传统思想中的“礼”和“礼仪”——兼论“礼”和“礼仪”的道德功能

我国对“礼”和“礼仪”的认识经历了曲折的过程。传统道德中许多关于“礼”和“礼仪”的论述 ,包含着合理的思想内核。我们要很好地利用这笔财富 ,充分发挥它的道德功能 ,广泛地开展礼仪教育 ,加强公民道德建设和社会主义精神文明建设。     

自我同一性危机与道德选择多元化

自我是一个复杂的概念 ,自我同一性则是依赖于我们经历过的所有不同的自己的综合 ,是对自身发展的一种强烈的一致性和连续性的主观感觉。自我同一性危机是指自我处于自身的矛盾与冲突中 ,反映了自我在过去和现在、彼地和此地的不连续。在现代社会 ,随着个体道德选择的可能性与主动性的增强 ,自我的完善与否对道德选择相应产生了积极与消极的作用。     

关于公共目的实现的伦理思考

公共目的是对公共生活的总体把握 ,是用于引导公共生活的。实现公共目的是公共管理的根本任务 ,是公共管理者的道德责任。道德上合理的公共目的的实现要求使用正当的公共管理手段 ,它要求公共管理者用道德来约束其对公共管理手段的选择。这种道德约束有两种情形 :其一是在多样化的手段中选择正当性的公共管理手段 ,其二是使公共管理手段的使用正当化。     

Parental Morality and Family Processes as Predictors of Adolescent Morality

This study investigated the extent to which parents' moral thought and family processes are involved in the socialization of adolescent moral thought. Olson et al's (1992) Circumplex Model and White's (2000) Family Socialization Model provided the conceptual framework for predicting that families high in cohesion, adaptability and communication would facilitate the transmission of moral values between parents and adolescents more effectively than families low in these family processes. Results involving 218 adolescent-parent dyads revealed that perceived family cohesion and communication moderated the father-adolescent moral thought relationship; that several facets of both parents' morality significantly predicted adolescents' morality; and that all three family processes significantly predicted certain aspects of adolescent morality. Therefore the extent to which parents' socialize adolescent moral values will vary according to each parent's moral view, the strength of family processes and the content of moral thought being transmitted.     

Particularism and Default Reasons

This paper addresses a recent suggestion that moral particularists can extend their view to countenance default reasons (at a first stab, reasons that are pro tanto unless undermined) by relying on certain background expectations of normality. I first argue that normality must be understood non-extensionally. Thus if default reasons rest on normality claims, those claims won't bestow upon default reasons any definite degree of extensional generality. Their generality depends rather on the contingent distributional aspects of the world, which no theory of reasons should purport to settle. Appeals to default reasons cannot therefore uniquely support particularism. But this argument also implies that if moral generalism entailed that moral reasons by necessity have invariant valence (in the natural extensional sense), it would be a non-starter. Since generalism is not a non-starter, my argument forces us to rethink the parameters of the generalism-particularism debate. Here I propose to clarify the debate by focusing on its modal rather than extensional aspects. In closing, I outline the sort of generalism that I think is motivated by my discussion, and then articulate some worries this view raises about the theoretical usefulness of the label ‘default reason’.     

In Defence of the Open Question Argument

The purpose of this paper is to defend G. E. Moore's open question argument, understood as an argument directed against analytic reductionism, the view that moral properties are analytically reducible to non-moral properties. In the first section I revise Moore's argument in order to make it as plausible and resistant against objections as possible. In the following two sections I develop the argument further and defend it against the most prominent objections raised against it. The conclusion of my line of reasoning is that the open question argument offers the best explanation of our responses to the questions put in the argument, namely that analytic reductionism is mistaken. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Embodiment Thesis

In this essay I articulate and defend a thesis about the nature of morality called “the embodiment thesis”. The embodiment thesis states that moral values underdetermine the obligations and entitlements of individual persons, and that actual social institutions must embody morality by specifying these moral relations. I begin by presenting two thought experiments that elucidate and motivate the embodiment thesis. I then proceed by distinguishing the embodiment thesis from a Rawlsian doctrine about the nature of justice, from the doctrine of moral relativism, and from solutions to the coordination problem of rational choice theory.     

Towards a Sociological turn in Contextualist Moral Philosophy

Contextualist moral philosophers criticise hands-off liberal theories of justice for abstracting from the cultural context in which people make choices. Will Kymlicka and Joseph Carens, for example, demonstrate that these theories are disadvantageous to cultural minorities who want to pursue their own way of life. I argue that Pierre Bourdieu's critique of moral reason radicalises contextualist moral philosophy by giving it a sociological turn. In Bourdieu's view it is not enough to provide marginalised groups or subgroups with equal access to public institutions and specific cultural rights—in some cases this may in fact be detrimental. He contends that scientists, politicians and other intellectuals have a duty to take seriously the social presuppositions of free deliberate choice and public opinion and to support cultural minorities with instruments to liberate themselves from their often precarious situation.     

Persons as goods: response to Patrick Lee.

Developing a British perspective on the abortion debate, I take up some ideas from Patrick Lee's fine paper, and pursue, in particular, the idea of individual humans as goods in themselves. I argue that this notion helps us to avoid the familiar mistake of making moral value impersonal. It also shows us the way out of consequentalism. Since the most philosophically viable notion of the person, the individual human, is (as Lee argues) a notion of individual substance that is there from conception, the move has a third effect, which is to rule out abortion.     

中国古代心理学思想家关于品德修养的论述

品德修养是中国古代道德教育思想中强调的重点;品德修养的形成．是一个由知到行的过程。由此提出了内省等重要的品德修养的方法。