Propositions, Sets, and Worlds

If we agree with Michael Jubien that propositions do not exist, while accepting the existence of abstract sets in a realist mathematical ontology, then the combined effect of these ontological commitments has surprising implications for the metaphysics of modal logic, the ontology of logically possible worlds, and the controversy over modal realism versus actualism. Logically possible worlds as maximally consistent proposition sets exist if sets generally exist, but are equivalently expressed as maximally consistent conjunctions of the same propositions in corresponding sets. A conjunction of propositions, even if infinite in extent, is nevertheless itself a proposition. If sets and hence proposition sets exist but propositions do not exist, then whether or not modal realism is true depends on which of two apparently equivalent methods of identifying, representing, or characterizing logically possible worlds we choose to adopt. I consider a number of reactions to the problem, concluding that the best solution may be to reject the conventional model set theoretical concept of logically possible worlds as maximally consistent proposition sets, and distinguishing between the actual world alone as maximally consistent and interpreting all nonactual merely logically possible worlds as submaximal. I am grateful to the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS), Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), for supporting this among related research projects in philosophical logic and philosophy of mathematics during my Resident Research Fellowship in 2005-2006.     

从帛书《易传》析述孔子晚年的学术思想

本文以帛书《易传》比对《论语》中关涉《周易》的章节,从而确定这些章节是属于孔子晚年所说的话。此外,从帛书《易传》所见的哲理,-显示了晚年的孔子已经具有哲学家的形态。关心形而上的问题,并且对这些哲学问题有很深的体会。孔子说《易》,开辟了以义理研究《易经》的新途,亦展示了一个学术发展的转折点,即儒家的道德形而上学以孔子为开山。     

Human and Animal Subjects of Research: The Moral Significance of Respect versus Welfare

Human beings with diminished decision-making capacities are usually thought to require greater protections from the potential harms of research than fully autonomous persons. Animal subjects of research receive lesser protections than any human beings regardless of decision-making capacity. Paradoxically, however, it is precisely animals’ lack of some characteristic human capacities that is commonly invoked to justify using them for human purposes. In other words, for humans lesser capacities correspond to greater protections but for animals the opposite is true. Without explicit justification, it is not clear why or whether this should be the case. Ethics regulations guiding human subject research include principles such as respect for persons—and related duties—that are required as a matter of justice while regulations guiding animal subject research attend only to highly circumscribed considerations of welfare. Further, the regulations guiding research on animals discount any consideration of animal welfare relative to comparable human welfare. This paper explores two of the most promising justifications for these differences␣between the two sets of regulations. The first potential justification points to lesser moral status for animals on the basis of their lesser capacities. The second potential justification relies on a claim about the permissibility of moral partiality as␣found in common morality. While neither potential justification is sufficient to justify the regulatory difference as it stands, there is possible common ground between supporters of some regulatory difference and those rejecting the current difference.     

Learning as Leaving Home: Fear,Empathy, and Hospitality in the Theology and Religion Classroom

The article is a response to this journal's call for papers on metaphors for teaching, and also draws from a previous publication in which Kent Eilers developed a methodology for teaching global theologies. In this methodology, the ultimate goal was the development of “hermeneutical dispositions of empathy, hospitality, and receptivity toward culturally diverse voices” (2014, 165). This article considers the goals of Eilers' methodology, and others like his, and how it is that the metaphors of “leaving home” and “communal imagination” highlight the importance of the ambient and interpersonal features of a classroom and their effect on the attainment of the above goals. In so doing, it extends the conversation beyond content and methodology in teaching theology and religion into the realms of philosophy of education, as well as the fields of moral and values education. It is contended that the metaphors informed by these areas of study facilitate the attainment of such goals, and similar ones, by demonstrating that the cultivation of an ambience of care, trust, and compassion within the classroom constitutes an essential foundation for learning in which students “leave home” and cultivate “communal imagination.” The article finishes with practical suggestions for educators in theology and religion.     

道德概念净脏隐喻及其对道德判断的影响

通过3个实验考察道德概念净脏隐喻的心理现实性以及道德概念净脏背景和净脏自身隐喻对道德判断的影响及其差异。结果表明：（1）道德概念净脏隐喻具有心理现实性,即被试在洁净背景上判断道德词的反应时更快,在肮脏背景上判断不道德词的反应时更快。（2）当将道德两难故事呈现在肮脏背景上时,相比于呈现在洁净背景上,被试更容易将故事主人公的行为判断为不道德,表现出隐喻一致性效应。（3）相比于肮脏自身启动,被试在洁净自身启动下对道德两难故事主人公的行为判断为更加不道德,表现出隐喻补偿性效应。（4）相比于洁净背景启动,被试在洁净自身启动下对道德两难故事的判断更加严厉;相比于肮脏背景启动,被试在肮脏自身启动下对道德两难故事的判断更加宽松。研究结果证明,道德概念净脏隐喻具有心理现实性,净脏背景和净脏自身隐喻均影响个体的道德判断,并且二者对道德判断的影响不同。     

青少年的学校适应问题：家庭亲密度、家庭道德情绪和责任感的作用

随机选取某市三所普通中小学四、六、八、十年级的755名青少年为被试,使用自评和他评问卷探讨家庭亲密度、家庭道德情绪和责任感与青少年学校适应之间的关系。结果显示：（1）青少年家庭亲密度、责任感与学校适应问题存在性别差异,女生家庭亲密度和责任感高于男生,外化和学业问题少于男生;家庭亲密度、道德情绪和责任感随年龄增长呈下降趋势;（2）家庭亲密度正向预测道德情绪和责任感,直接和间接负向预测青少年学校适应问题。（3）责任感负向预测学校适应问题,并在家庭亲密度和学校适应问题之间起部分中介作用;结构方程模型各指标的拟合效果较好。家庭亲密度、责任感是学校适应问题的良好预测指标。     

Blended courage: Moral and psychological courage elements in mental health treatment seeking by active duty military personnel

We propose that seeking mental health care in an environment with heightened stigma may combine elements of both psychological and moral courage. Interviews of 32 active duty US Army personnel about their process of seeking current mental health care were analyzed for themes of voluntary action, personal risk, and noble or worthwhile goals (benefits). Risks and benefits were divided into internal risks and benefits, characteristic of psychological courage; and external risks and benefits, characteristic of moral courage. Concerns about external risks were themes in all narratives, while concerns about internal risks were themes in only about half of narratives. Both internal and external benefits of treatment were themes in approximately three-quarters of the narratives, whereas doubts about internal (but not external) benefits were also expressed at a similar rate. Thus, participants described an act of blended courage, with social risks of moral courage taken for wellness goals of psychological courage.     

Ethnography and Subjectivity in Comparative Religious Ethics

The ethnographic turn in religious studies has responded to important developments, such as the rejection of value neutrality and the need to better address the lived experience of individuals and communities. In this essay, I affirm the value of ethnography as a method in comparative religious ethics, but distinguish between two ways of framing ethnography in relation to ethics. The first way insists on the hard limits of translating values across cultures, and tends to marginalize or dismiss normative inquiry. The second way allows for the interpretation of practices of ethical justification in diverse cultural contexts. I argue that this second category of ethnography is more congenial to the work of comparative religious ethicists, since an integral part of ethical inquiry involves reflecting on, and making arguments about, social norms and practices.     

Moral Philosophers as Ethical Engineers: Limits of Moral Philosophy and a Pragmatist Alternative

Ever since Kant, moral philosophers have been more or less animated by the mission of discovering inescapable law‐like rules that would provide a binding justification for morality. Recently, however, many have started to question (a) whether this is possible and (b) what, after all, this project could achieve. An alternative vision of the task of moral philosophy starts from the pragmatist idea that philosophizing begins and ends in human experiencing. It leads to a view where morality is seen as a “social technology” that aims to make living together possible, and strengthens people's capability to live a good life within a society. The role of moral philosophy is, accordingly, to develop our moral tools further. Moral philosophers become ethical engineers who use their expertise in ethical topics to criticize existing “moral technology” and construct new concepts, tools, and theories that better answer the current challenges for living a good life.     

A portable defense of the Procreation Asymmetry

Abstract

The Procreation Asymmetry holds that we have strong moral reasons not to create miserable people for their own sakes, but no moral reasons to create happy people for their own sakes. To defend this conjunction against an argument that it leads to inconsistency, I show how recognizing ‘creation’ as a temporally extended process allows us to revise the conjuncts in a way that preserves their intuitive force. This defense of the Procreation Asymmetry is preferable to others because it does not require us to take on controversial metaphysical or metaethical commitments – in other words, it has the theoretical virtue of portability.