Using Linguistic Corpora as a Philosophical Tool

The central aims of this paper are to show how linguistic corpora have been used and can be used in philosophy and to argue that linguistic corpora and corpus analysis should be added to the philosopher’s toolkit of ways to address philosophical questions. A linguistic corpus is a curated collection of texts representing language use that can be queried to answer research questions. Among many other uses, linguistic corpora can help answer questions about the meaning of words and the structure of discourse. Through a discussion of examples, the paper shows that there are many philosophical questions that can be addressed by using a linguistic corpus. However, linguistic corpora need not (and often cannot) replace traditional philosophical methods. Lastly, it argues that the special properties of linguistic corpora, including their independence and the current ease and cheapness of access, make them an indispensable resource for philosophers.     

INTRODUCTION: TOWARD A METAPHYSIC OF MEANING

We introduce a two‐part collection of articles (Part 2 to appear in the September 2010 issue) exploring a possible new research program in the field of science and religion. At the center of the program lies an attempt to develop a new theology of nature drawing on the philosophy of C. S. Peirce. Our overall idea is that the fundamental structure of the world is exactly that required for the emergence of meaning and truth‐bearing representation. We understand the emergence of a capacity to interpret an environment to be important to the emergence of life, and we see the subsequent history of biological evolution as a story of increasing capacities for meaning making and meaning seeking. Theologically, we understand God to be the ground of all such meaning making and the ultimate goal of the universe's emerging capacity for interpreting signs. Here we explain our reasons for seeking a new metaphysical framework in which science and theology may each find a home. We survey the contributions to the two‐part collection, and we suggest that the interdisciplinary collaboration from which these have arisen may serve as a methodological model for the field of science and religion.     

Exploration of anomalous perceptual experiences in migraine between attacks using the Cardiff Anomalous Perceptions Scale

Distortions in sensory experiences that precede a migraine attack have been extensively documented, the most well-known being the visual aura. Distortions in the experience of other senses are also reported as part of an aura, albeit less frequently, together with changes in the perception or ownership of the body or body parts. There are many examples of differences in aspects of visual perception between migraine and control groups, between attacks, but not as much on unusual experiences involving other senses, the sense of the body or the experience of the environment. Seventy-seven migraine (33 with aura) and 74 control participants took part. Anomalous perceptions were experienced by both migraine and control groups, but more with migraine experienced them and rated them as more distressing, intrusive and frequent. Associations with reports of visual triggers of migraine and visual discomfort are presented. This study is the first to show relationships between these factors.     

A BIOSEMIOTIC APPROACH TO THE QUESTION OF MEANING

A sign is something that refers to something else. Signs, whether of natural or cultural origin, act by provoking a receptive system, human or nonhuman, to form an interpretant (a movement or a brain activity) that somehow relates the system to this “something else.” Semiotics sees meaning as connected to the formation of interpretants. In a biosemiotic understanding living systems are basically engaged in semiotic interactions, that is, interpretative processes, and organic evolution exhibits an inherent tendency toward an increase in semiotic freedom. Mammals generally are equipped with more semiotic freedom than are their reptilian ancestor species, and fishes are more semiotically sophisticated than are invertebrates. The evolutionary trend toward the production of life forms with an increasing interpretative capacity or semiotic freedom implies that the production of meaning has become an essential survival parameter in later stages of evolution.     

WHY ZYGON? THE JOURNAL'S ORIGINAL VISIONS AND THE FUTURE OF RELIGION‐AND‐SCIENCE

This essay briefly examines the original visions of Zygon, how they helped explain the publication of a new journal, and what they imply for where we might be going today.     

What use has approved

The meaning of a word is given by a customary rule for its use. I defend that claim and explain its implications by a comparison with customary rules in law. I address two problems about customary rules: first, how can the mere facts of social practice yield a norm? Secondly, how can we explain disagreement about the requirements of a custom, if those requirements are determined by the shared practice of the participants in a community? These problems can be resolved in a way that illuminates customary rules, and helps to explain the relation between the meaning of a word and the customary rule for its use. The meaning of a word is the usefulness that it has because of the customary rule for its use.     

潜在思想再论

思想是行为的先导,行为反映思想。然而实然思想与外显行为不匹配、不一致的现象却时有发生,究其缘由乃潜在思想使然。因此,从潜在的层面把握思想,进而分析思想与行为的辨证统一关系不失为一个好的路径选择。     

The Middle Wittgenstein’s Critique of Frege

ABSTRACT

This article aims to analyse Wittgenstein’s 1929–1932 notes concerning Frege’s critique of what is referred to as old formalism in the philosophy of mathematics. Wittgenstein disagreed with Frege’s critique and, in his notes, outlined his own assessment of formalism. First of all, he approvingly foregrounded its mathematics-game comparison and insistence that rules precede the meanings of expressions. In this article, I recount Frege’s critique of formalism and address Wittgenstein’s assessment of it to show that his remarks are not so much a critique of Frege as rather a defence of the formalist anti-metaphysical investment.