初中生网络欺负的发展趋势：道德推脱、观点采择与共情关注的作用

以496名初中生为研究对象, 对其网络欺负行为进行为期2年的4次追踪测试, 同时测试其道德推脱、观点采择与共情关注。采用潜变量增长模型探讨初中生网络欺负行为的发展轨迹, 并分析道德推脱、观点采择与共情关注的影响。结果发现, (1)在2年时间内, 初中生网络欺负行为呈显著下降趋势, 起始水平与下降速度有显著负相关; (2)道德推脱能显著正向预测初中生网络欺负行为的起始水平, 负向预测其下降趋势; (3)观点采择能够显著负向预测初中生网络欺负行为的起始水平, 正向预测其下降趋势。上述结果肯定了道德推脱与观点采择对初中生网络欺负发展轨迹的预测作用, 以网络情境支持了道德推脱理论, 部分支持了社会信息处理模型。     

初中学生道德推理、移情反应、亲社会行为及其相互关系的比较研究

抽取上海市初中三个年级217名学生为被试,通过对道德判断推理能力、移情反应、亲社会行为的测量和问卷调查,考察初中阶段学生在这三个方面的发展规律,以及三者之间的相互关系。结果显示：道德判断推理与亲社会行为、与移情能力之问没有显著相关;移情能力中的个别指标与亲社会行为之间相关显著;在移情反应、亲社会行为水平、以及助人动机、帮助方式等方面均存在显著的性别差异;故事呈现方式不同会对故事与自己相关程度产生影响。     

公平--精神道德观念还是互利合作机制?

公平概念一直都是儿童道德发展研究的一个重要课题。传统上认为公平作为一个道德概念,属于人类精神层面,指导人类行为,是高于社会物质生活的。然而进一步研究关注,公平,作为人类生活中的一个重要而普遍的现象,是如何产生的,又为何能保持在人类社会生活中的。结果表明,公平在是人们在互利的目的下表现出来的一种策略,受到社会信息透明度的影响。一个社会中信息越透明,个体的名声越容易形成,则公平越成为一种最优的策略。     

陈独秀伦理革命评析

陈独秀在“五四”新文化运动中倡导的伦理革命在其思想理论体系中占有独特地位 ,对其伦理革命的思想进行评析 ,能够为我们今天的道德建设提供许多有益的启示。     

传统思想中的“礼”和“礼仪”——兼论“礼”和“礼仪”的道德功能

我国对“礼”和“礼仪”的认识经历了曲折的过程。传统道德中许多关于“礼”和“礼仪”的论述 ,包含着合理的思想内核。我们要很好地利用这笔财富 ,充分发挥它的道德功能 ,广泛地开展礼仪教育 ,加强公民道德建设和社会主义精神文明建设。     

自我同一性危机与道德选择多元化

自我是一个复杂的概念 ,自我同一性则是依赖于我们经历过的所有不同的自己的综合 ,是对自身发展的一种强烈的一致性和连续性的主观感觉。自我同一性危机是指自我处于自身的矛盾与冲突中 ,反映了自我在过去和现在、彼地和此地的不连续。在现代社会 ,随着个体道德选择的可能性与主动性的增强 ,自我的完善与否对道德选择相应产生了积极与消极的作用。     

关于公共目的实现的伦理思考

公共目的是对公共生活的总体把握 ,是用于引导公共生活的。实现公共目的是公共管理的根本任务 ,是公共管理者的道德责任。道德上合理的公共目的的实现要求使用正当的公共管理手段 ,它要求公共管理者用道德来约束其对公共管理手段的选择。这种道德约束有两种情形 :其一是在多样化的手段中选择正当性的公共管理手段 ,其二是使公共管理手段的使用正当化。     

Parental Morality and Family Processes as Predictors of Adolescent Morality

This study investigated the extent to which parents' moral thought and family processes are involved in the socialization of adolescent moral thought. Olson et al's (1992) Circumplex Model and White's (2000) Family Socialization Model provided the conceptual framework for predicting that families high in cohesion, adaptability and communication would facilitate the transmission of moral values between parents and adolescents more effectively than families low in these family processes. Results involving 218 adolescent-parent dyads revealed that perceived family cohesion and communication moderated the father-adolescent moral thought relationship; that several facets of both parents' morality significantly predicted adolescents' morality; and that all three family processes significantly predicted certain aspects of adolescent morality. Therefore the extent to which parents' socialize adolescent moral values will vary according to each parent's moral view, the strength of family processes and the content of moral thought being transmitted.     

Particularism and Default Reasons

This paper addresses a recent suggestion that moral particularists can extend their view to countenance default reasons (at a first stab, reasons that are pro tanto unless undermined) by relying on certain background expectations of normality. I first argue that normality must be understood non-extensionally. Thus if default reasons rest on normality claims, those claims won't bestow upon default reasons any definite degree of extensional generality. Their generality depends rather on the contingent distributional aspects of the world, which no theory of reasons should purport to settle. Appeals to default reasons cannot therefore uniquely support particularism. But this argument also implies that if moral generalism entailed that moral reasons by necessity have invariant valence (in the natural extensional sense), it would be a non-starter. Since generalism is not a non-starter, my argument forces us to rethink the parameters of the generalism-particularism debate. Here I propose to clarify the debate by focusing on its modal rather than extensional aspects. In closing, I outline the sort of generalism that I think is motivated by my discussion, and then articulate some worries this view raises about the theoretical usefulness of the label ‘default reason’.     

In Defence of the Open Question Argument

The purpose of this paper is to defend G. E. Moore's open question argument, understood as an argument directed against analytic reductionism, the view that moral properties are analytically reducible to non-moral properties. In the first section I revise Moore's argument in order to make it as plausible and resistant against objections as possible. In the following two sections I develop the argument further and defend it against the most prominent objections raised against it. The conclusion of my line of reasoning is that the open question argument offers the best explanation of our responses to the questions put in the argument, namely that analytic reductionism is mistaken. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.