Second-order beliefs about intention and children's attributions of sociomoral judgment

Predicting how another person will evaluate the intention underlying an action involves consideration of second-order mental states. Children (ages 5-10 years) and college students (N=105) predicted an observer's belief about an actor's intention and evaluated the actor from both their own perspectives and the perspective of the observer. Younger children were more likely than older children and adults to attribute a belief to the observer that mismatched the actor's prior intention. Attributed beliefs about intention were more likely to match negative prior intentions than to match positive prior intentions and were also more likely to match prior intentions when the observer knew the actor's prior intention than when the observer did not know the actor's prior intention. The judgments attributed to the observer were based on the beliefs about intention attributed to the observer, showing use of second-order mental states to infer another's sociomoral judgments.     

意识状态改变的心理生理学理论与实证研究

从“意识状态”解释人类意识的本质是当前意识心理学研究的一个重要取向。研究意识状态改变(ASC)的物质生理基础具有十分突出的理论和临床实践意义。意识状态改变可以分为自发、物理和生理原因、心理方式和疾病引起这样四个方面,不同类型的意识状态改变可以从激活、意识域、自我觉察和感觉振荡四个维度进行综合归类和分析。不仅脑结构功能状态、脑动力的暂时变化、神经化学过程和新陈代谢过程等因素影响着人的意识经验改变状态,而且环境变化、心理活动和自我控制及技巧也可以暂时改变人的意识功能状态。     

I felt low and my purse feels light: depleting mood regulation attempts affect risk decision making

We propose that negative affect can induce people to engage in risky decisions. We test two alternative hypotheses as to how this effect may emerge. The mood repair hypothesis states that risky choices in risk decision making serve as a means to repair one's negative affect. The depletion hypothesis, in contrast, states that risky choices in risk decision making are the mere consequence of a state of depletion resulting from engagement in active mood regulation attempts. The results of a first laboratory study establish a link between risky choices in risk decision making and negative affect. Subsequent experiments provide evidence that depletion due to active mood regulation attempts, rather than mood repair, is the underlying process for this link. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Simulation à la Goldman: pretend and collapse

Theories of mind draw on processes that represent mental states and their computational connections; simulation, in addition, draws on processes that replicate (Heal 1986) a sequence of mental states. Moreover, mental simulation can be triggered by input from imagination instead of real perceptions. To avoid confusion between mental states concerning reality and those created in simulation, imagined contents must be quarantined. Goldman bypasses this problem by giving pretend states a special role to play in simulation (Goldman 2006). We argue that this path leads to the resurgence of the threat of collapse (Davies 1994), diluting the principled distinction between simulation and theory use. Exploration of a related method of real-mental states operating in a pretend mode leads to a factually untenable model. Our main goal here is to raise this problem as a challenge for Goldman’s reconfigured simulation theory. Only at the end we will briefly sketch a possible alternative way of quarantine that preserves the replicative element of simulation and avoids collapse. Figure 1 provides a guide to our argument. Fig. 1 Structure of argument

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Jerry Fodor on non-conceptual content

Proponents of non-conceptual content have recruited it for various philosophical jobs. Some epistemologists have suggested that it may play the role of “the given” that Sellars is supposed to have exorcised from philosophy. Some philosophers of mind (e.g., Dretske) have suggested that it plays an important role in the project of naturalizing semantics as a kind of halfway between merely information bearing and possessing conceptual content. Here I will focus on a recent proposal by Jerry Fodor. In a recent paper he characterizes non-conceptual content in a particular way and argues that it is plausible that it plays an explanatory role in accounting for certain auditory and visual phenomena. So he thinks that there is reason to believe that there is non-conceptual content. On the other hand, Fodor thinks that non-conceptual content has a limited role. It occurs only in the very early stages of perceptual processing prior to conscious awareness. My paper is examines Fodor’s characterization of non-conceptual content and his claims for its explanatory importance. I also discuss if Fodor has made a case for limiting non-conceptual content to non-conscious, sub-personal mental states. This paper has grown out of comments I made on Fodor’s paper “Revenge of the Given,” delivered at The Steven Humphrey Excellence in Philosophy Conference: “Content and Concepts: A Conference on the Philosophy of Mind” at the University of California, Santa Barbara, February 14, 2004. Thanks to Jerry Fodor for useful feedback, and to Barry Loewer for discussing with me the ideas that went into this paper.     

On boredom: A close encounter with encapsulated parts of the psyche

The psychoanalytical literature has numerous scattered references to the analyst's experience of boredom, especially amongst writers working with primitive mental states. In the present paper, the author tries to gather some of these references in an attempt to integrate the various facets of this widespread phenomenon, and reflect on some clinical issues and dilemmas it raises. It is suggested that the experience of boredom in analysis may be a reaction to an encounter with a hidden, encapsulated part of the psyche, a bidimensional area of experience in which mental activity has been suspended, and experience remains meaningless. This is a barren area of lack, an encounter with the autistic core of the psyche. However, boredom may also be an experiential expression of despair, a re-living of primitive object relations with an emotionally non-existent primary object. Through bringing the emptiness and desolation into analysis, the individual makes room for the empty, blunt, dead inner object which resides within him, and that needs to be integrated into the psyche. This inner object is a vital part of the patient's inner world, part of his history, and can neither be erased nor filled in order to eradicate the emptiness. This is illustrated by clinical material from patients along the spectrum of autism, autistic reaction following trauma and autistic barriers in neurotic patients.     

An empirical and computational investigation of perceiving and remembering event temporal relations

Events have beginnings, ends, and often overlap in time. A major question is how perceivers come to parse a stream of multimodal information into meaningful units and how different event boundaries may vary event processing. This work investigates the roles of these three types of event boundaries in constructing event temporal relations. Predictions were made based on how people would err according to the beginning state, end state, and overlap heuristic hypotheses. Participants viewed animated events that include all the logical possibilities of event temporal relations, and then made temporal relation judgments. The results showed that people make use of the overlap between events and take into account the ends and beginnings, but they weight ends more than beginnings. Neural network simulations showed a self-organized distinction when learning temporal relations between events with overlap versus those without.     

情绪状态对学生创造性的影响

研究了情绪状态对学生创造性影响的问题。被试为上海师范大学第三附属中学初二的学生 2 2 0名 ,其中男生 10 4人 ,女生 116人 ,年龄 13～ 14岁。由于国外已有研究的结果并不统一 ,研究的方法也缺乏生态化效度 ,因此本文试图通过教学现场实验 ,运用实际教学情境中的刺激来诱发学生愉快—难过情绪 ,以探索在教学情境中学生情绪状态对其创造性影响状况。研究结果表明 ,学生在愉快情绪状态下的创造性总体发挥水平显著高于难过情绪状态 (t=2 0 2 5 ,p =0 0 4 5 ) ,且主要体现在流畅性和变通性两个方面     

乾卦六龙的天文科学含义新解

本文认为乾卦六爻爻辞所说的“六龙”各种状态是苍龙星在一个回归年中所运动的不同天象。这种天象的观测年代,过去的研究都根据秦汉“二月二,龙抬头”等记载认为是春秋秦汉的实际观测。我们认为,其观测年代至少应早于西周晚期以前的乾卦爻辞形成年代;并根据秦汉易学中“建子起乾龙”“九二当太簇之月”的文献记载、甲骨文中“正月见龙”的记载以及仰韶文化时期的“(恙)和御龙”蚌塑图有力地证实了六龙天象的观测年代当与五帝虞夏的年代相当。同时认为,六龙天象的观测是先民们创制“六龙季历”的天文基础．“六龙季历”则是在古老的易占系统中流传的“易以三百六十析为期”的、刨制于原始社会晚期的一种太阳历。     

Emotion Regulation in Adulthood: Timing Is Everything

Emotions seem to come and go as they please. However, we actually hold considerable sway over our emotions: We influence which emotions we have and how we experience and express these emotions. The process model of emotion regulation described here suggests that how we regulate our emotions matters. Regulatory strategies that act early in the emotion-generative process should have quite different outcomes than strategies that act later. This review focuses on two widely used strategies for down-regulating emotion. The first, reappraisal, comes early in the emotion-generative process. It consists of changing how we think about a situation in order to decrease its emotional impact. The second, suppression, comes later in the emotion-generative process. It involves inhibiting the outward signs of emotion. Theory and research suggest that reappraisal is more effective than suppression. Reappraisal decreases the experience and behavioral expression of emotion, and has no impact on memory. By contrast, suppression decreases behavioral expression, but fails to decrease the experience of emotion, and actually impairs memory. Suppression also increases physiological responding in both the suppressors and their social partners.