Revisionary Dispositionalism and Practical Reason

This paper examines the metaphysically modest view that attributionsof normative reasons can be made true in the absence of a responseindependent normative reality. The paper despairs in finding asatisfactory account of normative reasons in metaphysically modestterms.     

Is backing grounding?

Separatists are grounding theorists who hold that grounding relations and metaphysical explanations are distinct, yet intimately connected in the sense that grounding relations back metaphysical explanations, just as causal relations back causal explanations. But Separatists have not elaborated on the nature of the ‘backing’ relation. In this paper, I argue that backing is a form of (partial) grounding. In particular, backing has many of the properties commonly attributed to grounding, and taking backing to be partial grounding allows Separatists to make the most of their position vis-à-vis their Unionist opponents.     

《易纬·乾凿度》残篇文解析--西汉形上思想的成就

摘要<易纬·乾凿度>残篇文保存下来论气化宇宙的一节文字,这节文字所含的形上思想体系乃是以<易经>哲学为架构并融合了道家思想而成,它反映了汉代形上思想的最高成就.就形上思想的严密结构而论,自先秦以来,唯有此一思想体系能与儒、道两家并立而三.     

《周易》与接受美学

<周易>作为众经之首,对中国文化和中国人的思维定势产生过强烈的影响.在<周易>影响下形成的玄学论文艺观,则是基于表现宇宙原理的理论.这种宇宙原理在玄学论中一般都称之为"道"."道沿圣以垂文,圣因文而明道",由此形成宇宙、作者、作品三者关系;而文章必须通过读者大众的阅读,才会对社会起作用,这就强调了读者中心.后来,西方兴起的接受美学,也强调读者中心,正与中国的玄学论文艺观不谋而合.     

Is Nature Enough? No

Abstract. This essay is based on a lecture delivered at the 2002 IRAS Star Island conference, the theme of which was “Is Nature Enough? The Thirst for Transcendence.” I had been asked to represent the position of those who would answer No to the question. I thought it would stimulate discussion if I presented my side of the debate in a somewhat provocative manner rather than use a more ponderous approach that would argue each point in a meticulous and protracted fashion. Here I lay out a theological position that finds naturalism wanting in three ways: in terms of human spiritual needs, in terms of the mind's need for deep explanation, and in terms of the perennial human search for truth. Again, the style of presentation, like that of the original lecture, prohibits the kind of philosophical development that an adequate answer to each of the issues requires. The purpose is that of evoking discussion on a most important question.     

Negotiating the Boundaries of Science and Religion: The Case of Henry Margenau

The life of Henry Margenau (1901–1997) offers a case study in the complexity of the science-religion relation. As a physicist-philosopher at Yale University, he pursued a public program of "amalgamating religion with science." He drew upon his authority as a physicist and a tradition of philosophical idealism to advocate a "reciprocity" between the two spheres. He argued that a "new modesty" and "metaphysical attitude" among scientists created new opportunities for collaboration. At the same time, his view of faith and his sense of the religiousness of science created troubling ambiguities. In the end, Margenau embodied the ambivalent relation between science and religion while revealing the limits of renegotiating the boundaries.     

Über zwei Formen von Realismus in der Quantentheorie

On Two Types of Realism in Quantum Theory. Current realist approaches to the foundations of quantum theory emphasize the dichotomy between (Copenhagen) positivism and ‘beable’-realism. Recently it was even attempted to turn this picture into two (equally possible) histories in order to legitimate Bohmian Mechanics as a viable alternative. This paper argues that this dichotomy is philosophically inadequate and historically questionable by embedding it into the philosophical discussion on positivism and realism that has taken place since the 1920s. Logical Empiricists back then advocated empirical realism and contrasted it to absolutistic metaphysical realism. From this viewpoint David Bohm's ‘beable’-realism combines elements of Mach's sensualism with a pre-Kantian metaphysics. As Wesley Salmon's position shows, empirical realism can become quite pronounced without relapsing into Bohmian philosophy. Instead it arrives close to the GRWP-interpretation. Hence, when Bernard d'Espagnat binds both together as ‘ontological interpretations’, he blurs the borderline between empirical and metaphysical realism that his Veiled Reality has set out to draw, quite in concordance with Logical Empiricism. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Analytical Dispositionalism and Practical Reason

The paper examines the plausibility of analytical dispositionalism about practical reason, according to which the following claims are conceptual truths about common sense ethical discourse: i) Ethics: agents have reasons to act in some ways rather than others, and ii) Metaphysical Modesty: there is no such thing as a response independent normative reality. By elucidating two uncontroversial assumptions which are fundamental to the common sense commitment to ethics, I argue that common sense ethical discourse is most plausibly construed as committed to the denial of metaphysical modesty, and thereby as committed to the existence of a response independent normative reality.     

Boring Infinite Descent

In formal ontology, infinite regresses are generally considered a bad sign. One debate where such regresses come into play is the debate about fundamentality. Arguments in favour of some type of fundamentalism are many, but they generally share the idea that infinite chains of ontological dependence must be ruled out. Some motivations for this view are assessed in this article, with the conclusion that such infinite chains may not always be vicious. Indeed, there may even be room for a type of fundamentalism combined with infinite descent as long as this descent is “boring,” that is, the same structure repeats ad infinitum. A start is made in the article towards a systematic account of this type of infinite descent. The philosophical prospects and scientific tenability of the account are briefly evaluated using an example from physics.     

PROSPECTS FOR THE FIELD OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION: AN OCTOPUS VIEW

The organic unity between the head and the vital arms of the octopus is proposed as a metaphor for science and religion as an academic field. While the specific object of the field is to pursue second‐order reflections on existing and possible relations between sciences and religions, it is argued that several aspects of realism and normativity are constitutive to the field. The vital arms of the field are related to engagements with distinctive scientific theories, specialized philosophy of science, representative theological proposals, and the input from the study of world religions.