The weight of expectation: Implicit,rather than explicit,prior expectations drive the size–weight illusion

In the size–weight illusion, small objects feel heavier than identically weighted larger objects. This illusion is thought to be a consequence of how one's prior expectations can influence conscious perception—lifters expect the large object to outweigh the small object and subsequently experience it as feeling lighter than they expected it to be. Here, we directly examined how a familiar object's identity can affect how heavy someone expects it to be, and how these expectations will influence subsequent perceptions of heaviness. We describe two novel weight illusions induced with familiar objects. In one condition, participants judged the weight of a set of similar-size objects with very different natural weights (a polystyrene sphere, a tennis ball, and a cricket ball), which had all been adjusted to weigh the same amount as one another. In this condition, participants experienced a small, but reliable, weight illusion, with the lightest looking ball feeling heavier than the heaviest looking ball. In the other condition, participants judged the weights of a different set of balls, which were different sizes, but similar natural weights, to one another (a golf ball, a foam soccer ball, and an inflated beach ball). Again, participants experienced a perceptual illusion, but in the opposite direction. Surprisingly, participant's perceptions matched, rather than contrasted with, their explicit expectations such that, even though they expected the golf ball to outweigh the beach ball they perceived the golf ball as feeling heavier than the beach ball. The effect of object mass appeared to dominate the effect of conscious expectations, suggesting that contrasting expectations of heaviness are not necessary to experience weight illusions and that current models of this robust perceptual effect must be revised.     

Meaning Beyond Heroic Illusions? Transcendence in Everyday Life

Ernest Becker's theory of human evil is as devastating as it is incisive since he identifies the uniquely human capacity for transcendence as the source of evil. Anticipating our own death, we turn to elaborately constructed heroic illusions that give us meaning and the promise of immortality while treating those with different ideologies as opponents. This article summarizes Becker's interpretation of evil and discusses how transcendence is understood by contemporary thinkers such as Karl Rahner. It concludes by examining breakthroughs in personal relationships as transcendent experiences that are deeply meaningful but do not involve the construction of others as enemies.     

Is There a Dark Side of Positive Illusions? Overestimation of Social Competence and Subsequent Adjustment in Aggressive and Nonaggressive Children

This study examined (a) the links between children's overly positive perceptions about the relations with the peer group and with their best friend to subsequent behavioral, emotional, and social adjustment, and (b) whether these links are moderated by children's aggression. Using a short-term longitudinal design, the study was based on a sample of 819 4th- to 6th-graders (427 girls) from low to average SES families. Results showed that positive illusions about their social relations with classmates and with friends were related to an increase in children's peer-rated social preference and fostered the stability of children's dyadic friendships, regardless of children's level of aggression. In addition, overestimation of social competence with the peer group and overestimation of friendship quality were both related to a decrease in children's depressive feelings. Extreme overestimation as well as extreme underestimation of social competence with the peer group was also related to an increase in children's aggression. This latter result, however, was only true for children who were highly aggressive to begin with. The theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed.     

离线元认知调节的结构探索与验证

离线元认知调节指脱离具体任务情境后,个体在整体层面对自身活动的规划、管理、归纳反省并重新评价的过程。与在线元认知调节相结合,可以使元认知对行为的调节作用得到更加完整有力地发挥。本研究探索了离线元认知调节的测量学结构,开发出相应的测量工具,并且在职业测评领域通过实践检验。研究一编制离线调节量表,对离线元认知调节结构进行探索,得到全局规划、洞察力和整合概化三个维度;研究二对工具的效度进行实证检验,通过层次Logistic回归分析,发现公司中层领导与普通员工在离线调节水平上存在差异,验证了该工具的实证效度。研究结果证明离线调节量表具有较好的心理测量学品质,可以应用于相关的实践领域。     

The moderating role of early traumatic experiences on the association of schizotypal traits with visual perception

The findings on the association of schizotypal traits with the perception of visual illusions are scarce and inconsistent and have not taken into consideration potential effects of childhood traumatic experiences, a risk factor for schizophrenia-spectrum conditions. Thus, the present study addressed the question of potential moderating effects of early traumatic experiences on the association between different aspects of schizotypal traits with the perception of the Müller-Lyer and Navon's Hierarchical Letters (NHL) illusions. The study revealed that (a) increased suspiciousness was associated with increased liability to the Müller-Lyer illusion, when the exposure to traumatic events was high, whereas the opposite pattern was true when the exposure to traumatic events was low; (b) negative schizotypy was associated with more accurate global perception, and high disorganized schizotypy was associated with superior accuracy when target letters were present during the NHL illusion, when early traumatic experiences were at lower levels; and (c) high negative, disorganized, and total schizotypy were associated with lower accuracy when target letters were present in the NHL paradigm, when early traumatic experiences were at higher levels. The findings of the study suggest that early traumatic events differentially moderate the relationship between various aspects of schizotypal traits and visual perceptual processing.     

Improving attitudes towards minority groups by thinking about the thoughts and meta-cognitions of their members

Research on persuasion has shown that for attitudes to change people need to take into consideration not only the thoughts message recipients generate in response to proposals but also how people think about their own thoughts (metacognition). In the present research, we introduce a new perspective for improving outgroup attitudes focused on the distinction between cognition and metacognition but this time applied to the perceptions of others’ minds. Specifically, we examined to what extent thinking about the mental processes of outgroup members influences attitudes towards those outgroups. We compared the impact of thinking about how others think (perceived primary cognition) with how others think about their own thoughts (perceived secondary cognition or metacognition). In the primary cognition treatment, participants answered questions about the thinking processes of outgroup members. In the secondary cognition treatment, participants answered questions that required them to consider how outgroup members think about their own thoughts (i.e., metacognition). Compared to controls, these treatments were capable of improving attitudes of Spanish citizens towards Syrian refugees, South American immigrants, and Roma people. A third study used a minimal group paradigm in which a fictitious outgroup was described as having primary (vs. secondary) cognition. A final study also tested the implications of assuming that groups have one type of cognition or another. The effects of the two treatments varied depending on the type of outgroup.     

Afterimages: a tool for defining the neural correlate of visual consciousness

Our visual system not only mediates information about the visual environment but is capable of generating pictures of nonexistent worlds: afterimages, illusions, phosphenes, etc. We are "aware" of these pictures just as we are aware of the images of natural, physical objects. This raises the question: is the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) of such images the same as that of images of physical objects? Images of natural objects have some properties in common with afterimages (e.g., stability of verticality) but there are also obvious differences (e.g., images maintain size constancy, whereas afterimages follow Emmert's Law: when seen while screens at different distances are observed, an afterimage looks larger, the greater the distance of the screen). The differences can be explained by differences in the retinal extent of images and afterimages, which favors the view that both have the same NCC. It seems reasonable to assume that before neural activity can produce awareness, all the computations necessary for a veridical representation of, e.g., an object, must be completed within the neural substrate and that information characteristic of a particular object must be available within the NCC. Given these assumptions, it can be shown that no retinotopic (in a strict sense) cortical areas can serve as the NCC, although some type of topographic representation is necessary. It seems also to be unlikely that neurons classified as cardinal cells alone can serve as NCC.     

How to Make Decisions in An Uncertain World: Heuristics,Biases, and Risk Perception

From the seventies onward a large quantity of theoretical and empirical studies have investigated the heuristic principles and cognitive strategies that individuals use to deal with risky and uncertain situations. This research has shown how the explicative and predictive shortcomings of normative risk analysis depend in many respects on undervaluing the continuous interaction between the individual and the environment. There are factors that, day by day, represent significant obstacles to decision making.