道德直觉背景下的道德决策：影响因素探究

以往对道德直觉的研究表明了情绪因素在道德决策中的重要作用, 研究者提出道德决策中存在有意识认知和无意识情绪两种加工过程, 二者之间不能够完全分离与孤立。针对这种认知—情绪过程解释、经典电车和人行桥困境中的道德判断差异等问题, 近年来大量研究通过对道德行为者和道德判断者自身原因、道德情境等主客观因素的深入考察, 试图从不同角度来揭示认知—情绪过程解释的合理性及道德决策差异背后的其他原因, 形成了道德直觉背景下相关领域诸多新的关注点。未来研究有必要针对道德决策研究的方法学、情境的扩展及认知—情感系统内部交互等问题作进一步探讨。     

道德直觉加工机制的理论构想

认知和情绪因素在道德判断中的作用机制是社会认知神经科学研究中最具争议的热点问题之一。本文认为, 人类拥有一种普遍性的道德直觉, 它是一种可能同时包含道德知识和情绪情感的自动化加工系统, 决定人们对一个道德违反情境作出快速的判断。据此, 本文就如何深入揭示道德直觉的加工机制提出了研究构想, 研究将首先采用经颅磁刺激技术, 探索当认知功能受抑制后人们的道德加工的特点, 初步探索道德直觉存在的可能性; 然后采用事件相关电位技术, 从外显和内隐两个维度上探讨道德直觉的时程加工机制; 最后采用侧向化运动准备电位指标, 进一步探索道德直觉和基本厌恶情绪的分离。     

WELCOMING (AUTO)BIOGRAPHY WITHOUT WAVING AWAY FICTION

Abstract: This article is a response to Ole Martin Skilleås's “Knowledge and Imagination in Fiction and Biography.” The first section of the article summarizes the line of the argument in four theses: (1) What is real is more influential than what is made up; (2) there is no metaphysical chasm between autobiographers and us; (3) (auto)biographies are not just empirical; and (4) the moral lesson of a fiction need not be accepted. In the second section each of these theses is criticized. This criticism leads to the conclusion that we should welcome (auto)biographical texts in our moral investigations, but not at the cost of fictional texts. This conclusion is coupled with a proposal to formulate criteria to distinguish texts that matter from those that do not.     

社会医疗保险道德风险博弈与防控措施研究

通过对社会医疗保险道德风险产生原因与特征的探讨,根据不完全信息重复博弈模型对社会医疗保险道德风险进行了系统分析,据此提出了社会医疗保险道德风险的防控措施,以期实现对道德风险的有效防控,提高社会医疗保险基金的安全。     

医疗腐败的市场根源：儒家思想的角度

中国的医疗腐败问题成为社会关注的热点,其中一个重要的原因就是市场化过程中,一些不恰当的政策导致了医疗服务腐败的现象。核心就是忽视了中国传统的儒家思想对维护和改善医患关系的积极作用。应当重视儒家道德思想,并在此基础上重塑医学伦理。     

Representing the ‘other’: a discursive analysis of prejudice and moral exclusion in talk about Romanies

This article investigates the particulars of prejudiced and moral exclusion discourse about ethnic minorities in a Romanian socio‐cultural context. It examines in detail the discourse of middle‐class Romanian professionals taking up different ideological positions on the issue of the fairness of extremist politics towards ethnic minorities. A comparison is made between participants ‘supporting’ extremist politics and those ‘opposing’ this kind of politics to see whether there are differences in the way participants from both categories talk about the Romanies. It is suggested that a very similar expression of moral exclusion discourse is to be found across both positions, a very similar use of various discursive and rhetorical strategies to blame the Romanies and ‘naturalize’ their characteristics, position them beyond the moral order, nationhood and difference. The analysis, inspired by a critical discursive approach will focus on the construction of ideological representations of Romanies. In examining prejudiced and moral exclusion discourse against Romanies, this article constitutes an attempt to understand the situated dynamics of prejudice and some of the ways in which particular ways of talking delegitimize and, sometimes, dehumanize the ‘other’. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Right Motive, Wrong Action: Direct Consequentialism and Evaluative Conflict

In this paper I look at attempts to develop forms of consequentialism which do not have a feature considered problematic in Direct Consequentialist theories (that is, those consequentialist theories that apply the criterion of rightness directly in the evaluation of any set of options). The problematic feature in question (which I refer to as ‘evaluative conflict’) is the possibility that, for example, a right motive might lead an agent to perform a wrong act. Theories aiming to avoid this phenomenon must argue that causal relationship entails motives and acts (for example) having the same moral status. I argue that attempts to ensure such ‘evaluative consistency’ are themselves deeply problematic, and that we must therefore accept evaluative conflict.     

Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility

The author argued elsewhere that a necessary condition that John Fischer and Mark Ravizza offer for moral responsibility is too strong and that the sufficient conditions they offer are too weak. This article is a critical examination of their reply. Topics discussed include blameworthiness, irresistible desires, moral responsibility, reactive attitudes, and reasons responsiveness.     

On the Fulfillment of Moral Obligation

This paper considers three general views about the nature of moral obligation and three particular answers (with which these views are typically associated) concerning the following question: if on Monday you lend me a book that I promise to return to you by Friday, what precisely is my obligation to you and what constitutes its fulfillment? The example is borrowed from W.D. Ross, who in The Right and the Good proposed what he called the Objective View of obligation, from which he inferred what is here called the First Answer to the question. In Foundations of Ethics Ross repudiated the Objective View in favor of the Subjective View, from which he inferred a Second Answer. In this paper each of the Objective and Subjective Views and the First and Second Answers are rejected in favor of the Prospective View and a Third Answer. The implications of the Prospective View for another question closely related to the original question are then investigated: what precisely is your right regarding my returning the book and what constitutes its satisfaction?