Discrimination in measures of knowledge monitoring accuracy

Knowledge monitoring predicts academic outcomes in many contexts. However, measures of knowledge monitoring accuracy are often incomplete. In the current study, a measure of students’ ability to discriminate known from unknown information as a component of knowledge monitoring was considered. Undergraduate students’ knowledge monitoring accuracy was assessed and used to predict final exam scores in a specific course. It was found that gamma, a measure commonly used as the measure of knowledge monitoring accuracy, accounted for a small, but significant amount of variance in academic performance whereas the discrimination and bias indexes combined to account for a greater amount of variance in academic performance.     

How evaluation and need for structure affect motivation and creativity

Research has shown that evaluation can have negative effects when it is perceived as controlling rather than informational. We hypothesized that Personal Need for Structure (PNS) would moderate the effects of (perceptions of) evaluative situations. Specifically, we expected that informational evaluative situations would be associated with higher motivation and higher creative performance than controlling evaluative situations, but only when PNS is low. In a field study (N = 53) and an experiment (N = 72), we showed consistently across samples, methods, and outcomes that the positive effects ofinformational evaluation only existed for individuals who were low in PNS. These findings support the reasoning that high PNS individuals tend to welcome any type of feedback because of its disambiguating potential.     

I Remember When You Taught Me That! Preschool Children's Memories of Realistic Learning Episodes

This study examined whether preschool children are able to identify the source of new knowledge that they acquired in a stimulating, interactive learning context. Sixty 4‐ to 5‐year‐old children participated in two staged learning events. Several days later, children were asked questions that assessed their knowledge of factual information presented during the events. Children indicated whether they knew the answer to each question and whether they remembered the moment they learned it (i.e. had an episodic memory of the learning event), and then recalled event details. A majority of preschoolers were able to accurately identify how they had learned at least some factual information, but this ability was not consistent across children and test items. Recall of event‐specific details was positively correlated with correct answers to factual questions. The results indicate that when preschool children are asked to reflect on past learning experiences that occurred in complex and realistic contexts, their source monitoring abilities are evident but not yet fully developed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Memory development in Libyan and Dutch school children

Cross-cultural similarities and differences in memory were examined in two studies with Libyan and Dutch school children of two different grades. The first study analysed effects of word length and pronunciation speed on recall. Baddeley's phonological loop hypothesis could fully account for the somewhat larger digit span of the Dutch children. The second study investigated effects of rehearsal training on recall. Experimental groups showed a higher performance increase after training than did control groups; Libyan children with the same pretest scores as Dutch children showed higher posttest scores, which could be a consequence of sample differences in age or test-wiseness. The studies demonstrated that current theories provide more precise explanations of cross-cultural differences in structural memory features than in control processes. Implications for instructional practice are discussed.     

Sense of agency over speech and proneness to auditory hallucinations: The reality-monitoring paradigm

This study investigated the effects of imagining speaking aloud, sensorimotor feedback, and auditory feedback on respondents' reports of having spoken aloud and examined the relationship between responses to “spoken aloud” in the reality-monitoring task and the sense of agency over speech. After speaking aloud, lip-synching, or imagining speaking, participants were asked whether each word had actually been spoken. The number of endorsements of “spoken aloud” was higher for words spoken aloud than for those lip-synched and higher for words lip-synched than for those imagined as having been spoken aloud. When participants were prevented by white noise from receiving auditory feedback, the discriminability of words spoken aloud decreased, and when auditory feedback was altered, reports of having spoken aloud decreased even though participants had actually done so. It was also found that those who have had auditory hallucination-like experiences were less able than were those without such experiences to discriminate the words spoken aloud, suggesting that endorsements of having “spoken aloud” in the reality-monitoring task reflected a sense of agency over speech. These results were explained in terms of the source-monitoring framework, and we proposed a revised forward model of speech in order to investigate auditory hallucinations.     

Generation difficulty and memory for source

The role of the word predictability from sentence context for reality monitoring and external source monitoring was examined in two experiments. In a reality-monitoring task, discrimination of an internal source was better in the hard than in the easy condition. It is probable that extra cognitive operations engaged during word generation in the hard condition were effective cues for reality-monitoring judgements. In contrast, in an external source-monitoring task (recognition memory of item's colour), the hard condition resulted in worse source memory for generated words than did the easy condition. This result is consistent both with an item–context trade-off hypothesis and a processing hypothesis. Greater effort involved at the time of generation might limit resources available for encoding of an external source. It is also possible that for generated words, the hard condition promoted conceptual processing instead of perceptual processing; therefore the item's colour was not effectively encoded.     

Attribution of movement: Potential links between subjective reports of agency and output monitoring

According to agency memory theory, individuals decide whether “I did it” based on a memory trace of “I am doing it”. The purpose of this study was to validate the agency memory theory. To this end, several hand actions were individually presented as samples, and participants were asked to perform the sample action, observe the performance of that action by another person, or imagine performing the action. Online feedback received by the participants during the action was manipulated among the different conditions, and output monitoring, in which participants were asked whether they had performed each hand action, was conducted. The rate at which respondents thought that they themselves had performed the action was higher when visual feedback was unaltered than when it was altered (Experiment 1A), and this tendency was observed across all types of altered feedback (Experiment 1B). The observation of an action performed by the hand of another person did not increase the rate at which respondents thought that they themselves had performed the action unless the participants actually did perform the action (Experiments 2A and 2B). In Experiment 3, a relationship was observed between the subjective feeling that “I am the one who is causing an action” and the memory that “I did perform the action”. These experiments support the hypothesis that qualitative information and sense of “self” are tagged in a memory trace and that such tags can be used as cues for judgements when the memory is related to the “self”.     

Children's eyewitness memory: Repeating post-event misinformation reduces the distinctiveness of a witnessed event

Children may incorporate misinformation into reports of witnessed events, particularly if the misinformation is repeated. One explanation is that the misinformation trace is strengthened by repetition. Alternatively, repeating misinformation may reduce the discriminability between event and misinformation sources, increasing interference between them. We tested trace strength and distinctiveness accounts by showing 5- and 6-year-olds an event and then presenting either the “same” or “varying” items of post-event misinformation across three iterations. Performance was compared to a baseline in which misinformation was presented once. Repeating the same misinformation increased suggestibility when misinformation was erroneously attributed to both event and misinformation sources, supporting a trace strength interpretation. However, suggestibility measured by attributing misinformation solely to the event, was lower when misinformation was presented repeatedly rather than once. In contrast, identification of the correct source of the event was less likely if the misinformation was repeated, whether the same or different across iterations. Thus a reduction in the distinctiveness of sources disrupted memory for the event source. Moreover, there was strong association between memory for the event and a measure of distinctiveness of sources, which takes into account both the number of confusable source and their apparent temporal spacing from the point of retrieval.     

So that's why I don't remember: Normalising forgetting of childhood events influences false autobiographical beliefs but not memories

We investigated changes in autobiographical belief and memory ratings for childhood events, after informing individuals that forgetting childhood events is common. Participants received false prevalence information (indicating that a particular childhood event occurred frequently in the population) plus a rationale normalising the forgetting of childhood events; false prevalence information alone; or no manipulation, for one (Study 1) or two (Study 2) unlikely childhood events. Results demonstrated that combining prevalence information and the “forgetting rationale” substantially influenced autobiographical belief ratings, whereas prevalence information alone had no impact (Study 1) or a significantly lesser impact (Study 2) on belief ratings. Prevalence information consistently impacted plausibility ratings. No changes in memory ratings were observed. These results provide further support for a nested relationship between judgements of plausibility, belief, and memory in evaluating the occurrence of autobiographical events. Furthermore, the results suggest that some purported false memory phenomena may instead reflect the development of autobiographical false beliefs in the absence of memory.     

Developmental Features of Rapid Aiming Arm Movements Across the Lifespan

Using a lifespan approach, the authors investigated developmental features of the control of ballistic aiming arm movements by manipulating movement complexity, response uncertainty, and the use of precues. Four different age groups of participants (6- and 9-year-old boys and girls and 24- and 73-year- old men and women, 20 participants in each age group) performed 7 types of rapid aiming arm movements on the surface of a digitizer. Their movement characteristics such as movement velocity, normalized jerk, relative timing, movement linearity, and intersegment intervals were profiled. Analyses of variance with repeated measures were conducted on age and task effects in varying movement complexity (Study 1), response uncertainty (Study 2), and precue use (Study 3) conditions. Young children and senior adults had slower, more variant, less smooth, and less linear arm movements than older children and young adults. Increasing the number of movement segments resulted in slower and more variant responses. Movement accuracy demands or response uncertainty interacted with age so that the 6- and 74-year-old participants had poorer performances but responded similarly to the varying treatments. Even though older children and young adults had better performances than young children and senior adults, their arm movement performance declined when response uncertainty increased. The analyses suggested that young children's and senior adults' performances are poorer because less of their movement is under central control, and they therefore use on-line adjustments. In addition, older children and young adults use a valid precue more effectively to prepare for subsequent movements than do young children and senior adults, suggesting that older children and young adults are more capable of organizing motor responses than arc young children and senior adults.