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151.
This paper discusses the third volume of Pullman's remarkable trilogy. The two main child characters, Lyra and Will, are now entering adolescence, and the novel explores their intense and ambivalent feelings towards the parents and the variously protective or hostile parental figures who surround them. The novel devises remarkable imaginary worlds – for example the land of the mulefa, and the underworld visited by Will and Lyra – through which to explore issues of considerable intellectual and emotional depth. The ‘realism’ to which Pullman is committed is apparent in the conclusion of the book, where the two child characters, who have fallen in love with one another, have to accept the necessity of separation. 相似文献
152.
Kile Jones 《Zygon》2010,45(3):575-589
One of the most focused research programs in the science‐religion dialogue that has taken place up to the present is the series of volumes published jointly by the Vatican Observatory and the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences. Originating with the encouragement of Pope John Paul II, this series has produced seven volumes focusing on how divine action can be understood in light of contemporary science. A retrospective volume published in 2008, Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action: Twenty Years of Challenge and Progress, contains articles reviewing the series as a whole. In this article I analyze the series as a whole as well as some of the pivotal problems discussed throughout the series, such as the zero‐sum game, scientific “traction,” falsifiability in theories of divine action, and locating special divine action in the physical world. 相似文献
153.
Catriona Mackenzie 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(3):528-532
Many take the claim that you cannot ‘get’ an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ to imply that non-moral beliefs are by themselves incapable of justifying moral beliefs. I argue that this is a mistake and that the position that moral beliefs are justified exclusively by non-moral beliefs—a view that I call moral inferentialism—presents an attractive non-sceptical moral epistemology. 相似文献
154.
Thomas Lambert 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2019,62(1):49-69
ABSTRACTThis article considers Friedrich Nietzsche’s claims about value creation alongside his proclamation that ‘nature is always value-less’ (GS 301), assessing their implications for his metaethics. It begins by weighing the evidence for a recent constructivist interpretation of Nietzsche’s metaethics, arguing that despite several apparent interpretive advantages, Nietzschean constructivism ultimately fails. Through a close reading of GS 301 and related passages, the constructivist interpretation is shown to be misguided in taking Nietzsche’s talk of value creation as expressing (or playing a significant role in) a metaethical view according to which the evaluative attitudes of philosophers ground what is valuable. Against this, it is argued that GS 301 should be understood as an assertion of the status of philosophers as the causal sources of new evaluative outlooks that shape the held values of their respective cultures, a claim developed through analysis of passages in which Nietzsche discusses his ideal of the ‘genuine philosopher’ and contrasts this figure with ‘critics’ or ‘philosophical laborers’ (BGE 210–211). It is next argued that, insofar as it is best understood as describing a social or anthropological phenomenon rather than a metaphysical one, GS 301 is a poor piece of evidence not only for the constructivist interpretation, but in fact for any account of Nietzsche’s metaethical position—including radical anti-realist interpretations informed by his statement that ‘nature is always value-less’. The paper then concludes by appealing to another passage, GS 55, which hints towards a very different—and plausibly realist—picture of Nietzsche’s metaethics 相似文献
155.
This paper sets out a moderate version of metaphysical structural realism that stands in contrast to both the epistemic structural
realism of Worrall and the—radical—ontic structural realism of French and Ladyman. According to moderate structural realism,
objects and relations (structure) are on the same ontological footing, with the objects being characterized only by the relations
in which they stand. We show how this position fares well as regards philosophical arguments, avoiding the objections against
the other two versions of structural realism. In particular, we set out how this position can be applied to space-time, providing
for a convincing understanding of space-time points in the standard tensor formulation of general relativity as well as in
the fibre bundle formulation. 相似文献
156.
Chris John Daly 《Synthese》2008,162(1):37-52
David Lewis’s genuine modal realism is a controversial thesis in modal metaphysics. Charles Chihara and Ross Cameron have
each argued that Lewis’s defence of his thesis involves his committing serious methodological errors; in particular, that
his replies to two well-known and important objections are question-begging. Scott Shalkowski has further argued that Lewis’s
attempt to analyse modal talk in non-modal terms is viciously circular. This paper considers the methodology which Lewis uses
to argue for his thesis, and the paper tries to show that it is guilty of no methodological errors. 相似文献
157.
Abstact: This article responds critically to Tom Rockmore's essay “On Classical and Neo‐Analytic Forms of Pragmatism,” which appeared in Metaphilosophy in 2005. Rockmore charges analytic pragmatism with having a conflicted epistemology, relying on incoherent appropriations of Hegel, and maintaining an unpragmatic commitment to metaphysical realism. We rebut these charges by arguing that what Rockmore sees as conflicted in analytic pragmatist epistemology is simply fallibilism, that appropriations of Hegel needn't be as global as Rockmore claims, and that commitments to metaphysical realism need not disqualify philosophers from being pragmatists. 相似文献
158.
Peter Godfrey-Smith 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):141-148
Kyle Stanford’s arguments against scientific realism are assessed, with a focus on the underdetermination of theory by evidence.
I argue that discussions of underdetermination have neglected a possible symmetry which may ameliorate the situation.
相似文献
Peter Godfrey-SmithEmail: |
159.
Lothar Schäfer 《Zygon》2008,43(2):329-352
I describe characteristic phenomena of quantum physics that suggest that reality appears to us in two domains: the open and well‐known domain of empirical, material things—the realm of actuality—and a hidden and invisible domain of nonempirical, non‐material forms—the realm of potentiality. The nonempirical forms are part of physical reality because they contain the empirical possibilities of the universe and can manifest themselves in the empirical world. Two classes of nonempirical states are discussed: the superposition states of microphysical entities, which are nonempirical because observation destroys them, and the virtual states of material systems, which are nonempirical because they are empty. The non‐empirical part to physical reality represents a predetermined and hidden order that exists before it is empirical, and the visible world is an emanation out of it. I discuss consequences for our understanding of human nature, the origin of life, and human values. Reality is an indivisible wholeness that is aware of its processes, like a Cosmic Spirit, and it reveals its awareness in the mindlike properties of elementary processes as well as in the human consciousness. Thus, one is led to G. W. F. Hegel's thesis that the Cosmic Spirit is thinking in us. 相似文献
160.
Valeriano Iranzo 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2008,39(1):115-120
According to the “no-miracles argument” (NMA), truth is the best explanation of the predictive-instrumental success of scientific
theories. A standard objection against NMA is that it is viciously circular. In Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth Stathis Psillos has claimed that the circularity objection can be met when NMA is supplemented with a reliabilist approach
to justification. I will try to show, however, that scientific realists cannot take much comfort from this policy: if reliabilism
makes no qualifications about the domain where inference to the best explanation is reliable, scientific realists flagrantly
beg the question. A qualified version of reliabilism, on the other side, does not entitle us to infer the realist conclusion.
I conclude, then, that Psillos’s proposal does not make any significant progress for scientific realism.
相似文献
Valeriano IranzoEmail: |