全文获取类型
收费全文 | 319篇 |
免费 | 24篇 |
国内免费 | 2篇 |
出版年
2023年 | 7篇 |
2022年 | 1篇 |
2021年 | 3篇 |
2020年 | 11篇 |
2019年 | 17篇 |
2018年 | 10篇 |
2017年 | 16篇 |
2016年 | 12篇 |
2015年 | 11篇 |
2014年 | 17篇 |
2013年 | 33篇 |
2012年 | 8篇 |
2011年 | 3篇 |
2010年 | 8篇 |
2009年 | 15篇 |
2008年 | 26篇 |
2007年 | 17篇 |
2006年 | 14篇 |
2005年 | 15篇 |
2004年 | 13篇 |
2003年 | 13篇 |
2002年 | 9篇 |
2001年 | 7篇 |
2000年 | 6篇 |
1999年 | 14篇 |
1998年 | 3篇 |
1997年 | 4篇 |
1996年 | 6篇 |
1995年 | 3篇 |
1994年 | 6篇 |
1993年 | 6篇 |
1992年 | 1篇 |
1991年 | 3篇 |
1989年 | 1篇 |
1988年 | 5篇 |
1986年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有345条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
281.
Louise Cummings 《Argumentation》2004,18(1):61-94
In this paper, I examine the incessant call to theory that is evident in fallacy inquiry. I relate the motivations for this call to a desire to attain for fallacy inquiry certain attributes of the theoretical process in scientific inquiry. I argue that these same attributes, when pursued in the context of philosophical inquiry in general and fallacy inquiry in particular, lead to the assumption of a metaphysical standpoint. This standpoint, I contend, is generative of unintelligibility in philosophical discussions of rationality. I claim that this same unintelligibility can be shown to characterise fallacy inquiry, an example of the study of argumentative rationality. The context for my claim is an examination of the theoretical pronouncements of two prominent fallacy theorists, John Woods and Douglas Walton, in relation to the argument from ignorance fallacy. My conclusion takes the form of guidelines for the post-theoretical pursuit of fallacy inquiry. 相似文献
282.
与Brenmer等(1997)的实验对照,对4~7岁的儿童考察观察角度的变化方式、模型状态、年龄等与其绘画简单深度关系中视觉写实水平的关系。实验结果表明:年龄是影响儿童绘画简单深度关系中视觉写实水平的重要因素;观察角度变化的两种方式在6~7岁组有显著差异;模型状态对不同性别儿童的绘画成绩影响显著。 相似文献
283.
T. M. Scanlon 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2017,47(6):877-897
In response to comments on my book, Being Realistic about Reasons, by Justin Clarke-Doane, David Enoch and Tristram McPherson, and Gideon Rosen, I try to clarify my domain-based view of ontology, my understanding of the epistemology of normative judgments, and my interpretation of the phenomenon of supervenience. 相似文献
284.
This is a contribution to the symposium on Tim Scanlon’s Being Realistic about Reasons (2014). We have two aims here: First, we ask for more details about Scanlon’s meta-metaphysical view (about his notion of a domain, his criterion of existence, his ambition to remain ontologically thin, and on the role of pragmatic considerations in Scanlon’s picture), showing problems with salient clarifications. And second, we raise independent objections to the view – to its explanatory productivity, its distinctness, and the argumentative support it enjoys. 相似文献
285.
Justin Clarke-Doane 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2017,47(6):841-855
Scanlon’s Being Realistic about Reasons is a beautiful book – sleek, sophisticated, and programmatic. One of its key aims is to demystify knowledge of normative and mathematical truths, realistically construed – i.e. construed, roughly, as being true relevantly independent of minds and languages, when interpreted at face-value. In this article, I develop an epistemological problem that Scanlon fails to explicitly address. I argue that his ‘metaphysical pluralism’ can be understood as a response to that problem. However, it resolves the problem only if it undercuts the objectivity of normative and mathematical inquiry. 相似文献
286.
Raff Donelson 《Metaphilosophy》2017,48(4):383-403
Beginning with a thought experiment about a mysterious Delphic oracle, this article motivates, explains, and attempts to defend a view it calls Ethical Pragmatism. Ethical Pragmatism is the view that we can and should carry on our practice of moral deliberation without reference to moral truths, or more broadly, without reference to metaethics. The defense the article mounts tries to show that neither suspicions about the tenability of fact‐value distinctions, nor doubts about the viability of global pragmatism, nor worries about the “force” of ethical injunctions without reference to moral truths constitute good reason to reject Ethical Pragmatism. 相似文献
287.
Moral realism has been advanced as a central theme in contemporary hermeneutic thought. From this standpoint, participation in cultural practices is made possible and meaningful by ontologically real moral goods and reference points. Cultural practices thus constitute a moral referential totality for human action. This article suggests that these and related hermeneutic insights offer a unique perspective for taking account of practical involvement in the world and can form the basis of an interpretive frame for research that foregrounds this practice-based moral realism. An emphasis on moral realist concepts such as participation in practice, distinctions of worth, strong evaluations, and moral reference points can allow interrelated phenomena to show up as aspects of a moral ecology and reveal something about their moral significance within a form of practice. Moreover, inquiry of this sort can reveal something about that form of practice as a space of moral possibilities for action. 相似文献
288.
《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2017,(1):151-181
Descartes' metaphysical doubts in the Third and Fifth Meditations present a scenario like this:it is possible that I (the Meditator) am so imperfect as to be deceived by my author (i.e.,an omnipotent God/Deceiver) in the matters which I think I perceive clearly and distinctly.The metaphysical doubts attempt to cast doubt on beliefs based on present or recollected clear and distinct perceptions.This paper clarifies the intension of the metaphysical doubts by answering the question of how an omnipotent God/Deceiver might exercise a deceptive influence on clear and distinct perception.My analysis shows:(1) the memory interpretation and the retrospective interpretation to be implausible;(2) the incoherence interpretation to be ill-founded,though its conclusion is partly right,such that we should accept a weaker version of it;(3) the misrepresentation interpretation,the defective-origin interpretation,the truth-value variation interpretation and the radical interpretation to be plausible;(4) all of these credible interpretations to be compatible with each other as well. 相似文献
289.
Perhaps the most significant contemporary theory of lawhood is the Best System (/MRL) view on which laws are true generalizations
that best systematize knowledge. Our question in this paper will be how best to formulate a theory of this kind. We’ll argue
that an acceptable MRL should (i) avoid inter-system comparisons of simplicity, strength, and balance, (ii) make lawhood epistemically
accessible, and (iii) allow for laws in the special sciences. Attention to these problems will bring into focus a useful menu
of novel MRL theories, some of which solve problems the original MRL theory could not. Hence we conceive of the paper as moving
toward a better Best System theory of laws.
相似文献
Craig CallenderEmail: |
290.
Christopher Norris 《Metaphilosophy》2003,34(4):387-424
Abstract: Response‐dispositional (RD) properties are standardly defined as those that involve an object's appearing thus or thus to some perceptually well‐equipped observer under specified epistemic conditions. The paradigm instance is that of colour or other such Lockean “secondary qualities”, as distinct from those—like shape and size—that pertain to the object itself, quite apart from anyone's perception. This idea has lately been thought to offer a promising alternative to the deadlocked dispute between hard‐line ‘metaphysical’ realists and subjectivists, projectivists, social constructivists, or hard‐line anti‐realists. A chief source text is Plato's Euthyphro, where the issue is posed in ethical terms: do the gods infallibly approve virtuous acts on account of their divine moral omniscience or are virtuous acts just those the gods approve? Among the areas proposed as amenable to an RD approach are epistemology, ethics, political theory, and philosophy of mathematics. It is claimed that by making due allowance for the involvement of normalised or optimised human responses one can steer a course between the twin poles of an objectivist realism that places truth beyond our cognitive grasp and an epistemic conception that confines truth within the limits of humanly attainable proof, knowledge, or verification. Here I argue—on the contrary—that RD approaches can be shown to offer nothing more than a variant of the same old realist versus anti‐realist dilemma. That is, they work out either as a trivial (tautologous) claim that ‘truth’ simply equates with ‘best judgement’ in the ideal (quasi‐objective) limit or as the claim—advanced by anti‐realists like Michael Dummett—that we cannot form any adequate conception of objective (recognition‐transcendent) truths. After looking at this issue in various contexts of debate, I conclude that one useful (if pyrrhic) outcome is to demonstrate the non‐availability of any middle‐ground stance. We are left with the strictly unavoidable choice between a realist or objectivist approach and one that assimilates truth to the consensus of accredited best opinion. This latter amounts to a roundabout, elaborately qualified version of the anti‐realist case. 相似文献