Where do "constraints" come from? A comparison between inferences in biology and in word learning

In this paper, as a commentary on the papers in this special issue, the nature of constraints is discussed in terms of the comparison between inferences in biology and in word learning. Young children's inferences in biology could be constrained by three sources of information: factual knowledge, expectations based on a theory, and ontological knowledge. For example, young children's inference about the length of noses could be constrained by the facts the children know about the animals, the similarity between the animals and humans, and the ontological distinction between living things and nonliving things. In the same way, young children might figure out word meanings by linguistic and pragmatic knowledge, expectations of word meanings (e.g., the whole-object assumption), and ontological knowledge. Interactions among these sources of knowledge are documented by the papers in this special issue and related studies. It is argued that learning biases such as the whole-object assumption could not be induced only by linguistic and pragmatic cues in a social context, but should be regarded as a product of the interaction between a social context and children's theories.     

Is Putnam's Causal Theory of Meaning Compatible with Internal Realism?

Putnam originally developed his causal theory of meaning in order to support scientific realism and reject the notion of incommensurability. Later he gave up this position and adopted instead what he called ‘internal realism’, but apparently without changing his mind on topics related to his former philosophy of language. The question must arise whether internal realism, which actually is a species of antirealism, is compatible with the causal theory of meaning. In giving an answer I begin with an analysis of the content and metaphysical background of scientific realism. I show that it presupposes metaphysical realism and that Putnam's philosophical conversion is due to his becoming aware of the latter's incoherence. After giving a brief sketch of internal realism I conclude by arguing that within this new theoretical framework the causal theory of meaning loses its force as a weapon against incommensurability. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Jung Among the Physicists: A Review Essay of Dual-Aspect Monism and the Deep Structure of Meaning

This essay reviews the recent book by Harald Atmanspacher and Dean Rickles, Dual-Aspect Monism and the Deep Structure of Meaning. The essay aims to contextualize and clarify the book’s core argument about the theoretical and empirical fruitfulness of decompositional dual-aspect monism as an intervention into the mind-body problem that ascribes a pivotal role to meaning. The variants of dual-aspect monism discussed were developed primarily by physicists, but the essay also highlights the crucial contributions to the argument by the one non-physicist involved, Carl Gustav Jung, as well as noting the significance of dual-aspect monism and of the reviewed book for analytical psychology.     

Effects of temperature and prior residence on territorial aggression in the convict cichlid Cichlasoma nigrofasciatum

Aggression in the convict cichlid Cichlasoma nigrofasciatum was measured under two different environmental parameters after introduction of a conspecific intruder. Measurements were made after 24-hr and 48-hr teritorial residence times at both 26°C and 30°C. Eight fish established territories in individual tanks each containing one terra cotta pot. Intruders contained in a glass cylinder were introduced into the territories. An opaque divider separating the resident from the intruder was removed after a 15-min acclimation period. At 26°C, we observed a significant difference in the mean number of bites of the cichlids of 24-hr and 48-hr residency durations, whereas, at 30°C, such a difference did not exist. Statistical analysis showed that cichlids exhibited more aggression at 30°C than at 26°C. Increased aggression levels at the higher temperature may be related to the fact that cichlids establish territories and spawn at about 30°C.     

The Mission of Philosophy Today

The paper gives a brief characterization of philosophical problems; points up something of their significance for the culture, the social order, and our lives; indicates the methodology appropriate for the problems; and presents a view of the cultural mission of philosophy today. Philosophy attempts to bring under critical review and to correct errors in the cultural mind of our civilization, the prevailing assumptions and beliefs about our knowledge-yielding powers, the various sectors of the culture, and the basic structure of the world. It holds the cultural mind accountable to the unavoidable presuppositions of experience, thought, and action. Errors in the cultural mind can lead to distortions in the development of the culture and to social and personal pathologies. I contend that our modern Western cultural mind undermines the humanistic dimension of the culture, and ultimately the whole culture, by a restricted view of our knowledge-yielding powers and the resulting impoverished view of reality. The mission of philosophy today is to point out the errors in our cultural mind and to work for a humanistic cultural reformation.     

Meaning, Truth, and Phenomenology

This essay approaches Derrida through a consideration of his writings on Saussure and Husserl. Derrida is right to insist, following Saussure, on a relational theory of meaning: words do not have a one-to-one correspondence with their referents. But he is wrong to insist on a purely differential theory of meaning: words can refer to reality within the context of a body of knowledge. Similarly, Derrida is right to reject Husserl's idea of presence: no truths are simply given to consciousness. But he is wrong to reject the very idea of objective knowledge: we can defend a notion of objective knowledge couched in terms of a comparison of rival bodies of theories. The essay concludes by considering the implications of the preceding arguments for the enterprise of phenomenology.     

The risk of low risk: First time motherhood,prematurity and dyadic well-being

Premature birth has a well-documented impact on infants, mothers and their dyadic interactions. First time motherhood in the context of low risk premature birth—relatively unexplored in the literature—is a specific experience that sits at the nexus of premature infancy, motherhood and the processes that underpin dyadic connection. This qualitative study analyzed semistructured interviews with first time mothers of low risk premature babies. Findings were generated in response to research questions concerning mothers’ meaning-making, bonding and identity. Findings demonstrated that maternal meaning-making emerged from a dyadic framework. When mothers or their infants were considered outside of a dyadic context, surplus suffering inadvertently occurred. Findings have important implications for infant mental health practice in medical settings, for postnatal support in the aftermath of premature birth, and for understanding the meaning of risk.     

Experience With a Linguistic Variant Affects the Acquisition of Its Sociolinguistic Meaning: An Alien-Language-Learning Experiment

How do speakers learn the social meaning of different linguistic variants, and what factors influence how likely a particular social–linguistic association is to be learned? It has been argued that the social meaning of more salient variants should be learned faster, and that learners' pre-existing experience of a variant will influence its salience. In this paper, we report two artificial-language-learning experiments investigating this. Each experiment involved two language-learning stages followed by a test. The first stage introduced the artificial language and trained participants in it, while the second stage added a simple social context using images of cartoon aliens. The first learning stage was intended to establish participants' experience with the artificial language in general and with the distribution of linguistic variants in particular. The second stage, in which linguistic stimuli were accompanied by images of particular aliens, was intended to simulate the acquisition of linguistic variants in a social context. In our first experiment, we manipulated whether a particular linguistic variant, associated with one species of alien in the second learning phase, had been encountered in the first learning phase. In the second experiment, we manipulated whether the variant had been encountered in the same grammatical context. In both cases we predicted that the unexpectedness of a new variant or a new grammatical context for an old variant would increase the variant's salience and facilitate the learning of its social meaning. This is what we found, although in the second experiment, the effect was driven by better learners. Our results suggest that unexpectedness increases the salience of variants and makes their social distribution easier to learn, deepening our understanding of the role of individual language experience in the acquisition of sociolinguistic meaning.