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151.
Peter Godfrey-Smith 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):141-148
Kyle Stanford’s arguments against scientific realism are assessed, with a focus on the underdetermination of theory by evidence.
I argue that discussions of underdetermination have neglected a possible symmetry which may ameliorate the situation.
相似文献
Peter Godfrey-SmithEmail: |
152.
Peter Godfrey-Smith 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(1):101-116
Non-actual model systems discussed in scientific theories are compared to fictions in literature. This comparison may help
with the understanding of similarity relations between models and real-world target systems. The ontological problems surrounding
fictions in science may be particularly difficult, however. A comparison is also made to ontological problems that arise in
the philosophy of mathematics.
相似文献
Peter Godfrey-SmithEmail: |
153.
Helen Longino 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(1):25-32
Bas van Fraassen’s empiricist reading of Perrin’s achievement invites the question: whose doubts about atoms did Perrin put to rest? This comment recontextualizes the argument and applies the notion of empirical grounding to some contemporary work in behavioral biology. 相似文献
154.
Gary Slater 《Zygon》2014,49(3):593-611
The evolutionary debunking argument advanced by Sharon Street, Michael Ruse, and Richard Joyce employs the logic of Paul Griffiths and John Wilkins to contend that humans cannot have knowledge of moral truths, since the evolutionary process that has produced our basic moral intuitions lacks causal connections to those (putative) truths. Yet this argument is self‐defeating, because its aim is the categorical, normative claim that we should suspend our moral beliefs in light of the discoveries about their non‐truth‐tracking origins, when it is precisely this claim that relies upon the normativity under attack. This article cites Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914) to argue that such self‐defeat can be avoided by expanding upon the basic structure of the argument put forth by Griffiths and Wilkins, provided that one embraces a version of realism that corresponds with Peirce's doctrine of final causation. So construed, final causation reconciles real generals (including real moral values) with natural selection and undergirds further speculation of moral facts within values per se. 相似文献
155.
Chris John Daly 《Synthese》2008,162(1):37-52
David Lewis’s genuine modal realism is a controversial thesis in modal metaphysics. Charles Chihara and Ross Cameron have
each argued that Lewis’s defence of his thesis involves his committing serious methodological errors; in particular, that
his replies to two well-known and important objections are question-begging. Scott Shalkowski has further argued that Lewis’s
attempt to analyse modal talk in non-modal terms is viciously circular. This paper considers the methodology which Lewis uses
to argue for his thesis, and the paper tries to show that it is guilty of no methodological errors. 相似文献
156.
According to John Mackie, moral talk is representational (the realists go that bit right) but its metaphysical presuppositions
are wildly implausible (the non-cognitivists got that bit right). This is the basis of Mackie’s now famous error theory: that
moral judgments are cognitively meaningful but systematically false. Of course, Mackie went on to recommend various substantive
moral judgments, and, in the light of his error theory, that has seemed odd to a lot of folk. Richard Joyce has argued that
Mackie’s approach can be vindicated by a fictionalist account of moral discourse. And Mark Kalderon has argued that moral
fictionalism is attractive quite independently of Mackie’s error-theory. Kalderon argues that the Frege–Geach problem shows
that we need moral propositions, but that a fictionalist can and should embrace propositional content together with a non-cognitivist
account of acceptance of a moral proposition. Indeed, it is clear that any fictionalist is going to have to postulate more
than one kind of acceptance attitude. We argue that this double-approach to acceptance generates a new problem – a descendent
of Frege–Geach – which we call the acceptance–transfer problem. Although we develop the problem in the context of Kalderon’s
version of non-cognitivist fictionalism, we show that it is not the non-cognitivist aspect of Kalderon’s account that generates
the problem. A closely related problem surfaces for the more typical variants of fictionalism according to which accepting
a moral proposition is believing some closely related non-moral proposition. Fictionalists of both stripes thus have an attitude
problem.
相似文献
Graham OddieEmail: |
157.
Lucy Allais 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(4):369-392
This paper compares Kant's transcendental idealism with three main groups of contemporary anti‐realism, associated with Wittgenstein, Putnam, and Dummett, respectively. The kind of anti‐realism associated with Wittgenstein has it that there is no deep sense in which our concepts are answerable to reality. Associated with Putnam is the rejection of four main ideas: theoryindependent reality, the idea of a uniquely true theory, a correspondence theory of truth, and bivalence. While there are superficial similarities between both views and Kant's, I find more significant differences. Dummettian anti‐realism, too, clearly differs from Kant's position: Kant believes in verification‐transcendent reality, and transcendental idealism is not a theory of meaning or truth. However, I argue that part of the Dummettian position is extremely useful for understanding part of Kant's position – his idealism about the appearances of things. I argue that Kant's idealism about appearances can be expressed as the rejection of experiencetranscendent reality with respect to appearances. 相似文献
158.
Guillaume Frechette 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(5):654-679
AbstractPhenomenological accounts of self-consciousness are often said to combine two elements by means of a necessary connection: the primitive and irreducible subjective character of experiences and the idealist transcendental constitution of consciousness. In what follows I argue that this connection is not necessary in order for an account of self-consciousness to be phenomenological, as shown by early phenomenological accounts of self-consciousness – particularly in Munich phenomenology. First of all, I show that the account of self-consciousness defended by these phenomenologists was not influenced as much by Husserl as by two important figures in the prehistory of phenomenology: their teacher Theodor Lipps, and – indirectly, through Lipps’ influence – Hermann Lotze. Second, I show that their account of self-consciousness takes the metaphysical realism underlying Lotze’s and Lipps’ views on the distinction between feeling and sensations seriously. I argue that this distinction played a central role in the development of many early phenomenological accounts of self-consciousness. 相似文献
159.
Valeriano Iranzo 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2008,39(1):115-120
According to the “no-miracles argument” (NMA), truth is the best explanation of the predictive-instrumental success of scientific
theories. A standard objection against NMA is that it is viciously circular. In Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth Stathis Psillos has claimed that the circularity objection can be met when NMA is supplemented with a reliabilist approach
to justification. I will try to show, however, that scientific realists cannot take much comfort from this policy: if reliabilism
makes no qualifications about the domain where inference to the best explanation is reliable, scientific realists flagrantly
beg the question. A qualified version of reliabilism, on the other side, does not entitle us to infer the realist conclusion.
I conclude, then, that Psillos’s proposal does not make any significant progress for scientific realism.
相似文献
Valeriano IranzoEmail: |
160.
Alex Moran 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2019,97(2):368-382
This paper sets out a novel response to the ‘screening off’ problem for naïve realism. The aim is to resist the claim (which many naïve realists accept) that the kind of experience involved in hallucinating also occurs during perception, by arguing that there are causal constraints that must be met if an hallucinatory experience is to occur, ones that are never met in perceptual cases. Notably, given this response, it turns out that, contra current orthodoxy, naïve realists need not adopt any particular view about the psychological nature of hallucinatory experience to handle the screening off problem. Consequently, room opens up for naïve realists to endorse whatever theory of hallucinatory experience seems to best capture the distinctive nature of such episodes. 相似文献