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171.
Michael L. Anderson 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2006,5(2):125-154
Recent findings in cognitive science suggest that the epistemic subject is more complex and epistemically porous than is generally
pictured. Human knowers are open to the world via multiple channels, each operating for particular purposes and according
to its own logic. These findings need to be understood and addressed by the philosophical community. The current essay argues
that one consequence of the new findings is to invalidate certain arguments for epistemic anti-realism. 相似文献
172.
Julia Hermann 《Ratio》2019,32(4):300-311
Assuming that there is moral progress, and assuming that the abolition of slavery is an example of it, how does moral progress occur? Is it mainly driven by specific individuals who have gained new moral insights, or by changes in the socio‐economic and epistemic conditions in which agents morally judge the norms and practices of their society, and act upon these judgements? In this paper, I argue that moral progress is a complex process in which changes at the level of belief and changes at the level of institutions and social practices are deeply intertwined, and that changes in the socio‐economic and epistemic conditions of moral agency constitute the main motor of moral progress. I develop my view of moral progress by way of grappling with Michelle Moody‐Adams’ prominent philosophical account of it. My view is less intellectualistic and individualistic than hers, does not presuppose meta‐ethical moral realism, and blurs her distinction between moral progress in beliefs and moral progress in social practices. I point out the limits of humans to progress morally, which are partly grounded in our evolutionary history, and argue that moral progress is always of a ‘local’ nature. 相似文献
173.
Alex Moran 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2019,97(2):368-382
This paper sets out a novel response to the ‘screening off’ problem for naïve realism. The aim is to resist the claim (which many naïve realists accept) that the kind of experience involved in hallucinating also occurs during perception, by arguing that there are causal constraints that must be met if an hallucinatory experience is to occur, ones that are never met in perceptual cases. Notably, given this response, it turns out that, contra current orthodoxy, naïve realists need not adopt any particular view about the psychological nature of hallucinatory experience to handle the screening off problem. Consequently, room opens up for naïve realists to endorse whatever theory of hallucinatory experience seems to best capture the distinctive nature of such episodes. 相似文献
174.
Vassilis Livanios 《Metaphilosophy》2019,50(4):516-535
This paper aims to be a contribution to the recent discussion on the science‐metaphysics relationship. After drawing a distinction between two aspects of the relationship, it defends the theoretical importance of the proposed distinction and argues for the interconnectedness of the aspects in question. The paper then focuses on one of those aspects: that is, the methodological strategy of some metaphysicians to appeal to scientific findings and practice in the course of discussing various pure metaphysical problems. It discusses the question about the scope of science‐informed metaphysics and its relation to the issue concerning the existence of an autonomous metaphysical possibility. Finally, the paper explores the reasons metaphysicians have for involving science in metaphysical discussions. 相似文献
175.
Carla Bagnoli 《Ratio》2019,32(4):325-338
According to many, evolutionary accounts of ethics undermine the prospects of its objective foundation. By contrast, this paper argues that such evolutionary accounts discredit only the absolutist construal of moral truths as timeless but supports other conceptions of objectivity as tested by time. Insofar as Kantian constructivism addresses the problem of ethical objectivity from the standpoint of temporal rational agents, it is not vulnerable to debunking arguments based on evolutionary explanations. In fact, recent work on evolutionary accounts of reasoning and inferences not only coheres with but it also reinforces the constructivist conception of practical reason as a problem‐solving cooperative device apt to temporal and interdependent rational agents. 相似文献
176.
Robert M. Geraci 《Zygon》2002,37(4):891-908
Technical achievement in laboratories requires millennia–old ritual formulations; the methodological expectations and presuppositions of scientists stem not only from investigations of the last three centuries but also from the ritual knowledge making that has governed human religion. Laboratory research is a form of human ritual open to interpretation in the manner of religious ritual. The experiments of the laboratory are fact–gathering ventures, but the integration of that knowledge into our general understanding of a universe of information networks is the process of knowledge making, and it is the highest achievement of all rituals, be they religious or scientific. Ritual theory offers insight into the nature of scientific experimentation. 相似文献
177.
John Lemos 《Zygon》2002,37(4):789-801
In Michael Ruse's recent publications, such as Taking Darwin Seriously (1998) and Evolutionary Naturalism (1995), he has advocated a certain sort of evolutionary epistemology and has argued that it implies a rejection of metaphysical realism (MR) in favor of a position that he calls "internal realism" (IR). Additionally, he has maintained that, insofar as his evolutionary epistemology implies a rejection of MR in favor of IR, it escapes the kind of argument against naturalism that Alvin Plantinga makes in his Warrant and Proper Function (1993). In this article I explain the relevant views and arguments of Ruse and Plantinga, and I critically engage with Ruse's views, arguing that (1) his case for rejecting MR has no essential connection to evolutionary considerations; (2) his case for rejecting MR depends upon internalist assumptions about the nature of knowledge that are in need of some kind of defense; and (3) given his implicit internalism and his commitment to IR, his argument for rejecting MR can be used against his IR. 相似文献
178.
Maria Antonaccio 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2001,4(2):127-141
This paper draws from the resources of Iris Murdoch's moral philosophy to analyze the ethical status of the emotions at two related levels of reflection. Methodologically, it argues that a recovery of the emotions requires a revised notion of moral theory which affirms the basic orientation of consciousness to some notion of value or the good. Such a theory challenges many of the rationalist premises which in the past have led moral theory to reject the role of emotions in ethics. In particular, it acknowledges the centrality of moral psychology to ethics and reclaims the notion of consciousness rather than the will as the primary mode of human moral being. At a second, more substantive level, the paper explores the relation between the emotions and consciousness. Specifically, it defends a cognitivist and reflexive theory of the emotions which affirms a strong relation between the emotions and our evaluative beliefs. On this view, the emotions reflexively mediate our relation to objective value. In order to earn their cognitive status, however, the emotions must be tested in relation to a critical principle in order to guard against the egoistic tendencies of consciousness to build up images of reality to serve its own purposes. Therefore, a theory of the Good must be part of the critical content of a reflexive theory of the emotions. 相似文献
179.
Russell Pryba 《Metaphilosophy》2021,52(1):60-74
This paper examines the early aesthetic writings of Joseph Margolis from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s in order to argue for the relevance of these works in understanding Margolis’s later, more well-known views in the philosophy of art. Specifically, the paper addresses Margolis’s early essays on the definition and ontology of art and aesthetic perception. These essays not only show Margolis engaged in the most significant debates in mid-century analytic aesthetics but also provide important indications of the limitations of that approach to thinking about the arts that informs the development of Margolis’s later cultural realism. 相似文献
180.
Neil W. Williams 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2018,26(1):154-175
Since the term ‘pragmatism’ was first coined, there have been debates about who is or is not a ‘real’ pragmatist, and what that might mean. The division most often drawn in contemporary pragmatist scholarship is between William James and Charles Peirce. Peirce is said to present a version of pragmatism which is scientific, logical and objective about truth, whereas James presents a version which is nominalistic, subjectivistic and leads to relativism. The first person to set out this division was in fact Peirce himself, when he distinguished his own ‘pragmaticism’ from the broad pragmatism of James and others. Peirce sets out six criteria which defines ‘pragmaticism’: the pragmatic maxim; a number of ‘preliminary propositions’; prope-positivism; metaphysical inquiry; critical common-sensism; and scholastic realism. This paper sets out to argue that in fact James meets each of these criteria, and should be seen as a ‘pragmaticist’ by Peirce’s own lights. 相似文献