“To‐be‐forgotten” statements become less true: Memory processes involved in selection and forgetting lead to truthfulness changes of ambiguous sentences

What happens when people try to forget something? What are the consequences of instructing people to intentionally forget a sentence? Recent studies employing the item‐method directed forgetting paradigm have shown that to‐be‐forgotten (TBF) items are, in a subsequent task, emotionally devaluated relative to to‐be‐remembered (TBR) items, an aftereffect of memory selection (Vivas, Marful, Panagiotidou & Bajo, 2016). As such, distractor devaluation by attentional selection generalizes to memory selection. In this study, we use the item‐method directed forgetting paradigm to test the effects of memory selection and inhibition on truth judgments of ambiguous sentences. We expected the relative standing of an item in the task (i.e., whether it was instructed to be remembered or forgotten) to affect the truthfulness value of that item, making TBF items less valid/truthful than TBR items. As predicted, ambiguous sentences associated with a “Forget” cue were subsequently judged as less true than sentences associated with a “Remember” cue, suggesting that instructions to intentionally forget a statement can produce changes in the validity/truthfulness of that statement. To our knowledge, this is the first study to show an influence of memory processes involved in selection and forgetting on the perceived truthfulness of sentences.     

Do positive illusions predict overconfidence in judgment? A test using interval production and probability evaluation measures of miscalibration

We address the question as to whether judgmental overconfidence, as assessed by probability miscalibration, is related to positive illusions about the self. We first demonstrate that judgmental overconfidence measured with interval production procedures can be considered a trait, due to correlations observed in miscalibration scores in two sets of general‐knowledge questions of varying difficulty administered at different times. In addition, the hard‐easy effect operated in different ways on overprecision and self‐placement of one's performance relative to others: The more difficult the calibration task, the greater the over precision but the greater the under placement of one's performance. Finally, there was no evidence that miscalibration was related to dispositional optimism and self‐efficacy. A second study extended these results by including further measures of disposition to experience positive illusions such as unrealistic optimism, a general tendency to consider oneself “better‐than‐average,” and two indexes of dispositional perception of control. The positive illusion measures showed considerable inter‐correlations, but did not correlate with miscalibration on the interval production task, and correlated negatively with optimism concerning societal risks. A final study replicated this pattern of findings, but showed that disposition to positive illusions did predict miscalibration on the same questions measured with a probability evaluation technique. Our research demonstrates that “overconfidence” is not a unitary construct, but a series of overlapping ones. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Recall of details never experienced: Effects of age,repetition, and semantic cues

To test theoretical predictions about the role of meaning connections in false memory, the effects of semantic cues and list repetition on children's false memories were evaluated across early childhood to mid-adolescence using the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm. True recall and false recall increased from 7 to 13 years. Study list repetition increased true recall of list words with the magnitude of this effect largest in the older children and adolescents. Repetition reduced false recall of critical lures in all age groups. Consistent with theoretical predictions, false recall of critical lures increased when children were informed of the thematic gist of each list prior to study.     

How to, and how not to, bridge computational cognitive neuroscience and Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness

A number of recent attempts to bridge Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness and contemporary tools and results from cognitive science or computational neuroscience are described and critiqued. An alternate proposal is outlined that lacks the weaknesses of existing accounts.     

Not so above average after all: When people believe they are worse than average and its implications for theories of bias in social comparison

Recent research calls into question the generally accepted conclusion that people believe themselves to be better than average. This paper reviews the new theories that have been proposed to explain the fact that better-than-average effects are isolated to common behaviors and abilities, and that people believe themselves to be below average with respect to rare behaviors and uncommon abilities. These new theories are then used to revisit prior findings of better-than-average effects. When viewed in light of recent work, the evidence suggests that prior findings overstated the degree to which people engage in self-enhancement by believing that they are better than others when in fact they are not. Prior studies have often confounded desirability with commonness and have used subjective measures of comparative judgment that capitalize on people’s tendency to conflate relative with absolute self-evaluation.     

How probability theory explains the conjunction fallacy

The conjunction fallacy occurs when people judge a conjunctive statement B‐and‐A to be more probable than a constituent B, in contrast to the law of probability that P(B ∧ A) cannot exceed P(B) or P(A). Researchers see this fallacy as demonstrating that people do not follow probability theory when judging conjunctive probability. This paper shows that the conjunction fallacy can be explained by the standard probability theory equation for conjunction if we assume random variation in the constituent probabilities used in that equation. The mathematical structure of this equation is such that random variation will be most likely to produce the fallacy when one constituent has high probability and the other low, when there is positive conditional support between the constituents, when there are two rather than three constituents, and when people rank probabilities rather than give numerical estimates. The conjunction fallacy has been found to occur most frequently in exactly these situations. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Consciously monitored grasping is vulnerable to perceptual intrusions

The idea of functional differentiation between vision-for-action and vision-for-perception has been supported by evidence from different domains. According to this account, perception is based on consciously accessible, relative representations, whereas vision-for-action is performed in an analytic, automatic manner. Support for this idea comes from studies that showed that unlike perception, grasping movements are refractory to illusions and to Weber’s law. Yet, interactions between the systems may occur when an action is performed in a less automated fashion. To test this idea, we asked participants to monitor their fingers apertures in flight and to halt their movement for a short duration when they felt that their aperture reached a maximum amount. The results showed that movements in the monitored condition were biased by the Ponzo illusion and showed atypical adherence to Weber's law. These results show that action and perception are more likely to interact when movements are performed in a controlled manner.     

The relationship between dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs and problematic social networking sites use

Social networking sites (SNSs) enrol new subscribers each day. However, problematic SNS use has undesirable effects on psychological functioning. Therefore, it is important to identify the factors that contribute to the development of problematic SNS use. Very few studies have focused on revealing the underlying mechanisms of problematic SNS use. Although many past studies have examined the relationship between metacognitive beliefs and Internet addiction, the association between metacognitive beliefs and problematic SNS use has not been adequately explored. In this study, we aimed to explore the association between metacognitive beliefs and problematic SNS use among young adults. A total of 308 individuals participated in this study. A socio-demographic data form, the Metacognitions Questionnaire-30 (MCQ-30), and Social Media Addiction Scale (SMAS) were administered. Group comparisons were performed using multivariate analysis of covariance. Pearson's correlational and multiple linear regression analyses were conducted to examine the associations between metacognitive beliefs and problematic SNS use. The SNS addicts scored higher in all of the SMAS assessments. When compared to non-addicts, SNS addicts obtained higher scores on all the subtests of the SMAS and MCQ-30 except cognitive self-consciousness. The negative beliefs about the uncontrollability and danger of worry, cognitive confidence, and need for control thoughts were associated with SMAS mood modification, relapse and conflict subdimensions. Our findings revealed that dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs are related to problematic SNS use among young adults. These findings indicate that mental health workers should consider the modification of metacognitive beliefs in the treatment of problematic SNS use.     

冲动-思考型儿童在拼图游戏中的问题解决及元认知差异

以小学六年级思考型和冲动型儿童各32名为被试,通过考查儿童在完成不同难度拼图任务时的表现,探讨不同认知风格儿童在问题解决中认知活动和元认知活动的差异。结果发现:(1)在线与离线元认知监控均表现出认知风格与任务难度的交互作用。在简单和中等任务中,思考型的儿童运用更多的在线元认知监控,进行计划和检查的时间更长。离线元认知监控的差异只表现在简单任务中,思考型比冲动型儿童花费更多的时间进行预测和评价;(2)在问题解决结果上,认知风格不同的儿童完成任务的时间没有显著差异;(3)在问题解决过程中,冲动型儿童解决问题的操作步数多于思考型儿童;冲动型儿童更多地使用主体参照策略,而思考型儿童更多使用线索推断策略。