Book Reviews

Books reviewed:
John Ryder, Interpreting America: Russian and Soviet Studies of the History of American Thought
Maria Pia Lara, Moral Textures: Feminist Narratives in the Public Sphere     

“淑女之争”与“君子协议”:回眸英国精神分析学会的“论战”

20世纪40年代,英国精神分析学会内部爆发一场影响全世界精神分析学发展的"战争"。以Anna Freud和Melanie Klein各自为首的精神分析师团体围绕潜意识幻想、本能与力比多以及精神分析培训与教学等一系列主题展开激烈争论,即历史上著名的"Freud-Klein论战"。这场"论战"就精神分析培训问题达成协议,并直接导致克莱因学派、维也纳学派和独立学派三"组"鼎立的英国精神分析时局。"论战"促使了客体关系精神分析与自我心理学的分离,推动了精神分析研究从驱力模式向关系模式的范式转变,奠定了后续精神分析运动发展的格局。     

Unconscious phantasy and its conceptualizations: An attempt at conceptual integration

That there is a lack of consensus as to how to decide between competing, at times even contradictory theories, and about how to integrate divergent concepts and theories is well known. In view of this situation, the IPA Committee on Conceptual Integration (2009–2013) developed a method for comparing the different versions of any given concept, together with the underlying theories and fundamental assumptions on which they are based. Only when situated in the same frame of reference do similarities and differences begin to appear in a methodically comprehensible and reproducible form. After having studied the concept of enactment followed by the publication of a paper in this Journal in 2013, we proceeded to analyze the concept of unconscious phantasy while at the same time continuing to improve our method. Unconscious phantasy counts among the central concepts in psychoanalysis. We identified a wide range of definitions along with their various theoretical backgrounds. Our primary concern in the present paper addresses the dimensional analysis of the semantic space occupied by the various conceptualizations. By way of deconstructing the concepts we endeavoured to establish the extent to which the integration of the different conceptualizations of unconscious phantasy might be achieved.     

Phantasies, Neurotic-Beliefs, and Beliefs-Proper

This paper presents a philosophical analysis of three cognitive states familiar and important to psychoanalysts—phantasy, neurotic-belief, and belief-proper. It explores the differences among these three propositional attitudes and finds that the development of secondary process capacities of reality testing and truth directness out of earlier primary process operations (themselves prior to considerations of truth or falsity) plays a crucial role. Difficulties in the proper typing of cognitive states are discussed, as are the consequences of such confounds. This use of a philosophical method serves to sharpen the familiar psychoanalytic clinical concepts of phantasy and neurotic-belief. In addition, these same clinical concepts, once properly specified, have much to offer the philosophy of mind, where current understanding of representational cognitive states is restricted to those that are largely conscious and rational. When psychoanalytic concepts such as phantasy and neurotic-belief can be better integrated within the discipline of philosophy of mind, both philosophers and psychoanalysts will have a more complete and adequate theory of mind.     

Bereavement and triangular relationships in a case of a child suffering from anorexia

This paper describes the mother–child assessment of a five-year-old girl suffering from anorexia since weaning, which was carried out in an Italian NHS neuropsychiatric child and adolescent unit. The author aims to show how she was able to link the little girl’s refusal of food to a death in the maternal family, which occurred soon after her birth. As well as this post-traumatic formulation, the author links the child’s anorexia to two related aspects of the family dynamics: avoidance of the awareness of death and the inability to manage triangular relationships, due to important intrusion and exclusion anxieties. Using extracts from the sessions, the author shows how the little girl was able to begin to work through the death phantasy which was previously inaccessible to her and her family. The concept of the death phantasy is defined and explored and possible analogies between this case and what is observed in some anorexic adolescent girls and their families are described.     

Agoraphobic and claustrophobic anxieties two problems in leaving university for some final-year students

Abstract

This article considers the way final-year students present with agoraphobic and claustrophobic symptoms which have caused them to break down academically before the end of their courses. It presents a brief theoretical discussion of these anxieties in students, and offers a way of thinking about them in terms of a particular understanding of projective identification. Fragments of casework with three students are used to show that the anxieties are brought about when the desire for invisibility for part of the self, the motive for projective identification in these cases, is more exposed by the arrival of the final months leading up to the end of the students' courses.     

Sexual metaphor and the language of unconscious phantasy

This paper investigates the attempt to find a 'bedrock' for psychic life in the idea of unconscious phantasy. Through a detailed examination of the development of the concept of unconscious phantasy, especially in Kleinian discourse, it is argued that unconscious phantasies are inherently metaphorical and have no 'concrete' existence in the unconscious. The use of unconscious phantasy as metaphor enables a 'two-way' form of interpretation that describes sexual behaviour and fantasy in terms of object relations (interpreting 'away from sex', while simultaneously describing object relations in terms of the sexual body (interpreting 'towards sex').     

The impact of intrusive identification in the analytic process: Some implications of real trauma and phantasy1

In this paper, the author aims to show a possible understanding of very primitive identifications, especially intrusive identifications, when associated with traumatic situations and expressed through current phantasies related to these experiences. At first glance, this understanding could be considered quite straightforward. However, the original contribution offered by the author is the participation of this special kind of combination in the formation of the primitive intrusive identifications and its association with the imprisonment inside the primitive object of identification, especially the mother. The author proposes the amplification of the clinical use of the concept of ‘life in the claustrum’, originally described by Meltzer, moving beyond persecutory claustrophobic situations. He illustrates the phenomenon with the analytic work carried out with a patient whose narcissistic and intrusive character was structured on the basis of primitive intrusive identifications and phantasies related to the claustrum inside the mother. The patient's imprisonment inside the maternal compartments has, as its background, the phantasies related to the infantile traumatic experience of the death of the patient's brother, which are reproduced in the analytic relationship.     

JUMPING FROM THE COUCH

This paper addresses two questions: first, how do phantasies work? Second, how do these mental activities affect a person's overall emotional life? The first question tends to be overlooked since those who accept, for example, projective identification as a basic mental activity tend also to treat it as an explanatory primitive. On this view, there is no further question to ask about how projective identification itself works; rather, other psychological and emotional phenomena are explained in terms of it. By contrast, this paper asks, how does projective identification itself work? The aim is not to provide a reductive explanation but to ask how it is that phantasies have the efficacy they have. To that end, one moment in the analysis of the Rat Man is re‐examined. There is then an attempt to show the difficulties involved in weaving an account of phantasy into the broader‐scale interpretation of emotional life.     

Unconscious fantasy (or phantasy) as clinical concept

A clinical phenomenology of the concept ‘unconscious fantasy’ attempts to describe it from a ‘bottom‐up’ perspective, that is, from the immediate experience of the analyst working in session. Articles of psychoanalytic authors from different persuasions are reviewed, which taken as a whole would shed some light on how the concept of unconscious fantasy takes shape in the analyst's mind during the session with the patient. A clinical phenomenology in three steps is described. Each step is illustrated by clinical material. Current controversies around the concept of unconscious fantasy (or phantasy) are still trapped in the discussion about if and how they are really unconscious. The strategy to describe from a ‘bottom‐up’ perspective the process of how the analyst's mind embraces the idea that an emerging phenomenon in the relationship with the patient can be defined as ‘unconscious fantasy’, allows us to elude the question as to whether or not we believe that unconscious fantasies exist at all, since we are neither required to assert or deny such a prior existence in order to describe the process of elaboration which, in the end, does formulate a fantasy as fantasy.