心理学中实验法的方法论地位重估

认知心理学以实验法为其方法论基础,着力对人类的认识过程进行模型建构。然而,早在20世纪70年代初,其创立者奈塞尔就对心理学的实验范式感到不满,转而寻求心理学的生态学效度。心理学中对实验法的推崇源于自然科学特别是物理学的成功。而实际上,物理学在20世纪初遭遇了实验法所带来的困境。受制于实验法的种种局限,当代认知科学逐渐放弃了方法论的沙文主义立场,接纳了来自语言学、哲学、神经科学等多领域、多视角的研究策略。心理学在一定程度上具有人文科学的性质,因此同样需要采用多重研究手段和方法,而不是一味地笃信实验法的权威性。     

Is Nature Enough? No

Abstract. This essay is based on a lecture delivered at the 2002 IRAS Star Island conference, the theme of which was “Is Nature Enough? The Thirst for Transcendence.” I had been asked to represent the position of those who would answer No to the question. I thought it would stimulate discussion if I presented my side of the debate in a somewhat provocative manner rather than use a more ponderous approach that would argue each point in a meticulous and protracted fashion. Here I lay out a theological position that finds naturalism wanting in three ways: in terms of human spiritual needs, in terms of the mind's need for deep explanation, and in terms of the perennial human search for truth. Again, the style of presentation, like that of the original lecture, prohibits the kind of philosophical development that an adequate answer to each of the issues requires. The purpose is that of evoking discussion on a most important question.     

论心理学发展的困境与出路

近年来西方心理学家对心理学发展取向提出强烈批评。综合各家所论,心理学以往发展的困境乃是由于：(1)自哲学心理学到科学心理学对人性解释的理论始终纷歧,以致无法形成常规科学条件;(2)科学心理学自始即标榜自然科学而缺独立意识;(3)强调科学方法,忽视人性特质而陷入削足适履困境。因此,今后国内心理学的发展势不能再全盘西化,而应在人性特质与本土文化基础上吸取西方心理学精义,针对国人心理特质研究发展出属於自己的理论与应用心理学。本文最后提出的四会能力教学构想,希望对本土文化取向应用心理学的研究发挥一点抛砖引玉作用。     

Evolutionary Theology and God–Memes: Explaining Everything or Nothing

It is not uncommon for Darwinists and memeticists to speculate not only that god–memes (cultural units for belief in a god) evolved as maladaptive traits but also that these memes do not correspond to anything real. However, a counter–Darwinian argument exists that some god–memes evolved as adaptive traits and did so with a metaphysical correspondence to reality. Memeticists cannot disallow these positive claims, because the rules they would use to disallow them would also disallow their negative claims. One must either accept that positive Darwinian theological claims can fall within the bounds of science (and therefore be judged on their explanatory merits alone) or must disallow both sets of arguments, including any claims that god–memes fail to correspond to reality. Given that many Darwinists do not appear to accept a modest version of science that avoids negative metaphysical claims, precedence exists in memetic and Darwinian discourse for making positive metaphysical claims as well.     

Quality Criteria Under Methodological Pluralism: Implications for Conducting and Evaluating Research

Many community psychologists adhere to a methodological pluralist orientation to research; however, it is often unclear what such a position means in practice. This paper draws out the practical implications of methodological pluralism for community research. It proposes four sets of criteria for how research might be appraised under a pluralistic ethos: criteria applicable to all research, research-relevant community psychology values and principles, criteria specifically applicable to quantitative research, and criteria specifically applicable to qualitative research. The paper also addresses how pluralistic community research may be conducted, at each of three levels: integrating methods within a single study, using different approaches within a research program, and pluralism in the field as a whole.     

A PUZZLE ABOUT NATURALISM

Abstract: This article presents and solves a puzzle about methodological naturalism. Trumping naturalism is the thesis that we must accept p if science sanctions p, and biconditional naturalism the apparently stronger thesis that we must accept p if and only if science sanctions p. The puzzle is generated by an apparently cogent argument to the effect that trumping naturalism is equivalent to biconditional naturalism. It turns out that the argument for this equivalence is subtly question‐begging. The article explains this and shows more generally that there are no scientific arguments for biconditional naturalism.     

TWO BAD WAYS TO ATTACK INTELLIGENT DESIGN AND TWO GOOD ONES

Four arguments are examined in order to assess the state of the Intelligent Design debate. First, critics continually cite the fact that ID proponents have religious motivations. When used as criticism of ID arguments, this is an obvious ad hominem. Nonetheless, philosophers and scientists alike continue to wield such arguments for their rhetorical value. Second, in his expert testimony in the Dover trial, philosopher Robert Pennock used repudiated claims in order to brand ID as a kind of pseudoscience. His arguments hinge on the nature of methodological naturalism as a metatheoretic shaping principle. We examine the use of such principles in science and the history of science. Special attention is given to the demarcation problem. Third, the scientific merits of ID are examined. Critics rightly demand more than promissory notes for ID to move beyond the fringe. Fourth, although methodological naturalism gets a lot of attention, there is another shaping principle to contend with, namely, conservatism. Science, like most disciplines, tends to change in an incremental rather than revolutionary manner. When ID is compared to other non‐ or quasi‐Darwinian proposals, it appears to be a more radical solution than is needed in the face of the anomalies.     

Poppers Methodologischer Individualismus und die Sozialwissenschaften

Popper's methodological individualism and the social sciences. Popper's philosophy of social sciences poses a dilemma that arises out of the two theses of methodological individualism and situational logic. In order to find a way out of this dilemma, one must raise the question concerning the epistemological and methodological status of the `laws' of the human sciences. There are indeed `rules' from which human actions depart mostly to a negligible extent, but they remain valid or stay in effect without exception only as far as they are not re-evoked or re-emerge in the consciousness of the agents. The element of truth of methodological individualism lies in the person's capacity to revoke, in principle, the validity of the rules concerning oneself. Situational logic and methodological individualism can thus be reconciled. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The problem of other minds: A debate between Schrödinger and Carnap

This paper reviews the debate between Carnap and Schrödinger about Hypothesis P (It is not only I who have perceptions and thoughts; other human beings have them too)–a hypothesis that underlies the possibility of doing science. For Schrödinger this hypothesis is not scientifically testable; for Carnap it is. But Schrödinger and Carnap concede too much to each other and miss an alternative understanding: science does not depend on an explicit hypothesis concerning what other human beings see and think; it is simply a practice of communication which anticipates or presupposes the perfect interchangeability of positions amongst the members of the linguistic community. The mentalistic vocabulary of folk-psychology, used by Carnap and Schrödinger, does not take first but last place in this perspective; because it does nothing but express after the event the confidence to which the disputants bear witness regarding a generally successful practice of communication.