Children's equivalence judgments: Crossmapping effects

Preschoolers made numerical comparisons between sets with varying degrees of shared surface similarity. When surface similarity was pitted against numerical equivalence (i.e., crossmapping), children made fewer number matches than when surface similarity was neutral (i.e, all sets contained the same objects). Only children who understood the number words for the target sets performed above chance in the crossmapping condition. These findings are consistent with previous research on children's non-numerical comparisons (e.g., [Rattermann, M. J., & Gentner, D. (1998). The effect of language on similarity: The use of relational labels improves young children's performance in a mapping task. In K. Holyoak, D. Gentner, & B. Kokinov (Eds.), Advances in analogy research: Integration of theory and data from cognitive, computational, and neural sciences (pp. 274–282). Sofia: New Bulgarian University; Smith, L. B. (1993). The concept of same. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior, Vol. 24 (pp. 215–252). New York: Academic Press]) and suggest that the same mechanisms may underlie numerical development.     

The Great Apes and the Severely Disabled: Moral Status and Thick Evaluative Concepts

The literature of bioethics suffers from two serious problems. (1) Most authors are unable to take seriously both the rights of the great apes and of severely disabled human infants. Rationalism—moral status rests on rational capacities—wrongly assigns a higher moral status to the great apes than to all severely disabled human infants with less rational capacities than the great apes. Anthropocentrism—moral status depends on membership in the human species—falsely grants all humans a higher moral status than the great apes. Animalism—moral status is dependent on the ability to suffer—mistakenly equates the moral status of humans and most animals. (2) The concept person is widely used for justificatory purposes, but it seems that it cannot play such a role. It seems that it is either redundant or unable to play any justificatory role. I argue that we can solve the second problem by understanding person as a thick evaluative concept. This then enables us to justify assigning a higher moral status to the great apes than to simple animals: the great apes are persons. To solve the first problem, I argue that certain severely disabled infants have a higher moral status than the great apes because they are dependent upon human relationships for their well-being. Only very limited abilities are required for such relationships, and the question who is capable of them must be based on thick evaluative concepts. Thus, it turns out that to make progress in bioethics we must assign thick evaluative concepts a central role.

学校教育资源对学生数学素养预测效应的跨文化比较

采用国际学生评价项目PISA2006的数据,使用多水平线性模型方法,比较中国香港、日本、芬兰和美国四个国家（地区）的学校教育资源与学生数学素养成绩的关系。结果发现,在控制学生背景变量的情况下,学校教育资源对学生数学素养成绩的影响在四个国家（地区）之间存在一定的文化差异：学校大小、生师比对中国香港学生数学素养成绩有显著的正向预测作用;学校大小、班级大小、学校类型、有硕士研究生学历的教师比例对日本学生数学素养成绩有显著的正向预测作用,用于教学的计算机比例对日本学生数学素养成绩有显著的反向预测作用;学校教育资源对芬兰学生数学素养成绩没有显著的预测作用;学校类型对美国学生数学素养成绩具有显著的反向预测作用。     

Once More Unto the Breach: Type B Physicalism,Phenomenal Concepts,and the Epistemic Gap

Type B, or a posteriori, physicalism is the view that phenomenal-physical identity statements can be necessarily true, even though they cannot be known a priori—and that the key to understanding their status is to understand the special features of our phenomenal concepts, those concepts of our experiential states acquired through introspection. This view was once regarded as a promising response to anti-physicalist arguments that maintain that an epistemic gap between phenomenal and physical concepts entails that phenomenal and physical properties are distinct. More recently, however, many physicalists have lost confidence in the view, and have proposed less promising defences of physicalism—or have become outright sceptical about its prospects. I argue here that these physicalists have underestimated the resources of Type B physicalism and are thereby retreating too quickly—or fighting battles that have already been won.     

The flexibility of association between temporal concepts and physical space in the Japanese language

Previous studies have indicated that temporal concepts such as the past and future are associated with horizontal (left–right) space. This association has been interpreted as reflecting left‐to‐right writing systems. The Japanese language, however, is written both horizontally and vertically and, when texts are presented vertically, the sequence of columns runs from right to left. This study examines whether the associations between time and space are changed by the direction of the character strings using a word categorization task. Consistent with previous studies, response times and error rates indicated left‐past and right‐future associations when participants read words presented horizontally. On the other hand, response times indicated the opposite (i.e., left‐future and right‐past associations) when participants read words presented vertically. These results suggest that temporal concepts are not associated with one's body or physical space in an inflexible manner, but rather the associations can flexibly change through experience.     

Category essence or essentially pragmatic? Creator's intention in naming and what's really what

Daily experience is filled with objects that have been created by humans to serve specific purposes. For such objects, the very act of creation may be a key element of how people understand them. But exactly how does creator's intention matter? We evaluated its contribution to two forms of categorization: the name selected for an artifact, and intuitions about what an artifact "really" is. To contrast the possibility that intention serves as an essence (Bloom, P. (1996). Intention, history, and artifact concepts. Cognition, 60, 1-29; Bloom, P. (1998). Theories of artifact categorization. Cognition, 66, 87-93.) determining an artifact's name with the possibility that it matters through its relevance to discourse goals, participants in three experiments read scenarios about people interacting with an artifact and then judged the suitability of different names for it. The intention of the creator was of differing degrees of relevance to the communication, and the relevance of other aspects of the entity varied in a complementary fashion. We found that name selection was altered by the communicative goals of a situation, and name choice was most consistent with creator's intention when the situation made intention relevant to achieving those goals. In a fourth experiment, we used the same scenarios to test the possibility that intention serves as an essence determining intuitions about what an object "really" is. The impact of creator's intention was modulated by the discourse context. These findings suggest that creator's intention influences both name choice and intuitions about what something "really" is by virtue of its impact on how communicative goals are best realized.     

Concept empiricism: a methodological critique

Thanks to Barsalou's, Damasio's, Glenberg's, Prinz' and others' work, neo-empiricism is gaining a deserved recognition in the psychology and philosophy of concepts. I argue, however, that neo-empiricists have underestimated the difficulty of providing evidence against the amodal approach to concepts and higher cognition. I highlight three key problems: the difficulty of sorting out amodal predictions from neo-empiricist predictions, the difficulty of finding experimental tasks that are not best solved by imagery and the difficulty of generalizing findings concerning a given cognitive process in a given context to other cognitive processes or other contexts. Finally, solutions to these three problems are considered.     

Effects of self‐explanation as a metacognitive strategy for solving mathematical word problems1

Abstract: This study examined how a metacognitive strategy known as self‐explanation influences word problem solving in elementary school children. Participants were 79 sixth‐graders. They were assigned to one of three groups: the self‐explanation group, the self‐learning group, or the control group. Students in each group performed a ratio word problem test and a transfer test. The results showed that students in the self‐explanation group outperformed students in the other two groups on both the ratio word problem test and on the transfer test. In addition, high explainers who generated more self‐explanations relating to deep understanding of worked‐out examples outperformed low explainers on both ratio word problem and transfer tests. The self‐explanation effect is discussed.     

Unfinished business: How completeness affects the impact of emotional states and emotion concepts on social judgment

In two studies, we compared the impact of cold emotion concept primes with induced hot emotional states on subsequent social judgments. We hypothesized that the completeness of the prime episode is an important determinant of whether accessible information will lead to emotionally congruent or incongruent judgments. We extend previous research on knowledge and emotion accessibility effects by demonstrating that the effects of incomplete versus completed prime episodes are independent of whether we prime emotion states or emotion concepts. That is, our results show that both hot and cold affective information activated by incomplete prime episodes leads to assimilation, whereas information activated by completed prime episodes leads to contrast effects. Implications for accessibility research are discussed.