Dynamic Simulation and Static Matching for Action Prediction: Evidence From Body Part Priming

Accurately predicting other people's actions may involve two processes: internal real‐time simulation (dynamic updating) and matching recently perceived action images (static matching). Using a priming of body parts, this study aimed to differentiate the two processes. Specifically, participants played a motion‐controlled video game with either their arms or legs. They then observed arm movements of a point‐light actor, which were briefly occluded from view, followed by a static test pose. Participants judged whether this test pose depicted a coherent continuation of the previously seen action (i.e., “action prediction task”). Evidence of dynamic updating was obtained after compatible effector priming (i.e., arms), whereas incompatible effector priming (i.e., legs) indicated static matching. Together, the results support action prediction as engaging two distinct processes, dynamic simulation and static matching, and indicate that their relative contributions depend on contextual factors like compatibility of body parts involved in performed and observed action.     

The effects of a positive health priming intervention on somatic complaints

Somatic complaints are common and form a major burden. Previous studies suggested that such complaints might be increased by ‘illness-related memory’, for example due to worries about health. In this ambulatory study we tested whether we could decrease somatic complaints through enhancing the activation of health-related memory by a ‘positive health’-priming intervention. Forty-three students were randomly assigned to the ‘positive health’-group or a control group. Using online measures, participants reported negative affect (NA) and somatic complaints for a period of six days, while each morning performing the priming task. The intervention caused a decrease in somatic complaints but only for participants with low trait NA or low somatosensory amplification. These findings seem to suggest that priming or other interventions directed at activating positive health memory might reduce health complaints, but only in certain subgroups.     

Book Review

Repetition priming is one of the most robust phenomena in cognitive psychology, but participants vary substantially on the amount of priming that they produce. The current experiments assessed the reliability of repetition priming within individuals. The results suggest that observed differences in the size of the repetition priming effect across participants are largely reliable and result primarily from systematic processes. We conclude that the unreliability of semantic priming observed by Stolz, Besner, and Carr (2005) is specific to uncoordinated processes in semantic memory, and that this unreliability does not generalize to other processes in visual word recognition. We consider the implications of these results for theories of automatic and controlled processes that contribute to priming. Finally, we emphasize the importance of reliability for researchers who use similar paradigms to study individual and group differences in cognition.     

The influence of visual short-term memory on size perception

We show that perceived size of visual stimuli can be altered by matches between the contents of visual short-term memory and stimuli in the scene. Observers were presented with a colour cue (to hold in working memory or to merely identify) and subsequently had to indicate which of the two different-coloured objects presented simultaneously on the screen appeared bigger (or smaller). One of the two objects for size judgements had the same colour as the cue (matching stimulus) and the other did not (mismatching stimulus). Perceived object size was decreased by the reappearance of the recently seen cue, as there were more size judgement errors on trials where the matching stimulus was physically bigger (relative to the mismatching stimulus) than on trials where the matching stimulus was physically smaller. The effect occurred regardless of whether the visual cue was actively maintained in working memory or was merely identified. The effect was unlikely generated by the allocation of attention, because shifting attention to a visual stimulus actually increased its perceived size. The findings suggest that visual short-term memory, whether explicit or implicit, can decrease the perceived size of subsequent visual stimuli.     

Visual experience is not necessary for efficient survey spatial cognition: Evidence from blindness

This study investigated whether the lack of visual experience affects the ability to create spatial inferential representations of the survey type. We compared the performance of persons with congenital blindness and that of blindfolded sighted persons on four survey representation-based tasks (Experiment 1). Results showed that persons with blindness performed better than blindfolded sighted controls. We repeated the same tests introducing a third group of persons with late blindness (Experiment 2). This last group performed better than blindfolded sighted participants, whereas differences between participants with late and congenital blindness were nonsignificant. The present findings are compatible with results of other studies, which found that when visual perception is lacking, skill in gathering environmental spatial information provided by nonvisual modalities may contribute to a proper spatial encoding. It is concluded that, although it cannot be asserted that total lack of visual experience incurs no cost, our findings are further evidence that visual experience is not a necessary condition for the development of spatial inferential complex representations.     

Independent effects of colour on object identification and memory

We examined the effects of colour on object identification and memory using a study–test priming procedure with a coloured-object decision task at test (i.e., deciding whether an object is correctly coloured). Objects were selected to have a single associated colour and were either correctly or incorrectly coloured. In addition, object shape and colour were either spatially integrated (i.e., colour fell on the object surface) or spatially separated (i.e., colour formed the background to the object). Transforming the colour of an object from study to test (e.g., from a yellow banana to a purple banana) reduced priming of response times, as compared to when the object was untransformed. This utilization of colour information in object memory was not contingent upon colour falling on the object surface or whether the resulting configuration was of a correctly or incorrectly coloured object. In addition, we observed independent effects of colour on response times, whereby coloured-object decisions were more efficient for correctly than for incorrectly coloured objects but only when colour fell on the object surface. These findings provide evidence for two distinct mechanisms of shape–colour binding in object processing.     

Masked priming effect reflects evidence accumulated by the prime

In the same–different match task, masked priming is observed with the same responses but not different responses. Norris and Kinoshita's (2008) Bayesian reader account of masked priming explains this pattern based on the same principle as that explaining the absence of priming for nonwords in the lexical decision task. The pattern of priming follows from the way the model makes optimal decisions in the two tasks; priming does not depend on first activating the prime and then the target. An alternative explanation is in terms of a bias towards responding “same” that exactly counters the facilitatory effect of lexical access. The present study tested these two views by varying both the degree to which the prime predicts the response and the visibility of the prime. Unmasked primes produced effects expected from the view that priming is influenced by the degree to which the prime predicts the response. In contrast, with masked primes, the size of priming for the same response was completely unaffected by predictability. These results rule out response bias as an explanation of the absence of masked priming for different responses and, in turn, indicate that masked priming is not a consequence of automatic lexical access of the prime.     

Negative priming of unattended part primes: Implications for models of holistic and analytic processing in object recognition

The “hybrid” model of object recognition (Hummel, 2001) proposes that unattended objects are processed holistically, while attended objects are processed both holistically and analytically. Supporting evidence for this claim was reported by Thoma, Hummel, and Davidoff (2004) who showed that, unlike whole object primes, unattended split object parts (presumed to require analytic processing) do not elicit repetition priming. Here we tested the generality of this finding by contrasting priming for whole and part prime stimuli as a function of prime informativeness and by modifying the design so that both unattended whole and part prime displays contained a single perceptual object. Unlike Thoma et al. (2004) the results showed negative (rather than an absence of) priming for unattended half object primes. These findings place new constraints on theoretical models of the role of attention in object recognition.     

Are transposition effects specific to letters?

Recent research has consistently shown that pseudowords created by transposing two letters are perceptually similar to their corresponding base words (e.g., jugde–judge). In the framework of the overlap model (Gomez, Ratcliff, & Perea, 2008), this effect is due to a noisy process in the localization of the “objects” (e.g., letters, kana syllables). In the present study, we examine whether this effect is specific to letter strings or whether it also occurs with other “objects” (namely, digits, symbols, and pseudoletters). To that end, we conducted a series of five masked priming experiments using the same–different task. Results showed robust effects of transposition for all objects, except for pseudoletters. This is consistent with the view that locations of familiar objects (i.e., letters, numbers, and symbols) can be best understood as distributions along a dimension rather than as precise points.