Whorf and Wittgenstein. Language, world view and argumentation

Whorf and Wittgenstein are perhaps the most famous names in linguistics and philosophy associated with the assumption that language plays a decisive role in shaping our view of reality. After a critical discussion of Whorf's linguistic relativity principle I conclude that it is not language as a system, but the use of language according to the rules of language games which connects language thought and world view, especially if some particular usage becomes the commonly accepted norm. This traditional norm also enters argumentative discourse in the form of background assumptions occuring in the premises of arguments. Thus, traditional points of view and prevailing ideologies in a society, even if challenged in discussions, can become reinforced and stabilized. This is illustrated with a critical analysis of the role and function of tautological utterances in argumentative discourse, which only apparently are compelling means of argumentation.     

Systems Theory and Family Therapy: From a Critique on Systems Theory to a Theory on System Change

Some system therapists reject the systemic view for various reasons, often related to violence, victimisation and power. This critique is based on an outdated narrow and incomplete knowledge of linear systems theory. A better understanding of these linear systems theories and of systems levels of organisation already answers much of the critique, but does not explain change. For the latter, a theory of how systems change is necessary for systems therapy in general and family therapy in particular. Modern dynamic systems and chaos theory are most useful to understand change, chaos, history, unpredictability and flexibility.     

MISCONCEPTIONS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Abstract. Scholars in religious studies, or "religionists," often mischaracterize the social-scientific study of religion. They assume that a social-scientific analysis of the origin, function, meaning, or truth of religion either opposes or disregards the believer's analysis, which religionists profess to present and defend. I do not argue that the social sciences analyze religion from the believer's point of view. I argue instead that a social scientific analysis is more akin and germane to the believer's point of view than religionists assume. I single out seven mischaracterizations of the social sciences typically held by religionists.     

Matching, maximizing, and the behavioral unit: concurrent reinforcement of response sequences.

Pigeons pecked two keys in a probability matching situation in which four two-peck sequences were intermittently reinforced: left-left, left-right, right-left and right-right. In Phase 1, relative reinforcement rate was varied with respect to the first response of a sequence: reinforcers were differentially assigned for left-left and left-right sequences as opposed to right-left and right-right sequences. The second response of reinforced sequences occurred equally on the left and right keys across conditions. In Phase II, relative reinforcement rate was varied for sequences that involve an alternation as opposed to those that did not. The relative outputs of the different sequences matched the relative reinforcement rates for the different sequences in both phases. Relative response rates for key pecks did not always match relative reinforcement rates. The intertrial interval separating responses was varied in both phases; increases in the intertrial interval affected the relative frequency of different sequences. The results demonstrate that response sequences acted as functional units influencing choice and thus support a structural account of choice. At the same time, the matching of relative sequence proportion and relative reinforcement rate supports a matching account.     

Avoidance,induction, and the illusion of reinforcement

Environmental events that impact reproductive success may be called phylogenetically important events (PIEs). Some promote reproductive success, like mates and food; others threaten reproductive success, like predators and injury. Beneficial PIEs induce activities that enhance them, and detrimental PIEs induce activities that mitigate or avoid them. Free-operant avoidance relies on electric shock as a proxy for injury, a PIE. One theory takes avoidance behavior to be reinforced by its reducing shock rate. A more complete explanation is that avoidance both reduces shock rate and is induced by the PIEs it usually prevents. Shocks received act in concert with shock-rate reduction, in a feedback system. Four parametric data sets were analyzed to show that avoidance is induced by received shock rate according to power functions. Avoidance is not reinforced at all; avoidance is induced by its failures. Induction explains not only avoidance itself, but also phenomena unique to avoidance, like warmup and effects of unavoidable shock. Induction explains behavior more generally than reinforcement, because induction explains not only food-maintained operant and nonoperant behavior, but also shock-maintained behavior, including avoidance. Reinforcement fails to explain behavior when reinforcement is defined as strengthening by consequences. Induction erases the distinction between consequences and antecedents.     

Comment on Björn Sahlberg’s paper

This paper is a comment on Björn Sahlberg’s paper on the function of training analysis in the Swedish psychoanalytic association and discusses some aspects of the candidates’ personal analysis and supervision. The paper further suggests some possible sources for inspiration and perspective on organizational and educational issues, for example taking an interest in the epistemology of professions, in what the concept of ‘reflection-in-action’ could mean in the training situation, or in empirical research about the educational models and the practice of psychoanalysis.     

人格理论的系统发展观初探

文章以遗传论、精神动力论、学习论、特质论、社会文化及认知一情感系统理论为基础。利用系统科学中的系统论观点,对人格理论进行系统发展观分析。该观点将人格看作一个复杂的“大”系统,它包括外部系统和内部系统两部分。外部系统即外环境系统,内部系统则分为个体心理系统和个体行为系统,其核心是个体心理系统,它由认识系统、情意系统、自我系统及需要系统构成。人格的形成是内外两个系统相互作用、循环运动的结果。     

The ethics of earthquake prediction

Scientists’ responsibility to inform the public about their results may conflict with their responsibility not to cause social disturbance by the communication of these results. A study of the well-known Brady-Spence and Iben Browning earthquake predictions illustrates this conflict in the publication of scientifically unwarranted predictions. Furthermore, a public policy that considers public sensitivity caused by such publications as an opportunity to promote public awareness is ethically problematic from (i) a refined consequentialist point of view that any means cannot be justified by any ends, and (ii) a rights view according to which individuals should never be treated as a mere means to ends. The Parkfield experiment, the so-called paradigm case of cooperation between natural and social scientists and the political authorities in hazard management and risk communication, is also open to similar ethical criticism. For the people in the Parkfield area were not informed that the whole experiment was based on a contested seismological paradigm.     

Is Putnam's Causal Theory of Meaning Compatible with Internal Realism?

Putnam originally developed his causal theory of meaning in order to support scientific realism and reject the notion of incommensurability. Later he gave up this position and adopted instead what he called ‘internal realism’, but apparently without changing his mind on topics related to his former philosophy of language. The question must arise whether internal realism, which actually is a species of antirealism, is compatible with the causal theory of meaning. In giving an answer I begin with an analysis of the content and metaphysical background of scientific realism. I show that it presupposes metaphysical realism and that Putnam's philosophical conversion is due to his becoming aware of the latter's incoherence. After giving a brief sketch of internal realism I conclude by arguing that within this new theoretical framework the causal theory of meaning loses its force as a weapon against incommensurability. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.