Race for Power in Public Good Games with Unequal,Unstable Punishment Power

Decentralized punishment can maintain contributions to a public good at a high level. This positive effect holds even for situations involving inequality in punishment power, meaning that the relative costs for punishment differ between persons. We extend this line of research by examining the additional influence of instability of and thus potential competition for punishment power in public good experiments. As in previous research, inequality is operationalized by assigning the role of a ‘strong player’ to one group member, who can punish others at a reduced cost compared to other players. Instability is operationalized by the fact that the role assignment can change across rounds and is contingent on behavior in previous rounds. Three experiments show that under unequal, unstable (punishment‐) power, individuals behave more competitively and engage in a race for power resulting in detrimental effects for the group. Specifically, we find that (i) unstable power goes along with a disproportionate use of punishment; (ii) not inequality by itself but rather the combination of instability and inequality causes this effect; and (iii) this excessive use of punishment is found not only when the role of the strong player is assigned to individuals who previously behaved rather selfishly but also when prosocial behavior leads to the top, speaking for a generalizability of our findings. Implications for organizational settings are discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A motivational perspective on punishment in social dilemmas

In social dilemma situations, individuals benefit from uncooperative behaviour while exploiting resources of the collective. One prominent solution to prevent uncooperative behaviour and to increase cooperation is to establish a sanction system in that private resources are invested by individuals to punish uncooperative interaction partners. The present review is intended to provide an overview concerning motivational determinants of punishment in social dilemma situations. Specifically, we (a) outline that fairness concerns and revenge motivate individuals to punish uncooperative other individuals, (b) show that this is done especially when they possess the basic motivational orientation of a prevention focus. We (c) illustrate that individuals do not punish to acquire a good reputation in the eyes of others, and (d) elaborate on whether individuals punish to regulate satisfaction. Finally, we present empirically neglected motivational factors in studies on punishment in social dilemmas and discuss limitations and possible future directions in this field of research.     

Amount of altruistic punishment accounts for subsequent emotional gratification in participants with primary psychopathy

We are often willing to incur personal costs in order to punish people that violate group norms. Previous studies have suggested that high-psychopathy participants may engage in more such “altruistic punishment behaviors” than those with lower levels of psychopathy. Although this finding could suggest that psychopathy is in fact associated with prosocial behavior, high-psychopathy participants show clear evidence of various decision-making and emotional deficits. It is therefore possible that the increased altruistic punishment behavior observed in psychopathy participants is in some fashion related to such deficits. To address this possibility, we administered the altruistic punishment paradigm to a group of university students with low and high levels of psychopathy (N = 50). We found that high-psychopathy participants (n = 24) gave defectors significantly more punishment than did low psychopathy participants (n = 26), under personally costly conditions. Furthermore, a mediational analysis revealed that the amount of altruistic punishment administered completely mediated the relationship between primary psychopathy and a person’s emotional gratification subsequent to performing the altruistic punishment behavior. These findings suggest that while high psychopathy participants do appear to engage in greater levels of altruistic punishment behavior, they may do this largely for their own emotional gratification.     

Behavioral effects of delayed timeouts from reinforcement

Timeouts are sometimes used in applied settings to reduce target responses, and in some circumstances delays are unavoidably imposed between the onset of a timeout and the offset of the response that produces it. The present study examined the effects of signaled and unsignaled timeouts in rats exposed to concurrent fixed‐ratio 1 fixed‐ratio 1 schedules of food delivery, where each response on one lever, the location of which changed across conditions, produced both food and a delayed 10‐s timeout. Delays of 0 to 38 s were examined. Delayed timeouts often, but not always, substantially reduced the number of responses emitted on the lever that produced timeouts relative to the number emitted on the lever that did not produce timeouts. In general, greater sensitivity was observed to delayed timeouts when they were signaled. These results demonstrate that delayed timeouts, like other delayed consequences, can affect behavior, albeit less strongly than immediate consequences.     

The effects of 100 dB 1‐kHz and 22‐kHz tones as punishers on lever pressing in rats

Aversive control is an important yet understudied process of learning. One reason aversive control may be relatively understudied is ethical concerns about painful stimuli (e.g., electric shock). High decibel broad‐band noise and 22‐kHz vocalizations both demonstrably affect rodent behavior while not necessarily being painful. The goal of this study was to determine if 100‐dB 22‐kHz‐pure tones were differentially more effective in reducing operant response rates in rats. We examined whether 22‐kHz pure tones would function as aversive stimuli, specifically as positive punishers. The effects of response‐dependent as well as continuously presented 22‐kHz and 1‐kHz tones on rate of response maintained by variable interval 30‐s food deliveries were assessed across several conditions. We found that response rates were lower when tones were presented response dependently than when tones were presented continuously throughout a session. We also found that the lower response rates obtained with response‐dependent 22‐kHz tones were not significantly different from response rates obtained with response‐dependent 1‐kHz tones. The primary conclusion of this experiment is that both 1‐kHz and 22‐kHz tones functioned as punishers, but that the 22‐kHz tones were not differentially more effective in reducing response rate.     

Rights Forfeiture Theorists Should Embrace the Duty View of Punishment

In this paper, I bring into conversation with each other two views about the justification of punishment: the rights forfeiture theory and the duty view. I argue that philosophers attracted to the former should instead accept the latter.     

“金钱-环境”复合收益的风险决策:价值取向的影响

现实中的环境决策,往往要在多个由"金钱-环境"复合而成的结果间做选择。人们如何对异质复合结果进行评估与选择,是决策研究面临的新课题。本研究着重考察个体金钱取向和环境取向的相对强度对复合收益风险决策的影响。结果表明,无论是采用自陈量表(实验1)或内隐联想测验(实验2)来测量价值取向,还是采用混词造句任务(实验3)来启动价值取向,均发现价值取向相对强度对复合风险决策有显著影响。(1)相比于金钱取向占优的个体,环境取向占优的个体在进行复合风险决策时更偏好环境风险较小的复合选项;(2)在复合选项等价匹配任务中,环境取向占优的个体会赋予复合选项中的环境收益以更高权重,倾向于用更多的金钱收益来弥补环境收益的风险折扣;(3)在复合收益风险概率匹配任务中,环境取向占优的个体更倾向于为获取倍增的环境收益而承担更大的复合收益风险。作为对复合结果风险决策的首次探索,本研究初步回答了不同价值取向的个体在金钱-环境复合风险决策中更倾向于规避什么风险、拿什么冒险以及为什么冒险等问题,为今后进一步开展复合决策研究打下了理论和方法基础。     

HUMAN RESPONDING ON RANDOM‐INTERVAL SCHEDULES OF RESPONSE‐COST PUNISHMENT: THE ROLE OF REDUCED REINFORCEMENT DENSITY

An experiment with adult humans investigated the effects of response‐contingent money loss (response‐cost punishment) on monetary‐reinforced responding. A yoked‐control procedure was used to separate the effects on responding of the response‐cost contingency from the effects of reduced reinforcement density. Eight adults pressed buttons for money on a three‐component multiple reinforcement schedule. During baseline, responding in all components produced money gains according to a random‐interval 20‐s schedule. During punishment conditions, responding during the punishment component conjointly produced money losses according to a random‐interval schedule. The value of the response‐cost schedule was manipulated across conditions to systematically evaluate the effects on responding of response‐cost frequency. Participants were assigned to one of two yoked‐control conditions. For participants in the Yoked Punishment group, during punishment conditions money losses were delivered in the yoked component response independently at the same intervals that money losses were produced in the punishment component. For participants in the Yoked Reinforcement group, responding in the yoked component produced the same net earnings as produced in the punishment component. In 6 of 8 participants, contingent response cost selectively decreased response rates in the punishment component and the magnitude of the decrease was directly related to the punishment schedule value. Under punishment conditions, for participants in the Yoked Punishment group response rates in the yoked component also decreased, but the decrease was less than that observed in the punishment component, whereas for participants in the Yoked Reinforcement group response rates in the yoked component remained similar to rates in the no‐punishment component. These results provide further evidence that contingent response cost functions similarly to noxious punishers in that it appears to suppress responding apart from its effects on reinforcement density.     

Promoting prospective self-control through abstraction

When people anticipate that future temptations may undermine valued goals, they use a number of prospective self-control strategies (or “precommitment devices”) to increase the likelihood of future self-control success. Little is known, however, about the conditions under which people are more or less likely to use them. Drawing from construal level theory (e.g., Trope & Liberman, 2003), we argue that people are more likely to engage in prospective self-control when they construe events more abstractly (at higher-level construals). Results from two experiments demonstrated that higher-level construals promote use of two well-documented prospective strategies: choice bracketing and self-imposing punishment. Higher-level construals thus appear to enhance people's efforts to protect their valued goals from anticipated temptations.