Body representations and cognitive ontology: Drawing the boundaries of the body image

The distinction between body image and body schema has been incredibly influential in cognitive neuroscience. Recently, researchers have begun to speculate about the relationship between these representations (Gadsby, 2017, 2018; Pitron & de Vignemont, 2017; Pitron et al., 2018). Within this emerging literature, Pitron et al. (2018) proposed that the long-term body image and long-term body schema co-construct one another, through a process of reciprocal interaction. In proposing this model, they make two assumptions: that the long-term body image incorporates the spatial characteristics of tools, and that it is distorted in the case of Alice in wonderland syndrome. Here, I challenge these assumptions, with a closer examination of what the term “long-term body image” refers to. In doing so, I draw out some important taxonomic principles for research into body representation.     

Evaluating Creativity Through the Degrees of Solidity of Its Assessment: A Relational Approach

In this paper, we introduce a new approach to creativity assessment. Arguably, one of the main obstacles to creativity assessment is that creativity criteria are likely to change depending on what is assessed and who is making the assessment. We argue that we might be able to solve this problem by adopting a relational ontology, i.e., an ontology according to which beings of the world acquire their properties by relating to other beings. First, we present the main consequences of this ontological approach for creativity assessment: (a) Accounting for the creativity of a given object involves retracing the beings (including criteria) that relate it to its alleged creativity; (b) One can assess the creativity of this object by looking at the number of beings that substantiate this relation, i.e., by looking at what we call the “degree of solidity” of the relation; (c) One can thus account for the specificity of various forms of creativity and, at the same time, compare them in terms of solidity. Building on these ontological assumptions, we then present a new assessment technique, the Objection Counting Technique, before putting it to the test using an excerpt taken from a naturally occurring brainstorming session.     

Searle on the unity of the world

According to mentalism some existing things are endowed with (subjectively) conscious minds. According to physicalism all existing things consist entirely of physical particles in fields of force. Searle holds that mentalism and physicalism are compatible and true—“the world is one”. The aim of this paper is to show that Searle fails to make the compatibility between mentalism and physicalism intelligible. The paper has three parts: first, I criticize drawing an analogy between solidity and consciousness as macro-features of systems with micro-features. Second, I argue that Searle’s defence of the ontological irreducibility of consciousness is terminologically confused and that his argument for the trivial nature of that irreducibility is unsuccessful. Third, I defend Nagel’s argument for the causal irreducibility of conscious minds by answering some of Searle’s objections to it.

Effects of self‐explanation as a metacognitive strategy for solving mathematical word problems1

Abstract: This study examined how a metacognitive strategy known as self‐explanation influences word problem solving in elementary school children. Participants were 79 sixth‐graders. They were assigned to one of three groups: the self‐explanation group, the self‐learning group, or the control group. Students in each group performed a ratio word problem test and a transfer test. The results showed that students in the self‐explanation group outperformed students in the other two groups on both the ratio word problem test and on the transfer test. In addition, high explainers who generated more self‐explanations relating to deep understanding of worked‐out examples outperformed low explainers on both ratio word problem and transfer tests. The self‐explanation effect is discussed.     

Eine Welt ohne Individuelle EntitÄten?

A world without individual entities? An advice to not to extract immediate ontological consequences from quantum theory. Should we assume a world without individual entities? I pledge not to extract immediate ontological consequences from quantum theory. My intention is to focus on the complexity of ontological concepts commonly associated with quantum theory. Using as an example the compatibility of EPR correlations with the existence of individual entities, it is shown that an absolute rejection of an ontological category, based on some aspects of the formalism of quantum theory, does not seem reasonable. A consequence of this argument is that the common sense view – the world is composed of individual entities – can be maintained, despite of the particularities of quantum mechanics.     

预见性的本体论指归

囿于认识论或价值论范围,把有关预见性的一切解释置于本体论解释的视野之外,预见性的本体论根据之追究就会被无端地“搁置”起来,从而处在被“荒漠化”的境地,本体论意义之显现也就会被严实地“遮蔽”起来,即使偶有论及也只处在被“边缘化”的地带。本文由自我认识的诠解引发关于自我认识的预见性研究的本体论和方法论意义,进而集中解说自我认识何以具有预见性,自我认识的预见性有什么特点和表现形式,其存在变化是否具有客观基础暨本体论指归。     

中国古代哲学中的"本体"概念考辨

"本体论"(ontology)的说法为中国传统文化所无,"本体"却是中国固有之词,"本体论"一词从其面世之日起就具有了中西文化对话与交流的性质。如今我们要重新检视"本体论"的用法,首先要讨论的就是这种文化层面的格义与会通之前提是否成立。本文为此对中国古代哲学中的"本体"用法做了考辨。     

认知压力与建构主义数学教学的关系

与通常在消极意义上使用的“精神压力”概念不同,“认知压力”是学习环境促使学习者进行不同类型认知活动的积极力量。根据这种环境导致学习者使用一级还是二级程序性知识达成目标,可将认知压力分成一级认知压力和二级认知压力。本研究以325名小学高年级和初中一二年级学生为被试,采用问卷法考察了数学课堂上认知压力的现状及其与建构主义教学的关系。结果表明：（1）对于数学课堂而言,被试报告的一级和二级认知压力处于中等偏上水平,而且二级认知压力显著高于一级认知压力;（2）建构主义数学教学有助于产生认知压力,特别是二级认知压力;（3）修订后的认知压力问卷有良好的信度和效度。