A few thoughts about the mind,the brain,and a child with early deprivation

Infant brain research is having an increasing impact on child psychotherapy and our understanding of the neurobiological effects of trauma and neglect. This paper outlines the 'experience-dependent' nature of brain development in infancy and the concept of critical periods in such development. The effects of deprivation on child development are illustrated and case material from a child who was institutionalized during his second year is used as a basis for posing questions about the nature of the mind and the brain. In spite of his deprivation, he was able to communicate imaginatively. Schore's proposal for the use of early interventions is put forward to counter discouragement that can be engendered by work with severely deprived children.     

Limbic-striatal memory systems and drug addiction

Drug addiction can be understood as a pathological subversion of normal brain learning and memory processes strengthened by the motivational impact of drug-associated stimuli, leading to the establishment of compulsive drug-seeking habits. Such habits evolve through a cascade of complex associative processes with Pavlovian and instrumental components that may depend on the integration and coordination of output from several somewhat independent neural systems of learning and memory, each contributing to behavioral performance. Data are reviewed that help to define the influences of conditioned Pavlovian stimuli on goal-directed behavior via sign-tracking, motivational arousal, and conditioned reinforcement. Such influences are mediated via defined corticolimbic-striatal systems converging on the ventral striatum and driving habit-based learning that may depend on the dorsal striatum. These systems include separate and overlapping influences from the amygdala, hippocampus, and cingulate and medial prefrontal cortex on drug-seeking as well as drug-taking behavior, including the propensity to relapse.     

Learning related modulation of functional retrieval networks in man

The medial temporal lobe has been implicated in studies of episodic memory tasks involving spatio-temporal context and object-location conjunctions. We have previously demonstrated that an increased level of practice in a free-recall task parallels a decrease in the functional activity of several brain regions, including the medial temporal lobe, the prefrontal, the anterior cingulate, the anterior insular, and the posterior parietal cortices, that in concert demonstrate a move from elaborate controlled processing towards a higher degree of automaticity. Here we report data from two experiments that extend these initial observations. We used a similar experimental approach but probed for effects of retrieval paradigms and stimulus material. In the first experiment we investigated practice related changes during recognition of object-location conjunctions and in the second during free-recall of pseudo-words. Learning in a neural network is a dynamic consequence of information processing and network plasticity. The present and previous PET results indicate that practice can induce a learning related functional restructuring of information processing. Different adaptive processes likely subserve the functional re-organisation observed. These may in part be related to different demands for attentional and working memory processing. It appears that the role(s) of the prefrontal cortex and the medial temporal lobe in memory retrieval are complex, perhaps reflecting several different interacting processes or cognitive components. We suggest that an integrative interactive perspective on the role of the prefrontal and medial temporal lobe is necessary for an understanding of the processing significance of these regions in learning and memory. It appears necessary to develop elaborated and explicit computational models for prefrontal and medial temporal functions in order to derive detailed empirical predictions, and in combination with an efficient use and development of functional neuroimaging approaches, to further the understanding of the processing significance of these regions in memory.     

相继记忆模式：展现情节记忆形成脑机制的窗口

相继记忆模式在记忆形成的脑认知成像研究领域应用广泛,已成为研究者探究大脑形成记忆时活动的主要窗口。该文在介绍相继记忆模式及记忆形成过程的基础上,分析影响相继记忆效应大小和时空分布的因素,最后讨论内侧颞叶及前额叶神经网络中相关脑区如何分工、协同支持情节记忆形成。情节记忆多维度特性导致该神经网络中有关区域表现出不同形式的相继记忆效应,因此,该文提出有效分离这些脑区在记忆形成中如何分工及交互协同关系进行更为重要     

分类和概念对恐惧泛化的影响机制

恐惧泛化与多种焦虑障碍的病理基础密切相关。例如创伤后应激障碍个体往往持续地逃避与创伤事件有关的刺激,遭受着创伤痛苦折磨。本文在厘清知觉辨别与恐惧泛化关系的基础上,着力于高级认知过程(分类与概念相似性、典型性和人工概念)对恐惧泛化的影响,回顾了恐惧泛化的相关神经机制,并揭示恐惧泛化对焦虑障碍患者的临床治疗启示。未来研究应将知觉和高级认知维度的恐惧泛化进行整合研究,同时扩充恐惧习得和泛化的神经回路,以促进人类恐惧泛化更深入的研究。     

The effects of lesions in the central nucleus of the amygdala on appetitive classical conditioning in rats

Abstract: Lesions in the central nucleus of the amygdala (cAMY) have been known to interfere with the acquisition of fear classical conditioning when footshock is used as an unconditioned stimulus (US). The present study examined whether or not a similar interference would occur with an appetitive US. Five rats with lesions in the cAMY (the cAMY group), and eight unoperated control rats were trained in an appetitive classical conditioning paradigm, which did not include elements of operant learning, using a visual conditioned stimulus (CS) (5 W of light for 10 s duration) paired with a food pellet US (45 mg, cheese flavor). The behavioral index of appetitive conditioning was an increase in rearing approach behavior to the CS after CS and US pairings. During CS and US pairings, the movement of the rat was limited so that this approach behavior could not occur. As a result, all control rats showed an increase in rearing, but the cAMY group did not. These results suggest that the cAMY is critical for appetitive as well as fear classical conditioning.     

人类情绪记忆的行为遗传学与神经遗传学研究进展述评

情绪记忆及其增强效应存在广泛的个体差异,这种个体差异可能有其神经与遗传基础。近来的行为遗传学与神经遗传学证实人类ADRA2B基因缺失突变以及BDNF Val66Met基因的多态性与情绪记忆增强及其神经机制的个体差异相联系。本文重点介绍与人类情绪记忆相关的这两种基因,梳理了行为与神经遗传学研究的最新进展,指出未来应关注更多候选基因,并重视多个脑区之间的交互作用;还应使用情绪面孔刺激探索BDNF Val66Met基因多态性对情绪记忆编码和提取的影响等。     

The minimal self hypothesis

For millennia self has been conjectured to be necessary for consciousness. But scant empirical evidence has been adduced to support this hypothesis. Inconsistent explications of “self” and failure to design apt experiments have impeded progress. Advocates of phenomenological psychiatry, however, have helped explicate “self,” and employed it to explain some psychopathological symptoms. In those studies, “self” is understood in a minimalist sense, sheer “for-me-ness.” Unfortunately, explication of the “minimal self” (MS) has relied on conceptual analysis, and applications to psychopathology have been hermeneutic, allowing for many degrees of interpretive latitude. The result is that MS’s current scientific status is analogous to that of the “atom,” at the time when “atom” was just beginning to undergo transformation from a philosophical to a scientific concept. Fortunately, there is now an opportunity to promote a similar transformation for “MS.” Discovery of the brain’s Default Mode Network (DMN) opened the door to neuroimaging investigations of self. Taking the DMN and other forms of intrinsic activity as a starting point, an empirical foothold can be established, one that spurs experimental research and that enables extension of research into multiple phenomena. New experimental protocols that posit “MS” can help explain phenomena hitherto not thought to be related to self, thereby hastening development of a mature science of self. In particular, targeting phenomena wherein consciousness is lost and recovered, as in some cases of Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome (UWS), allow for design of neuroimaging probes that enable detection of MS during non-conscious states. These probes, as well as other experimental protocols applied to NREM Sleep, General Anesthesia (GA), and the waking state, provide some evidence to suggest that not only can self and consciousness dissociate, MS might be a necessary precondition for conscious experience. Finally, these findings have implications for the science of consciousness: it has been suggested that “levels of consciousness” (LoC) is not a legitimate concept for the science of consciousness. But because we have the conceptual and methodological tools with which to refine investigations of MS, we have the means to identify a possible foundation—a bifurcation point—for consciousness, as well as the means by which to measure degrees of distance from that foundation. These neuroimaging investigations of MS position us to better assess whether LoC has a role to play in a mature science of consciousness.