情绪具身观：情绪研究的新视角

情绪具身性有着广泛的理论假说与研究证据, 从情绪外周理论到面部反馈假说、躯体标记假说再到现在的情绪具身观, 都一致认为情绪是具身的。情绪具身观认为情绪是包括大脑在内的身体的情绪, 身体的解剖学结构、身体的活动方式、身体的感觉和运动体验决定了我们怎样加工情绪。相关的行为和脑机制研究均支持了情绪加工的具身性。目前关于具身情绪的理论解释主要有镜像神经元系统假说、具身模仿论和知觉符号系统理论等。作为一种新兴的理论观点, 情绪具身观为情绪研究提供了新的视角。     

康德宗教哲学对我们的启示

在这个演讲里,笔者试图从康德的哲学与宗教观里发现西方文化的心理镜像结构,并以此来参照对比中国文化的心灵结构,结合个人的经验对二者都有所论衡。     

认知判断中手部动作模拟的fMRI研究

该研究采用功能磁共振成像技术,考察不同条件下进行工具认知判断时手部姿势对认知判断的影响及动作模拟的神经机制。实验发现：手部姿势存在显著的主效应,冲突手部姿势条件下反应时最慢,且冲突手部姿势条件下与不冲突手部姿势条件下、自然状态条件下反应时存在显著差异,自然状态条件与不冲突手部姿势条件下反应时不存在显著差异。另外,f MRI成像结果发现,额中回、额下回、顶下小叶以及辅助运动区在自然状态下有显著激活,表明个体在进行认知判断过程中有动作模拟过程;海马结构、扣带回及楔前叶等与记忆有关的脑区有显著激活,表明身体经验在认知过程的作用。总的研究表明,不同的手部姿势状态对认知判断有不同影响,冲突手部姿势会对动作模拟产生干扰作用,手部动作模拟的神经机制主要涉及镜像神经元区,且在认知判断时存在具身效应。     

Beyond sensorimotor segregation: On mirror neurons and social affordance space tracking

Mirror neuron research has come a long way since the early 1990s, and many theorists are now stressing the heterogeneity and complexity of the sensorimotor properties of fronto-parietal circuits. However, core aspects of the initial ‘mirror mechanism’ theory, i.e. the idea of a symmetric encapsulated mirroring function translating sensory action perceptions into motor formats, still appears to be shaping much of the debate. This article challenges the empirical plausibility of the sensorimotor segregation implicit in the original mirror metaphor. It is proposed instead that the teleological organization found in the broader fronto-parietal circuits might be inherently sensorimotor. Thus the idea of an independent ‘purely perceptual’ goal understanding process is questioned. Further, it is hypothesized that the often asymmetric, heterogeneous and contextually modulated mirror and canonical neurons support a function of multisensory mapping and tracking of the perceiving agents affordance space. Such a shift in the interpretative framework offers a different theoretical handle on how sensorimotor processes might ground various aspects of intentional action choice and social cognition. Mirror neurons would under the proposed “social affordance model” be seen as dynamic parts of larger circuits, which support tracking of currently shared and competing action possibilities. These circuits support action selection processes—but also our understanding of the options and action potentials that we and perhaps others have in the affordance space. In terms of social cognition ‘mirror’ circuits might thus help us understand not only the intentional actions others are actually performing—but also what they could have done, did not do and might do shortly.