证候存在的逻辑回答

2003年我国开始了农村合作医疗的重建工作,它直接关系到中国几亿农民的健康和利益,目前仍处于大规模的试点阶段。通过对部分试点地区的实地调查研究和文献资料分析,以及新型农村合作医疗在其具体的实施过程中存在问题的探讨,对进一步发展提出了相关的政策建议,希望能对这项制度稳健和可持续的发展有所裨益。     

Analyzing feature distinctiveness in the processing of living and non-living concepts in Alzheimer’s disease

The conceptual structure account (CSA) is a model specifying the role of the living and non-living domain dichotomy in the structure of semantic memory. According to this model, feature distinctiveness and the perceptual–functional inter-correlation of concepts are assumed to play a major role in impairing the ability to discriminate between living and non-living concepts in Alzheimer’s disease (AD). The hypothesis was tested in this study by using naming and sorting tasks traditionally considered as assessing distinctiveness, and a property verification task where distinctiveness and perceptual–functional inter-correlation were objectively controlled against norms especially created for this purpose. Alzheimer’s patients (n = 59) with minimal, mild or moderate dementia and normal elderly adults (n = 31) participated in the study. Overall, the findings did not support the CSA predictions. They revealed a distinctiveness effect on response accuracy with shared features dominating distinctive features regardless of domain. They also revealed more difficulties in the tasks involving effortful processes. The results stress the need to consider both cognitive demands of tasks and structural aspects of knowledge in the evaluation of semantic memory in AD.     

分类学习与混合学习下的注意促进效应比较

注意促进效应(ABE)是指目标探测性质的干扰会促进与之同时进行的背景刺激的记忆编码, 产生比分心拒绝下更优的记忆成绩。Spataro等人(2017)对此提出项目特异性解释, 认为目标探测主要促进的是对项目的特异性信息而非关系性信息加工。本研究采用混合学习和分类学习的方式形成对背景刺激的特异性信息和关系性信息加工。结果表明, 与混合学习相比, 分类学习下的ABE有所减少(实验2), 甚至消失(实验1), 表明当编码过程中对背景刺激的加工主要依赖于关系性信息时, 目标探测所产生的促进效应会被削弱, 从而为ABE的项目特异性解释提供更为直接的证据。     

The Relational Value of Empathy

ABSTRACT

Philosophers and scholars from other disciplines have long discussed the role of empathy in our moral lives. The distinct relational value of empathy, however, has been largely overlooked. This article aims to specify empathy’s distinct relational value: Empathy is both intrinsically and extrinsically valuable in virtue of the pleasant experiences we share with others, the harmony and meaning that empathy provides, the recognition, self-esteem, and self-trust it enhances, as well as trust in others, attachment, and affection it fosters. Once we better understand in what ways empathy is a uniquely relational phenomenon, we can unveil its relevance to morality, which avoids the strictures of both partiality and impartiality. On the one hand, it is the relational value of empathy that grounds defeasible reasons to empathize insofar as empathy is morally called for by a particular relationship (or if we have defeasible reasons to establish a relationship by empathy). On the other hand, it is precisely empathy’s relational value that allows us to show that it can be kept within bounds. To realize empathy’s relational value, we are not constantly required to empathize. Instead, once we properly appreciate empathy’s distinct relational value, we can show that this leaves us room to respond to impartialist concerns.     

Trust,Belief, and the Second-Personal

Cognitivism about trust says that it requires belief that the trusted is trustworthy; non-cognitivism denies this. At stake is how to make sense of the strong but competing intuitions that trust is an attitude that is evaluable both morally and rationally. In proposing that one's respect for another's agency may ground one's trusting beliefs, second-personal accounts provide a way to endorse both intuitions. They focus attention on the way that, in normal situations, it is the person whom I trust. My task is to develop an account of the latter insight without the controversial theoretical commitments of the former. I propose a functional account for why the second and third-personal ‘systems’ operate not just in parallel, but in tandem, in support of a cognitivist account of trust.     

Self-knowledge,belief, ability (and agency?)

Matthew Boyle [(2011). “Transparent Self-Knowledge.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1): 223–241. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2011.00204.x] has defended an account of doxastic self-knowledge which he calls “Reflectivism”. I distinguish two claims within Reflectivism: (A) that believing that p and knowing oneself to believe that p are not two distinct cognitive states, but two aspects of the same cognitive state, and (B) that this is because we are in some sense agents in relation to our beliefs. I find claim (A) compelling, but argue that its tenability depends on how we view the metaphysics of knowledge, something Boyle does not consider. I argue that in the context of the standard account of knowledge as a kind of true belief – what I call the Belief Account of knowledge – the claim faces serious problems, and that these simply disappear if we instead adopt an Ability Account of knowledge, along the lines of that defended by John Hyman [(1999). “How knowledge Works.” The Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197): 433–451; John Hyman (2015). Action, Knowledge, and the Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press]. I find claim (B) less compelling, and a secondary aim of the paper is to suggest that once we reject the Belief Account of knowledge, and move over to an Ability Account, there is no explanatory role for (B) left to play.     

Molar versus as a paradigm clash.

The molar view of behavior arose in response to the demonstrated inadequacy of explanations based on contiguity. Although Dinsmoor's (2001) modifications to two-factor theory render it irrefutable, a more basic criticism arises when we see that the molar and molecular views differ paradigmatically. The molar view has proven more productive.     

Behaviorism, private events, and the molar view of behavior

Viewing the science of behavior (behavior analysis) to be a natural science, radical behaviorism rejects any form of dualism, including subjective-objective or inner-outer dualism. Yet radical behaviorists often claim that treating private events as covert behavior and internal stimuli is necessary and important to behavior analysis. To the contrary, this paper argues that, compared with the rejection of dualism, private events constitute a trivial idea and are irrelevant to accounts of behavior. Viewed in the framework of evolutionary theory or for any practical purpose, behavior is commerce with the environment. By its very nature, behavior is extended in time. The temptation to posit private events arises when an activity is viewed in too small a time frame, obscuring what the activity does. When activities are viewed in an appropriately extended time frame, private events become irrelevant to the account. This insight provides the answer to many philosophical questions about thinking, sensing, and feeling. Confusion about private events arises in large part from failure to appreciate fully the radical implications of replacing mentalistic ideas about language with the concept of verbal behavior. Like other operant behavior, verbal behavior involves no agent and no hidden causes; like all natural events, it is caused by other natural events. In a science of behavior grounded in evolutionary theory, the same set of principles applies to verbal and nonverbal behavior and to human and nonhuman organisms.     

REFLECTIONS ON BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY: A SELECTIVE REVIEW OF EVOLUTION SINCE DARWIN—THE FIRST 150 YEARS. EDITED BY M. A. BELL,D. J. FUTUYAMA,W. F. EANES, & J. S. LEVINTON

This review focuses on parallels between the selectionist sciences of evolutionary biology and behavior analysis. In selectionism, complex phenomena are interpreted as the cumulative products of relatively simple processes acting over time—natural selection in evolutionary biology and reinforcement in behavior analysis. Because evolutionary biology is the more mature science, an examination of the factors that led to the triumph of natural selection provides clues whereby reinforcement may achieve a similar fate in the science of behavior.