Qualitative research in psychology: Attitudes of psychology students and academic staff

Qualitative research is experiencing a resurgence within the field of psychology. This study aimed to explore the range of attitudes towards qualitative research in psychology held by students and academics, using the model of attitudes by Eagly and Chaiken as a framework. Twenty‐one psychology students and academics were interviewed about their attitudes towards qualitative research. Interviews were transcribed and analysed using thematic analysis. While qualitative research was described as inherent to the psychology profession and useful for generating rich data, some participants felt that this approach was not well respected or considered as legitimate as quantitative methods. Reflecting common misperceptions about qualitative research, participants also expressed concerns that qualitative research was too subjective and had limited generalisability. Furthermore, some participants felt that they lacked the skills and confidence necessary to conduct qualitative research. Large investments in time and resources were identified as barriers to undertaking qualitative research. Identifying attitudes towards qualitative research provides a basis for future work in dispelling myths, promoting attitudinal change and increasing both the use and teaching of qualitative approaches in psychology.     

Cross-cultural investigations of stress: Conceptual and methodological considerations

Cross-cultural studios on stress are confounded by conceptual, methodological and applied problems. Although several comprehensive definitions of stress have been offered, the conceptual schema from which the definitions emerge reflect a Western perspective and are not always relevant when transposed into other cultures. The word stress itself is not easily translated into other languages which creates a problem for research workers in non-Western cultures. While studies in India of Westernized executives in organizations using Western models have offered valuable insights into problems related to organizational structures, executive stress, etc., they do not tell us a great deal about the nature and experience of stress in the rest of the population. A brief history of stress research is offered with a concentration on stress research in India. Conceptual and methodological issues are discussed leading to an assessment of the difficulties of stress research in India.     

当代社会心理学发展的双重走向论评

本文以社会心理研究的不同学科取向、文化取向和方法论取向做为三条主要线索,对当代社会心理学发展的多元化道路和整合社会心理学的努力进行了分析评价。认为社会心理学发展的多元化道路主要是由于社会心理的多质性和社会心理学的边缘学科性质所决定的,社今心理学发展过程中的整合努力则主要是由于社会心理的整体性和社会心理学的学科统一性所决定的。分化与整合作为当代社会心理学研究和发展的一对予盾统一体,伴随了社会心理学发展的百年进程,推动着当代社会心理学新的发展。     

Plugging the Leaks in Neurath's Ship: A Defense of Naturalistic Epistemology

This paper examines the question whether foundational epistemology (“FE”) can be replaced by naturalized epistemology (“NE”). First, it argues that Quine's defense of NE is inadequate since it is only based on arguments showing the impossibility of the logical empiricist version of FE rather than on arguments for the impossibility of FE as such. Second, it proposes that a more promising argument for the impossibility of FE can be found in the Münchhausen-trilemma which aims at showing that ultimate foundations (and, hence, FE) are unattainable. However, Karl-Otto Apel has shown that this trilemma is unconclusive since it uncritically presupposes the premise that all argumentation is deductive in nature. Apel's argument implies that FE is possible if and only if it is possible to devise a non-deductive foundation (“NDF”). It is argued, however, that the possibility of NDF cannot be demonstrated. This leads to a situation called the Multatuli-dilemma: we cannot prove the possibility of ultimate foundations nor can we prove the impossibility of ultimate foundations. This dilemma shows that the discussion about the possibility of FE is pointless. Thus, it suggests that it is legitimate to replace FE by NE. Barry Stroud and Henri Lauener, however, argue that this replacement is not feasible since NE is not capable of refuting scepticism (Stroud) or justifying methodological rules (Lauener). But these objections are shown to be mistaken: First, epistemological scepticism is practically impossible and, hence, does not pose a serious threat to NE. Second, NE is capable of justifying methodological norms if and only if it makes use of so-called internal justifications. Thus, the final conclusion of this paper is that FE can be replaced by NE. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Understanding Religion: The Challenge of E. O. Wilson

E. O. Wilson's fundamental challenge is to bring knowledge and sensibility into an effective working relationship. Both ambivalence and opaqueness characterize his analysis of religion. Ambivalence refers to his conviction on the one hand that religion is essential for societal well-being and genetically resourced and his prediction, on the other hand, that religion will be superseded by scientific reason; the opaqueness refers to his strange insistence that religion be subjected to tests of literal facticity, whereas, in contrast, the arts are exempted from this test, because they constitute a delivery system that impacts the sensibilities directly, with no particular concern for literalness. Wilson's analysis of religion should be brought into consonance with his view of the arts, thereby recognizing the importance of myth, symbol, metaphor, and analogy in religious formulations and their status as direct delivery systems to the sensibilities. Wilson's distinction between empiricist/materialist and transcendentaliist worldviews is reshaped by distinguishing between metaphysical and methodological transcendentalism. This reshaping enables us to recognize how the action required by human existence depends both on scientific knowledge and symbolic formulations that extend to human action, even though certain knowledge is lacking.     

BUDDHISM,NATURALISM, AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS

Owen Flanagan's important book The Bodhisattva's Brain presents a naturalized interpretation of Buddhist philosophy. Although the overall approach of the book is very promising, certain aspects of its presentation could benefit from further reflection. Traditional teachings about reincarnation do not contradict the doctrine of no self, as Flanagan seems to suggest; however, they are empirically rather implausible. Flanagan's proposed “tame” interpretation of karma is too thin; we can do better at fitting karma into a scientific worldview. The relationship between eudaimonist and utilitarian strands in Buddhist ethics is more complex than the book suggests. Flanagan is right to criticize incautious and imprecise claims that Buddhism will make practitioners happy. We can make progress by distinguishing between happiness in the sense of a Buddhist version of eudaimonia, and happiness in the sense of attitudinal pleasure. Doing so might result in an interpretation of Buddhist views about happiness that was simultaneously philosophically interesting, historically credible, and psychologically testable.     

CYBORG: MYTH OR REALITY?

Abstract. The idea of cyborg often is taken as a token for the distinction between human and machine having become irrelevant. In this essay I argue against that view. I critically analyze empirical arguments, theoretical reflections, and ultimate convictions that are supposed to support the idea. I show that empirical arguments at this time rather point in a different direction and that theoretical views behind it are at least questionable. I also show that the ultimate convictions presupposed deny basic tenets of traditional Christianity, while their claim to be based on science confuses scientific results with their interpretation on the basis of a naturalistic world‐view.