦理品质所产生的道德实力。企业的道德实力是企业遵循与市场经济理性相适应的道德准则,它一贯尊重和尽力满足利益相关人利益,并与利益相关人和谐交往共同发展而产生的道德凝聚力和影响力。与企业经营实力一样,企业道德实力是可以描述和量度的客观状态。具体可以从顾客忠诚度、员工忠诚度、股东忠诚度、融资资信度、同行联系度、供销稳定度、社区融洽度和社会美誉度等八个方面进行考量。     

Nie Wieder: Group‐Based Emotions for In‐Group Wrongdoing Affect Attitudes toward Unrelated Minorities

This article focuses on the effects of group‐based emotions for in‐group wrongdoing on attitudes towards seemingly unrelated groups. Two forms of shame are distinguished from one another and from guilt and linked to positive and negative attitudes towards an unrelated minority. In Study 1 (N = 203), Germans' feelings of moral shame—arising from the belief that the in‐group's Nazi past violates an important moral value—are associated with increased support for Turks living in Germany. Image shame—arising from a threatened social image—is associated with increased social distance. In Study 2 (N = 301), Britons' emotions regarding atrocities committed by in‐group members during the war in Iraq have similar links with attitudes towards Pakistani immigrants. We extend the findings of Study 1 by demonstrating that the effects are mediated by a sense of moral obligation and observed more strongly when the unrelated group is perceived as similar to the harmed group. Guilt was unrelated to any outcome variable across both studies. Theoretical and practical implications about the nature of group‐based emotions and their potential for affecting wider intergroup relations are discussed.     

Trustworthiness in explanation: The obligation to explain well

‘Scientific integrity’ certainly requires that data and references be beyond reproach. However, issues within the theory of scientific explanation suggest that there may be more to it than just this. While it is true that some contemporary, pragmatic analyses of explanation suffer from the ‘problem of relevance’ (an inability to ensure that explanations which are paradigmatic technically are relevant to the question being posed), it does not seem to be true that the addition of formal, metaphysical constraints is necessary to solve this problem. I argue that, when viewed as requests for help with an epistemic problem, explanation-seeking questions reveal the existence of a set of moral criteria centered in trust which, when satisfied, prevent trivial or irrelevant explanations from being offered, thereby broadening the concept of ‘scientific integrity’.     

Defending Cognitive Liberty in an Age of Moral Engineering

In 2009, Mark Walker first proposed the Genetic Virtue Project, advancing that science should explore using genetic engineering to eliminate moral evils just as it attempts to eliminate natural ones like disease. This seemed like an issue for the far future given the unique challenges. Walker focused on the wrong aspect of personhood, however, as moral engineering of the brain appears to be a more likely possibility. As early aspects of moral engineering the brain are in development, especially through the manipulation of the neural correlates of religious and political beliefs, emotions, and behaviors, I consider several issues surrounding this project so as to protect individual rights and prevent future harms. I advance an internal criterion for the field called Acceptability Across Ideologies to serve as a guide to protect against coercive and harmful technologies and analyze how current laws protecting cognitive liberty are lacking and in need of revision.     

EVOLUTION OF RELIGIOUS CAPACITY IN THE GENUS HOMO: COGNITIVE TIME SEQUENCE

Intrigued by the possible paths that the evolution of religious capacity may have taken, the authors identify a series of six major building blocks that form a foundation for religious capacity in genus Homo. Homo neanderthalensis and Homo sapiens idaltu are examined for early signs of religious capacity. Then, after an exploration of human plasticity and why it is so important, the analysis leads to a final building block that characterizes only Homo sapiens sapiens, beginning 200,000–400,000 years ago, when all the other cognitive and neurological underpinnings gradually came together. Because the timing of cognitive evolution has become an issue, the authors identify the time periods for these building blocks based on findings from modern cognitive science, neuroscience, genomic science, the new cognitive archaeology, and traditional stones‐and‐bones archaeology. The result is a logical, and even a likely story 55–65 million years long, which leads to the evolution of religious capacity in modern human beings.     

Ethical Predispositions to Violate or Obey Traffic Rules and the Mediating Role of Driving Styles

Traffic law violations are the most important determinants of traffic accidents. This study examined the influence of drivers' ethical perspective on their traffic violations and the mediating role of driving styles in these relationships. A sample of 313 drivers participated in the study. Contrary to expectations, high ethical relativism was found to be associated with fewer aggressive traffic violations. This suggests that the informal normative system that parallels the official traffic regulations is the more salient reference against which drivers usually assess the adequacy of their behaviors, highly relativistic drivers being more willing to also take into consideration the official traffic code in these appraisals. We also found significant interactions between idealism and relativism on both ordinary and aggressive violations. Idealism emerged as a predictor of these violations only in drivers low in relativism. In this group, one's concern about the harm that he/she might cause to other traffic participants induces higher traffic law abidingness. These influences of idealism were mediated by certain driving styles. Drivers' general ethical perspective fosters a specific pattern of driving styles and, consequently, the tendency to commit or to refrain from traffic violations.     

Non-Naturalist Moral Realism and the Limits of Rational Reflection

This essay develops the epistemic challenge to non-naturalist moral realism. While evolutionary considerations do not support the strongest claims made by ‘debunkers’, they do provide the basis for an inductive argument that our moral dispositions and starting beliefs are at best partially reliable. So, we need some method for separating truth from falsity. Many non-naturalists think that rational reflection can play this role. But rational reflection cannot be expected to bring us to truth even from reasonably accurate starting points. Reflection selects views that are coherent and conflict-free, yet there is no reason to think that the non-natural moral truth must be like this. Inasmuch as we seek coherent, conflict-free, ethical viewpoints, that suggests that our goal is not non-natural truth at all.