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291.
John Dilworth 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2007,6(3):369-387
Representationalists currently cannot explain counter-examples that involve indeterminate perceptual content, but a double content (DC) view is more promising. Four related cases of perceptual imprecision are used to outline the DC view, which also applies
to imprecise photographic content. Next, inadequacies in the more standard single content (SC) view are demonstrated. The
results are then generalized so as to apply to the content of any kinds of non-conventional representation. The paper continues
with evidence that a DC account provides a moderate rather than extreme realist account of perception, and it concludes with
an initial analysis of the failure of nomic covariance accounts of information in indeterminacy cases.
相似文献
John DilworthEmail: |
292.
Ronald B. MacLennan 《Zygon》2001,36(2):309-320
Despite tensions between Tillich's category of belief-ful realism and a view of science that embraces metaphysical and epistemological realism, a constructive relationship can be developed between the two. Both are based on common understandings about reality. Belief-ful or theonomous realism thus affirms scientific realism. On the other hand, scientific realism is open to the ecstatic, self-transcending elements of belief-ful realism. Finally, Tillich's formulation of the relationship between culture and religion can be reformulated specifically to include scientific and technological culture. 相似文献
293.
ZHOU Lian 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2015,10(4):568
In this essay, I consider two challenges implicit in Russ Shafer-Landau’s criticism of constructivists: the realism challenge and the relativism challenge, respectively. I do not try to offer a decisive set of objections to the challenges; instead I argue that some objective versions of constructivism, especially Rawls’s constructivism, are not susceptible to the criticisms. 相似文献
294.
XU Difei 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2015,10(3):492
G?del asserts that his philosophy falls under the category of conceptual realism. This paper gives a general picture of G?del’s conceptual realism’s basic doctrines, and gives a way to understand conceptual realism in the background of Leibniz’s and Kant’s philosophies. Among philosophers of mathematics, there is a widespread view that Platonism encounters an epistemological difficulty because we do not have sensations of abstract objects. In his writings, G?del asserts that we have mathematical intuitions of mathematical objects. Some philosophers do not think it is necessary to resort to intuition to defend Platonism, and other philosophers think that the arguments resorting to intuition are too na?ve to be convincing. I argue that the epistemic difficulty is not particular to Platonism; when faced with skepticism, physicalists also need to give an answer concerning the relationship between our experience and reality. G?del and Kant both think that sensations or combinations of sensations are not ideas of physical objects, but that, to form ideas of physical objects, concepts must be added. However, unlike Kant, G?del thinks that concepts are not subjective but independent of our minds. Based on my analysis of G?del’s conceptual realism, I give an answer to the question in the title and show that arguments resorting to intuition are far from na?ve, despite what some philosophers have claimed. 相似文献
295.
王巍 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2008,3(2):294-306
The epistemological version of structural realism, proposed by Cao Tianyu, has great influence in the philosophy of science.
Syntheses has published a special volume discussing the topic. Cao criticizes anti-realism, as well as the epistemic and ontic versions
of structural realism. From the concepts of structure, ontology, and construction, he analyzes the objectivity of scientific
theories as having five aspects: construction, historicity, holism, revision, and revolution. This paper systematically analyzes
and comments on Cao's structural realism. The author agrees with his criticism of the under-determination thesis, is neutral
to his argument against ontological discontinuity, and questions his universal language argument.
Translated by Yu Jinlong from Ziran Bianzhengfa Yanjiu 自然辩证法研究 (Studies in Dialectics of Nature), 2006, (11): 34–38 相似文献
296.
Raff Donelson 《Metaphilosophy》2017,48(4):383-403
Beginning with a thought experiment about a mysterious Delphic oracle, this article motivates, explains, and attempts to defend a view it calls Ethical Pragmatism. Ethical Pragmatism is the view that we can and should carry on our practice of moral deliberation without reference to moral truths, or more broadly, without reference to metaethics. The defense the article mounts tries to show that neither suspicions about the tenability of fact‐value distinctions, nor doubts about the viability of global pragmatism, nor worries about the “force” of ethical injunctions without reference to moral truths constitute good reason to reject Ethical Pragmatism. 相似文献
297.
T. M. Scanlon 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2017,47(6):877-897
In response to comments on my book, Being Realistic about Reasons, by Justin Clarke-Doane, David Enoch and Tristram McPherson, and Gideon Rosen, I try to clarify my domain-based view of ontology, my understanding of the epistemology of normative judgments, and my interpretation of the phenomenon of supervenience. 相似文献
298.
This is a contribution to the symposium on Tim Scanlon’s Being Realistic about Reasons (2014). We have two aims here: First, we ask for more details about Scanlon’s meta-metaphysical view (about his notion of a domain, his criterion of existence, his ambition to remain ontologically thin, and on the role of pragmatic considerations in Scanlon’s picture), showing problems with salient clarifications. And second, we raise independent objections to the view – to its explanatory productivity, its distinctness, and the argumentative support it enjoys. 相似文献
299.
Justin Clarke-Doane 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2017,47(6):841-855
Scanlon’s Being Realistic about Reasons is a beautiful book – sleek, sophisticated, and programmatic. One of its key aims is to demystify knowledge of normative and mathematical truths, realistically construed – i.e. construed, roughly, as being true relevantly independent of minds and languages, when interpreted at face-value. In this article, I develop an epistemological problem that Scanlon fails to explicitly address. I argue that his ‘metaphysical pluralism’ can be understood as a response to that problem. However, it resolves the problem only if it undercuts the objectivity of normative and mathematical inquiry. 相似文献
300.
《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2017,(1):151-181
Descartes' metaphysical doubts in the Third and Fifth Meditations present a scenario like this:it is possible that I (the Meditator) am so imperfect as to be deceived by my author (i.e.,an omnipotent God/Deceiver) in the matters which I think I perceive clearly and distinctly.The metaphysical doubts attempt to cast doubt on beliefs based on present or recollected clear and distinct perceptions.This paper clarifies the intension of the metaphysical doubts by answering the question of how an omnipotent God/Deceiver might exercise a deceptive influence on clear and distinct perception.My analysis shows:(1) the memory interpretation and the retrospective interpretation to be implausible;(2) the incoherence interpretation to be ill-founded,though its conclusion is partly right,such that we should accept a weaker version of it;(3) the misrepresentation interpretation,the defective-origin interpretation,the truth-value variation interpretation and the radical interpretation to be plausible;(4) all of these credible interpretations to be compatible with each other as well. 相似文献