Psychopathy and internalism

Do psychopaths make moral judgments but lack motivation? Or are psychopaths’ judgments are not genuinely moral? Both sides of this debate seem to assume either externalist or internalist criteria for the presence of moral judgment. However, if moral judgment is a natural kind, we can arrive at a theory-neutral criterion for moral judgment. A leading naturalistic criterion suggests that psychopaths have an impaired capacity for moral judgment; the capacity is neither fully present nor fully absent. Psychopaths are therefore not counterexamples to internalism. Nonetheless, internalism is empirically problematic because it is unable to explain psychopaths’ moral deficits.     

An interactive fuzzy satisficing method for multiobjective stochastic linear programming problems using chance constrained conditions

Two major approaches to deal with randomness or ambiguity involved in mathematical programming problems have been developed. They are stochastic programming approaches and fuzzy programming approaches. In this paper, we focus on multiobjective linear programming problems with random variable coefficients in objective functions and/or constraints. Using chance constrained programming techniques, the stochastic programming problems are transformed into deterministic ones. As a fusion of stochastic approaches and fuzzy ones, after determining the fuzzy goals of the decision maker, interactive fuzzy satisficing methods to derive a satisficing solution for the decision maker by updating the reference membership levels is presented. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Tests of an indifference rule in variable‐delay and double‐reward choice procedures with humans

Four hundred and fifty participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk across 3 experiments to test the predictions of a hyperbolic discounting equation in accounting for human choices involving variable delays or multiple rewards (Mazur, 1984, 1986). In Experiment 1, participants made hypothetical choices between 2 monetary alternatives, 1 consisting of a fixed delay and another consisting of 2 delays of equal probability (i.e., a variable‐delay procedure). In Experiment 2, participants made hypothetical monetary choices between a single, immediate reward and 2 rewards, 1 immediate and 1 delayed (i.e., a double‐reward procedure). Experiment 3 also used a double‐reward procedure, but with 2 delayed rewards. Participants in all 3 experiments also completed a standard delay‐discounting task. Finally, 3 reward amounts were tested in each type of task ($100, $1000, and $5000). In the double‐reward conditions (Experiments 2 and 3), the results were in good qualitative and quantitative agreement with Mazur's model (1984, 1986). In contrast, when participants made choices involving variable delays (Experiment 1), there was relatively poor qualitative and quantitative agreement with this model. These results, along with our previous findings, suggest the structure of questions in hypothetical tasks with humans can be a strong determinant of the choice pattern.     

Philosophical Methodology and Conceptions of Evil Action

There is considerable philosophical dispute about what it takes for an action to be evil. The methodological assumption underlying this dispute is that there is a single, shared folk conception of evil action deployed amongst culturally similar people. Employing empirical research the authors undertook, this article suggests that this assumption is false. There exist, amongst the folk, numerous conceptions of evil action. Hence, the authors argue, philosophical research is most profitably spent in two endeavours. First, in determining which (if any) conception of evil action we have prudential or moral (or both) reason to deploy and, second, in determining whether we could feasibly come to adopt that conception as the single shared conception given our psychological make‐up and the content of the conceptions currently deployed.     

Stereotype threat may not impact women's inhibitory control or mathematical performance: Providing support for the null hypothesis

Underpinned by the findings of Jamieson and Harkins (2007; Experiment 3), the current study pits the mere effort motivational account of stereotype threat against a working memory interference account. In Experiment 1, females were primed with a negative self- or group stereotype pertaining to their visuospatial ability and completed an anti-saccade eye-tracking task. In Experiment 2 they were primed with a negative or positive group stereotype and completed an anti-saccade and mental arithmetic task. Findings indicate that stereotype threat did not significantly impair women's inhibitory control (Experiments 1 and 2) or mathematical performance (Experiment 2), with Bayesian analyses providing support for the null hypothesis. These findings are discussed in relation to potential moderating factors of stereotype threat, such as task difficulty and stereotype endorsement, as well as the possibility that effect sizes reported in the stereotype threat literature are inflated due to publication bias.     

纳西族亲属词的概念结构——兼与汉族亲属词概念结构比较

运用自然分类和多维标度方法,研究了纳西族亲属词的概念结构。被试是63名纳西族大学生。结果表明,纳西族亲属词概念结构由6个类别构成：（1）父母;（2）与父母同辈的长辈;（3）兄弟姐妹;（4）同辈的姻亲兄弟姐妹;（5）媳妇和女婿;（6）祖父母、子孙、旁系或姻亲子侄。纳西族亲属词的概念结构有两个维度：（1）同辈/异辈;（2）照顾者/被照顾者。纳西族亲属词概念结构与汉族亲属词概念结构具有明显差异,这与两个民族的家庭婚姻制度和文化有关,也与语言有关。     

情绪概念加工与情绪面孔知觉的相互影响

通过3个实验探讨情绪概念加工与情绪面孔知觉是否存在相互影响, 以及加工深度对两者关系的影响。实验1采用情绪面孔启动范式, 探讨较深的情绪概念加工层面对情绪概念与情绪面孔的关系的影响。实验2更改概念任务, 探讨较浅的概念加工层面对两者关系的影响。实验3缩短启动面孔呈现时间, 探讨较浅的面孔知觉层面对两者关系的影响。通过研究主要得出以下结论：(1)情绪概念加工与情绪面孔知觉确实存在相互影响; (2)概念加工深度影响两者关系的方向性, 在较深的概念加工层面, 两者的关系是双向的, 在较浅的概念加工层面, 两者的关系是单向的; (3)知觉加工深度也影响两者关系的方向性, 在较深的知觉加工层面, 两者的关系是双向的, 在较浅的知觉加工层面, 没有发现两者的相互影响。本研究为抽象概念的具身表征提供了实证支持。     

Is the mystery an illusion? Papineau on the problem of consciousness

A number of philosophers have recently argued that (i) consciousness properties are identical with some set of physical or functional properties and that (ii) we can explain away the frequently felt puzzlement about this claim as a delusion or confusion generated by our different ways of apprehending or thinking about consciousness. This paper examines David Papineau’s influential version of this view. According to Papineau, the difference between our “phenomenal” and “material” concepts of consciousness produces an instinctive but erroneous intuition that these concepts can’t co-refer. I claim that this account fails. To begin with, it is arguable that we are mystified about physicalism even when the account predicts that we shouldn’t be. Further, and worse, the account predicts that an “intuition of distinctness” will arise in cases where it clearly does not. In conclusion, I make some remarks on the prospects for, constraints on, and (physicalist) alternatives to, a successful defence of the claim (ii).