后悔内容的影响因素研究：基于中美的初步比较

后悔内容的研究由于缺乏理论总结长期处于后悔研究的主流之外。Roese和Summerville（2005）通过元分析发现美国人的后悔出现在12个生活领域,在此基础上,他们提出解释后悔内容的机会理论,该理论的核心观点是机会导致了后悔。而Beike、Markman和Karadogan（2009）的观点刚好相反,他们认为失去的机会才会产生后悔。我们将中国人的后悔和美国人的后悔进行比较后,发现中国人后悔出现的生活领域和美国人既有相似性也有差异。该结果提示,除了（失去的）机会之外生活领域的重要性可能也是解释后悔内容的一个重要因素     

Error-statistical elimination of alternative hypotheses

I consider the error-statistical account as both a theory of evidence and as a theory of inference. I seek to show how inferences regarding the truth of hypotheses can be upheld by avoiding a certain kind of alternative hypothesis problem. In addition to the testing of assumptions behind the experimental model, I discuss the role of judgments of implausibility. A benefit of my analysis is that it reveals a continuity in the application of error-statistical assessment to low-level empirical hypotheses and highly general theoretical principles. This last point is illustrated with a brief sketch of the issues involved in the parametric framework analysis of tests of physical theories such as General Relativity and of fundamental physical principles such as the Einstein Equivalence Principle.     

伦理与道德之间－以“道理”说文为视角

“道”、“理”二字使道理、道德和伦理三个不同的基本范畴的关系变得耐人寻味,“道”与“理”合一相成即“道理”,道理和道德以“道”为“同源”,道理和伦理以“理”为“同源”,道德和伦理分有“道理”的“养分”,二者“同源共生异长”,长成各自独特的内涵,成为伦理学中两个最基本、最重要的范畴。     

伦理与道德之间——以"道理"说文为视角

"道"、"理"二字使道理、道德和伦理三个不同的基本范畴的关系变得耐人寻味,"道"与"理"舍一相成即"道理",道理和道德以"道"为"同源",道理和伦理以"理"为"同源",道德和伦理分有"道理"的"养分",二者"同源共生异长",长成各自独特的内涵,成为伦理学中两个最基本、最重要的范畴.     

教师资格和职业发展因素对学生数学成绩的影响：一个跨文化比较

采用TIMSS2003中的数据,应用混合模型,比较香港、日本、瑞典和美国四个国家(地区)教师资格因素和职业发展因素对其学生数学学业成绩的影响。结果发现香港教师高学历和常有其他教师听课提高了学生成绩;瑞典教师的性别、专业和参加数学教学方法方面的职业发展活动,以及美国教师的专业和听其他教师讲课显著影响其学生成绩;日本教师资格和职业发展因素对其学生成绩没有影响。     

HIERARCHIES: THE CORE ARGUMENT FOR A NATURALISTIC CHRISTIAN FAITH

This article takes on a perhaps impossible task: not only to reconstruct the core argument of Arthur Peacocke's program in science and religion but also to evaluate it in two major areas where it would seem to be vulnerable, namely, more recent developments in systems biology and the philosophy of mind. If his theory of hierarchies is to be successful, it must stand up to developments in these two areas and then be able to apply the results in a productive way to Christian theological reflection. Peacocke recognized that one's model of the mind‐body relation is crucial for one's position on the God‐world relation and divine action. Of the three models that he constructed, it turns out that only the third can serve as a viable model for theology if it is to be more than purely deistic or metaphorical.     

人的尊严与生命伦理

“尊严”是频繁出现在生命伦理学中的一个概念,但关国学者麦克琳却在最近认为,尊严在生命伦理学中是个无用的概念,可以毫无损失地用其它概念,比如尊重人的自主性概念所代替。反驳了麦克琳的观点,定义了尊严的含义,认为生命伦理学的使命就是在当代生命科技高度发达的情况下如何尊重和保护人的尊严。     

Bochenski on Property Identity and the Refutation of Universals

An argument against multiply instantiable universals is considered in neglected essays by Stanislaw Lesniewski and I.M. Bochenski. Bochenski further applies Lesniewski’s refutation of universals by maintaining that identity principles for individuals must be different than property identity principles. Lesniewski’s argument is formalized for purposes of exact criticism, and shown to involve both a hidden vicious circularity in the form of impredicative definitions and explicit self-defeating consequences. Syntactical restrictions on Leibnizian indiscernibility of identicals are recommended to forestall Lesniewski’s paradox.     

A strategy for assessing closure

This paper looks at an argument strategy for assessing the epistemic closure principle. This is the principle that says knowledge is closed under known entailment; or (roughly) if S knows p and S knows that p entails q, then S knows that q. The strategy in question looks to the individual conditions on knowledge to see if they are closed. According to one conjecture, if all the individual conditions are closed, then so too is knowledge. I give a deductive argument for this conjecture. According to a second conjecture, if one (or more) condition is not closed, then neither is knowledge. I give an inductive argument for this conjecture. In sum, I defend the strategy by defending the claim that knowledge is closed if, and only if, all the conditions on knowledge are closed. After making my case, I look at what this means for the debate over whether knowledge is closed.