幼儿说谎认知的年龄特征及其与心理理论水平的关系

研究探讨了3～4岁幼儿说谎认知的年龄特征,并在此基础上考察了说谎的概念理解水平与道德评价之问的关系,及说谎认知与心理理论水平的关系。结果表明：3岁和4岁幼儿在说谎和说真话概念的判断上年龄差异显著,在对说谎的道德评价上,年龄差异不显著;幼儿心理理论与说谎概念的相关显著,4岁组的心理理论与道德评价的相关显著。     

初中学生道德推理、移情反应、亲社会行为及其相互关系的比较研究

抽取上海市初中三个年级217名学生为被试,通过对道德判断推理能力、移情反应、亲社会行为的测量和问卷调查,考察初中阶段学生在这三个方面的发展规律,以及三者之间的相互关系。结果显示：道德判断推理与亲社会行为、与移情能力之问没有显著相关;移情能力中的个别指标与亲社会行为之间相关显著;在移情反应、亲社会行为水平、以及助人动机、帮助方式等方面均存在显著的性别差异;故事呈现方式不同会对故事与自己相关程度产生影响。     

Aristotle on Pleasure and the Worst Form of Akrasia

The focus of this paper is Aristotle's solution to the problem inherited from Socrates: How could a man fail to restrain himself when he believes that what he desires is wrong? In NE 7 Aristotle attempts to reconcile the Socratic denial of akrasia with the commonly held opinion that people act in ways they know to be bad, even when it is in their power to act otherwise. This project turns out to be largely successful, for what Aristotle shows us is that if we distinguish between two ways of having knowledge (‘potentially’ and ‘actually’), the Socratic thesis can effectively account for a wide range of cases (collectively referred to here as ‘drunk-akrasia’) in which an agent acts contrary to his general knowledge of the Good, yet can still be said to ‘know’ in the qualified sense that his actions are wrong. However, Book 7 also shows that the Socratic account of akrasia cannot take us any farther than drunk-akrasia, for unlike drunk-akrasia, genuine akrasia cannot be reduced to a failure of knowledge. This agent knows in the unqualified sense that his actions are wrong. The starting-point of my argument is that Aristotle's explanation of genuine akrasia requires a different solution than the one found in NE 7 which relies on the distinction between qualified and unqualified ‘knowing’: genuinely akratic behaviour is due to the absence of an internal conflict that a desire for the ‘proper’ pleasures of temperance would create if he could experience them.     

Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings

Can collectives feel guilt with respect to what they have done? It hasbeen claimed that they cannot. Yet in everyday discourse collectives areoften held to feel guilt, criticized because they do not, and so on.Among other things, this paper considers what such so-called collectiveguilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimesappropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed beguilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collectiveto intend to do something and to act in light of that intention.According to this account, and in senses that are explained, there is acollective that intends to do something if and only if the members of agiven population are jointly committed to intend as a body to do thatthing. A related account of collective belief is also presented. It isthen argued that, depending on the circumstances, a group's action canbe free as opposed to coerced, and that the idea that a collective assuch can be guilty of performing a wrongful act makes sense. The ideathat a group might feel guilt may be rejected because it is assumed thatto feel guilt is to experience a ``pang'' or ``twinge'' of guilt –nothing more and nothing less. Presumably, though, there must becognitions and perhaps behavior involved. In addition, the primacy, eventhe necessity, of ``feeling-sensations'' to feeling guilt in theindividual case has been questioned. Without the presumption that it isalready clear what feeling guilt amounts to, three proposals as to thenature of collective guilt feelings are considered. A ``feeling ofpersonal guilt'' is defined as a feeling of guilt over one's own action.It is argued that it is implausible to construe collective guiltfeelings in terms of members' feelings of personal guilt. ``Membershipguilt feelings'' involve a group member's feeling of guilt over what hisor her group has done. It is argued that such feelings are intelligibleif the member is party to the joint commitment that lies at the base ofthe relevant collective intention and action. However, an account ofcollective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting.Finally, a ``plural subject'' account of collective guilt feelings isarticulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt asa body. The parties to a joint commitment of the kind in question may asa result find themselves experiencing ``pangs'' of the kind associatedwith personal and membership guilt feelings. Since these pangs, byhypothesis, arise as a result of the joint commitment to feel guilt as abody, they might be thought of as providing a kind of phenomenology forcollective guilt. Be that as it may, it is argued the plural subjectaccount has much to be said for it.     

道德敏感性：概念理解与辨析

道德敏感性是新科尔伯格取向的重要概念,是道德行为发生之前逻辑上的心理初始成分,是对情境的道德领悟与解释,典型地反映了道德认知和道德情感的相互作用。对这个概念的性质和内涵理解存在能力观和经验观等不同观点;该概念也常操作化地为道德觉察、道德意识、后果意识、确认道德问题等;它与伦理敏感性、道德直觉等相近概念有着不同程度的区别和联系。     

Harcèlement moral au travail et pro/antisocialité du salarié victime : quels effets sur les jugements,les émotions et les intentions d’aide des témoins ?

Bullying at work is characterized by negative, repetitive and frequent acts towards a person, bearing reached with her physical and psychic health (Einarsen, Hoel, Zapf, & Cooper, 2003; Leymann, 1996). On the basis of research of Weiner (1996) and Rudolph, Roesch, Greitemeyer, and Weiner (2004), we postulated that the bullying acts, the behaviors of the bullied employee and it revictimisation would influence the judgments and the emotions of the witnesses. Research was carried out within the framework of the paradigm of the judges of 72 participants. The variance analyses show that the gravity of the acts decreases the feeling of equity, increases the attribution of responsibility towards the harcelor, decreases the attribution of responsibility to the victim and increases the help. The bullying acts always interact with the victim’s pro or antisocial behaviors. The emotions of the judges are mainly positive with regard to the victim and negative towards the harcelor except when bullied employee has emitted an antisocial behavior. The gravity of the bullying acts increases on the one hand sympathy, fear and sadness towards the victims, on the other hand, anger and dislike towards the harcelor.     

Embodying Confident Agency: Luther's “Three Estates” as a Resource for Virtue Theory

Martin Luther's social writings (volumes 44–47 in the American edition) provide a robust account of human agency that might help Lutheran social ethics address contemporary crises of confidence. When Luther addresses concrete moral issues, he enriches his two‐kingdoms frame with a focus on particular social roles such as ruler, merchant, soldier, parent, etc. This (often tacit) “three‐estates” approach creates room for a distinctly Lutheran contribution to contemporary virtue theory by focusing on the functions served by particular social roles more than on individual self‐chosen pathways of moral improvement. It also supports a prophetic affirmation of vocation against the contemporary breakdown of expectations and confidence in social roles.     

肝移植的伦理学问题

肝脏移植和其它器官移植一起实现了人类长期以来渴望生命再生的梦想,并成为终末期肝病的有效治疗方法。器官移植也面对许多伦理道德方面的难题。供体,特别是活体器官的摘取,受体的选择等,都受到社会道德观的制约。从伦理道德角度来分析如何制定相关的法律法规,成为当前社会关注的热点。从受体的利益、人体科研的道德规范以及相关制度的伦理学要求等方面,较为详细的阐述肝移植伦理学的基本原则。     

法律运行道德追问的两重向度

将法律运行的道德追问规定为两重向度 ,既有其学理的依据 ,又是历史给予的启示和破解现实难题的需要。对立法的道德追问不仅要考察法之形式正义和实质正义 ,而且要审视法与社会主导道德以及与广大民众心理和情感相契合的状况。对司法的道德追问则不仅要关注司法是否公正以及司法工作者是否具有良好的职业道德素质 ,而且应特别关注当下我国社会全面转型时期司法之“应然”。     

善因营销的捐赠水平与消费者态度:一个有中介的调节效应模型检验

通过两个实验,探讨了善因营销的捐赠水平对消费者态度的影响,尤其是考察了道德提升感的中介作用以及产品-公益事业拟合度的调节作用。研究发现,善因营销的捐赠水平对消费者态度有显著的正向影响,且道德提升感在捐赠水平与消费者态度之间起中介作用。与此同时,产品-公益事业拟合度显著地调节了捐赠水平与道德提升感的关系,且该调节关系通过道德提升感的中介作用来进一步影响消费者态度。