From Conceptual Analysis to Serious Metaphysics

Abstract

Habermas’s recent work in epistemology has been marked by a decisive rejection of his earlier epistemic conception of truth in which he understood truth as ‘what may be accepted as rational under ideal conditions’. Arguing that no ‘idealization of justificatory conditions’ can do justice to both human fallibility and the unconditional nature of truth, he has attempted to develop a realistic conception of truth that severs any conceptual link between truth and justification while respecting the epistemic relevance of justification for ascertaining the truth. But realizing this second goal has proved elusive for Habermas because he veers too close to a form of metaphysical realism in his epistemology. By contrast, Hilary Putnam’s recent turn to what he calls ‘natural realism’ is more successful in articulating a form of realism that, in taking its leave of an epistemic conception of truth, still manages to keep its distance from metaphysical realism.     

The Limits of Photography

Abstract

This paper is about what counts as a photograph and what does not. One way in which this question arises stems from new technologies that keep changing our way of producing photographs, such as digital photography, which not only has now widely replaced traditional film photography but also challenges the very limits of what we count as a photograph. I shall discuss below at some length different aspects of digital photography, but also want to focus here on a new striking type of photographic camera, announced in early 2012 by Lytro, Inc., namely, the so-called ‘Light Field Camera’, which is said to represent a revolution in the photographic world. Indeed, unlike in the case of any previously available cameras, the photographs produced by a Light Field Camera can be re-focused after the photograph has been taken, which harbours many interesting consequences with regard to the resulting image and the way we interact with it. But of course, the initial question also arises in the case of traditional film photography as well as ‘traditional’ digital photography. The question amounts to asking about what the essential features of photographs are – in short, what their nature is.     

Ostrich Nominalism and Peacock Realism: A Hegelian Critique of Quine

Abstract

My aim in this paper is to offer a Hegelian critique of Quine’s predicate nominalism. I argue that at the core of Hegel’s idealism is not a supernaturalist spirit monism, but a realism about universals, and that while this may contrast to the nominalist naturalism of Quine, Hegel’s position can still be defended over that nominalism in naturalistic terms. I focus on the contrast between Hegel’s and Quine’s respective views on universals, which Quine takes to be definitive of philosophical naturalism. I argue that there is no good reason to think Quine is right to make this nominalism definitive of naturalism in this way – where in fact Hegel (along with Peirce) offers a reasonably compelling case that science itself requires some commitment to realism about universals, kinds, etc. Furthermore, even if Hegel is wrong about that, at least his case for realism is still a naturalistic one, as it is based on his views on concrete universality, which is an innovative form of in rebus realism about universals.     

A Mereological Challenge to Endurantism

In this paper, we argue that time travel is problematic for the endurantist. For it appears to be possible, given time travel, to construct a wall out of a single time travelling brick. This commits the endurantist to one of the following: (a) the wall is composed of the time travelling brick many times over; (b) the wall does not in fact exist at all; (c) the wall is identical to the brick. We argue that each of these options is unsatisfactory.     

Critical Realism—A Sustainable Bridge Between Science and Religion?

Since Barbour's introduction of the term in 1966, “critical realism” bridges the gulf between science and religion. Yet, like the Golden Gate Bridge, this bridge must be supported by pillars to carry its weight. These pillars are the social and the human sciences, which are still designed too small within critical realism to make a really sustainable construct. Critical realism should be modified to “constructive-critical realism” to allow for more weight of these disciplines in the dialog, which actually should become a trialog.     

Natural character: psychological realism for the downwardly mobile

Nancey Murphy recently offered a proposal for altruistic self-renunciation as the core theory of a Christian research program in psychology. Her argument intersects with recent concerns in moral psychology that theory should be constrained by the lives of ordinary people, an idea known as psychological realism. This article considers limitations for altruistic self-renunciation through research with L’Arche assistants for the developmentally disabled. Incipient, “natural” character is evident through the ambivalence of these everyday altruists, creating a difficult methodological challenge for the psychological realist. Consequently, a novel approach for the mathematical analysis of subject narrative is explored with the use of a powerful computational linguistics program.     

Global government or global governance? Realism and idealism in Kant's legal theory

Did Kant believe we need a world government? It has been a matter of controversy in Kant scholarship whether Kant endorsed the creation of a world state or merely a voluntary federation of states with no coercive power. I argue that Kant's main concern was with a global juridical condition, which he regarded as a rational requirement given the equal freedom and equality of individuals. However, he recognized that implementing this rational ideal requires sensitivity to contingent aspects of world politics. I will argue that Kant offers an ideal theory not disentangled from realist considerations and that he adopts what I will call methodological realism: the attempt to realize the requirements of Right (Recht) in a world governed by its own laws and mechanisms. I will illustrate this interpretation with Kant's discussion of the right of nations (Völkerrecht). The confusion in regard to Kant's actual position on the matter, I will argue, is a direct consequence of Kant's methodological realism. The article concludes by showing how Kant’'s ideas and methods can inspire us to rethink global institutions for our current global challenges.     

Scanlon’s modal metaphysics

In Being Realistic About Reasons (Oxford University Press, 2014) T. M. Scanlon argues that particular fact about reasons are explained by contingent non-normative facts together with pure normative principles. A question then arises about the modal status of these pure principles. Scanlon maintains that they are necessary in a sense, and suggests that they are ‘metaphysically’ necessary. I argue that the best view for Scanlon to take, given his other commitments, is that these pure normative principles are metaphysically contingent in some cases and necessary only in a weaker sense.     

WHAT KIND OF PERSON COULD BE A TORTURER?

What kind of persons could engage in political torture? Not only the morally impaired who lack empathy or compassion, or even the merely obedient, but also the righteous who struggle with conscience, and the realists who set morality aside.     

《周易》与接受美学

<周易>作为众经之首,对中国文化和中国人的思维定势产生过强烈的影响.在<周易>影响下形成的玄学论文艺观,则是基于表现宇宙原理的理论.这种宇宙原理在玄学论中一般都称之为"道"."道沿圣以垂文,圣因文而明道",由此形成宇宙、作者、作品三者关系;而文章必须通过读者大众的阅读,才会对社会起作用,这就强调了读者中心.后来,西方兴起的接受美学,也强调读者中心,正与中国的玄学论文艺观不谋而合.