全文获取类型
收费全文 | 1361篇 |
免费 | 149篇 |
国内免费 | 118篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 3篇 |
2023年 | 30篇 |
2022年 | 27篇 |
2021年 | 35篇 |
2020年 | 75篇 |
2019年 | 105篇 |
2018年 | 96篇 |
2017年 | 96篇 |
2016年 | 90篇 |
2015年 | 54篇 |
2014年 | 66篇 |
2013年 | 189篇 |
2012年 | 43篇 |
2011年 | 31篇 |
2010年 | 25篇 |
2009年 | 42篇 |
2008年 | 51篇 |
2007年 | 72篇 |
2006年 | 83篇 |
2005年 | 71篇 |
2004年 | 67篇 |
2003年 | 67篇 |
2002年 | 41篇 |
2001年 | 24篇 |
2000年 | 30篇 |
1999年 | 32篇 |
1998年 | 19篇 |
1997年 | 12篇 |
1996年 | 10篇 |
1995年 | 13篇 |
1994年 | 1篇 |
1993年 | 9篇 |
1992年 | 3篇 |
1991年 | 1篇 |
1990年 | 4篇 |
1989年 | 1篇 |
1988年 | 8篇 |
1987年 | 1篇 |
1980年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有1628条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
211.
Paul Gaffney 《Sport, Ethics and Philosophy》2017,11(1):3-11
The domain of sport provides opportunity for development and growth, which is often incremental but can be marked by significant breakthroughs. Using Aristotle’s virtue ethic as a model, this paper explores the challenge of overcoming new obstacles, sometimes reversing bad habits, in the athletic domain. Breakthrough victories in sport are achievements that both reward persistent effort and open new horizons in the pursuit of excellence. They are significant because they seem to hold out a promise for future performance, now that some barrier has been passed. Breakthrough victories are often among the most important and rewarding moments in an athletic career. 相似文献
212.
Stewart W. Herman 《Dialog》2017,56(4):428-440
Martin Luther's social writings (volumes 44–47 in the American edition) provide a robust account of human agency that might help Lutheran social ethics address contemporary crises of confidence. When Luther addresses concrete moral issues, he enriches his two‐kingdoms frame with a focus on particular social roles such as ruler, merchant, soldier, parent, etc. This (often tacit) “three‐estates” approach creates room for a distinctly Lutheran contribution to contemporary virtue theory by focusing on the functions served by particular social roles more than on individual self‐chosen pathways of moral improvement. It also supports a prophetic affirmation of vocation against the contemporary breakdown of expectations and confidence in social roles. 相似文献
213.
Sandra Buratti Carl Martin Allwood Bodil Karlsson 《The Journal of general psychology》2017,144(1):35-58
In this study, investigating answerability judgments, 123 participants judged whether each of 46 general knowledge questions could currently be answered by themselves, by someone else, or by no one. There were 26 consensus questions (high expected consensus about their answerability) and 20 non-consensus questions. Before each question, half of the participants rated the extent of their knowledge related to the question. Results showed that answering consensus questions compared with non-consensus led to a lower proportion of “No one knows” answers. Moreover, in the knowledge rating condition compared with the control condition, participants choose “No one knows” proportionally less. Participants’ ratings of belief in certainty of knowledge were associated with more “Someone else knows” for the non-consensus questions. Moreover, tendency to maximization led to a higher proportion of “Someone else knows” options for the non-consensus questions. Finally, high need for cognition was associated with fewer choices of “Someone else knows.” 相似文献
214.
D. Goldstick 《Metaphilosophy》2017,48(1-2):25-29
Did G. E. Moore prove the existence of things outside us? Philosophers have objected to his proof, but not for good reasons. Since when, for instance, has absolute certainty been the mark of philosophy? But Moore's proof was superfluous, as its conclusion had already been proved previously. (If immanent critique were the only acceptable way to refute a philosophy rationally, “Nothing exists” would be immune from refutation—which is preposterous.) 相似文献
215.
Niklas Forsberg 《Metaphilosophy》2017,48(1-2):30-46
What is it we do when we philosophize about a word? How are we to act as we ask the philosophical question par excellence, “What is … ?” These questions are addressed here with particular focus on Troy Jollimore's Love's Vision and contemporary theories of love. Jollimore's rationalist account of love, based on a specific understanding of “reasons for love,” illustrates a particular philosophical mistake: When we think about a word, we are prone to believe that even though “the sense of the word” that we investigate may be up for grabs, the other words we use when we do these investigations are not. Jollimore's exploration of love is guided by specific conceptions of “reasons” and “rationality” that remain unquestioned. The article argues that we may have to rethink a great number of words as we embark on the task of uncovering the sense of one word. 相似文献
216.
Moral Philosophers as Ethical Engineers: Limits of Moral Philosophy and a Pragmatist Alternative
下载免费PDF全文
![点击此处可从《Metaphilosophy》网站下载免费的PDF全文](/ch/ext_images/free.gif)
Frank Martela 《Metaphilosophy》2017,48(1-2):58-78
Ever since Kant, moral philosophers have been more or less animated by the mission of discovering inescapable law‐like rules that would provide a binding justification for morality. Recently, however, many have started to question (a) whether this is possible and (b) what, after all, this project could achieve. An alternative vision of the task of moral philosophy starts from the pragmatist idea that philosophizing begins and ends in human experiencing. It leads to a view where morality is seen as a “social technology” that aims to make living together possible, and strengthens people's capability to live a good life within a society. The role of moral philosophy is, accordingly, to develop our moral tools further. Moral philosophers become ethical engineers who use their expertise in ethical topics to criticize existing “moral technology” and construct new concepts, tools, and theories that better answer the current challenges for living a good life. 相似文献
217.
Jake Earl 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2017,47(2-3):178-199
AbstractThe Procreation Asymmetry holds that we have strong moral reasons not to create miserable people for their own sakes, but no moral reasons to create happy people for their own sakes. To defend this conjunction against an argument that it leads to inconsistency, I show how recognizing ‘creation’ as a temporally extended process allows us to revise the conjuncts in a way that preserves their intuitive force. This defense of the Procreation Asymmetry is preferable to others because it does not require us to take on controversial metaphysical or metaethical commitments – in other words, it has the theoretical virtue of portability. 相似文献
218.
通过两个实验,探讨了善因营销的捐赠水平对消费者态度的影响,尤其是考察了道德提升感的中介作用以及产品-公益事业拟合度的调节作用。研究发现,善因营销的捐赠水平对消费者态度有显著的正向影响,且道德提升感在捐赠水平与消费者态度之间起中介作用。与此同时,产品-公益事业拟合度显著地调节了捐赠水平与道德提升感的关系,且该调节关系通过道德提升感的中介作用来进一步影响消费者态度。 相似文献
219.
Gregory R. Peterson 《Zygon》2017,52(1):232-257
The purpose of this article is to (1) critique the primary arguments given by Paul Bloom and Jesse Prinz against empathy, and (2) to argue instead that empathy is best understood as a virtue that plays an important but complicated role in the moral life. That it is a virtue does not mean that it always functions well, and empathy sometimes contributes to behavior that is partial and unfair. In some of their writings, both Bloom and Prinz endorse the view that empathy is a fixed trait, but there is little reason to think this, and the studies that they cite do not support this view. Further, a number of recent studies suggest the opposite: our empathic reactions are malleable and subject to environmental effects and learning. Although our capacities for cognitive and emotional empathy are clearly not sufficient for being moral, I argue that they are functionally necessary traits that, like other virtues, must be cultivated correctly. 相似文献
220.
Voin Milevski 《Philosophical Psychology》2017,30(1-2):44-57
The unconditional version of motivational internalism says that if an agent sincerely judges that to φ in circumstances C is the best option available to her, then, as a matter of conceptual necessity, she will be motivated to φ in C. This position faces a powerful counterargument according to which it is possible for various cases of practical irrationality to completely defeat an agent’s moral motivation while, at the same time, leaving her appreciation of her moral reasons intact. In this paper, I will argue that weakness of will, as the paradigmatic case of practical irrationality, and all other cases of practical irrationality that feature in standard formulations of this argument do not represent genuine counterexamples to this version of motivational internalism. In this sense, the main aim of this paper is to show that proponents of this internalist position are well justified in their denial of the claim that there are people who are completely unmotivated by their judgments about what is the best option available to them. 相似文献