The decoy effect as a covert influence tactic

The purpose of this research was to determine whether individuals could use the decoy effect to influence others' choices. In study 1, undergraduates (n = 50) and executive master's of business administration (EMBA) students (n = 24) read an employee selection scenario in which they were randomly assigned to prefer one of two candidates that were equal in overall attractiveness, but that had different strengths and weaknesses. They were then asked to choose one of three inferior candidates to add to the choice set that would make their preferred candidate more likely to be chosen by other decision makers. The “correct” inferior candidate was asymmetrically dominated—dominated by one of the two existing candidates, but not the other. Participants chose the “correct” decoy candidate at better than chance levels. In study 2, undergraduates and EMBA students (total n = 66) completed a set of four decision tasks, in which they were asked to choose from potential decoy alternatives that would highlight their preferred job candidate or the product they preferred to sell to a customer. Participants again chose the correct option at better than chance levels. When participants provided free‐response reasons for their choices, these responses indicated a fairly strong recognition of the influential nature of creating a dominating relationship. Implications for understanding this effect and how it may be used by hiring managers, sales personnel, and others who attempt to influence others people's decisions at work, are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Loss aversion in the eye and in the heart: The autonomic nervous system's responses to losses

The common view in psychology and neuroscience is that losses loom larger than gains, leading to a negativity bias in behavioral responses and Autonomic Nervous System (ANS) activation. However, evidence has accumulated that in decisions under risk and uncertainty individuals often impart similar weights to negative and positive outcomes. We examine the role of the ANS in decisions under uncertainty, and its consistency with the behavioral responses. In three studies, we show that losses lead to heightened autonomic responses, compared to equivalent gains (as indicated by pupil dilation and increased heart rate) even in situations where the average decision maker exhibits no loss aversion. Moreover, in the studied tasks autonomic responses were not associated with risk taking propensities. These results are interpreted by the hypothesis that losses signal the subjective importance of global outcome patterns. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pre‐outcome regret: Widespread and overlooked

Many real‐life decisions (e.g. promises, plans and agreements) involve a time interval between when the decision is made and the main outcome is revealed. Nearly all regret studies focus on anticipated or experienced post‐outcome regret. We argue that regret is also frequently experienced in the pre‐outcome period, and that this ‘pre‐outcome regret’ has other sources than regret experienced after the outcome is known. Regret experienced in the pre‐outcome period has an important function post‐outcome regret (usually) cannot have, namely to motivate the decision maker to reconsider the ongoing decision process and reverse the initial decision. Pre‐outcome regret should for these reasons be distinguished from post‐outcome regret, and studied separately. In two scenario studies, participants were asked to imagine their regret after agreeing to perform an inconvenient task. In both, more regret was reported before than after the event, even when they had imagined a ‘worst case’ outcome. In the third study, participants described a difficult choice from their own life. Again, regret was perceived as higher in the pre‐outcome period than afterwards. In a fourth study, participants reported regret ‘online’ during an economic game (a version of the ultimatum game). They regretted their decisions more before than after they knew the outcome. We conclude that experienced pre‐outcome regret is often stronger than post‐outcome regret, and typically increases during the pre‐outcome period. We suspect that the absence of JDM studies of pre‐outcome regret is a legacy of the dominant gambling metaphor within decision research. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Modeling the Impact of Control on the Attractiveness of Risk in a Prospect Theory Framework

Many decisions involve a degree of personal control over event outcomes, which is exerted through one's knowledge or skill. In three experiments we investigated differences in decision making between prospects based on a) the outcome of random events and b) the outcome of events characterized by control. In Experiment 1, participants estimated certainty equivalents (CEs) for bets based on either random events or the correctness of their answers to U.S. state population questions across the probability spectrum. In Experiment 2, participants estimated CEs for bets based on random events, answers to U.S. state population questions, or answers to questions about 2007 NCAA football game results. Experiment 3 extended the same procedure as Experiment 1 using a within-subjects design. We modeled data from all experiments in a prospect theory framework to establish psychological mechanisms underlying decision behavior. Participants weighted the probabilities associated with bets characterized by control so as to reflect greater risk attractiveness relative to bets based on random events, as evidenced by more elevated weighting functions under conditions of control. This research elucidates possible cognitive mechanisms behind increased risk taking for decisions characterized by control, and implications for various literatures are discussed.     

当前实施麻醉过程中遇到的困惑及解决办法

当前麻醉应用过程中存在困惑,表现为：麻醉知情告知与患者接受存在矛盾;麻醉应用费用支出与患者经济节约构成冲突;麻醉风险意外出现与患者期待绝对安全冲突;麻醉要求与外科医生要求冲突。当前麻醉应用困惑的解决在于将告知沟通贯穿治疗全程,体现人文关怀;提高麻醉质量,提高麻醉安全系数;加强麻醉医生与外科医生沟通配合,共同提高手术效果...     

The relationship between the objective identification threshold and priming effects does not provide a definitive boundary between conscious and unconscious perceptual processes

The Objective Threshold/Strategic Model (OT/S) proposes that strong, qualitative inferences of unconscious perception can be made if the relationship between perceptual sensitivity (typically priming effects) and stimulus visibility is nonlinear and nonmonotonic. The model proposes a nadir in priming effects at the objective identification threshold (identification d′ = 0). These predictions were tested with masked semantic priming and repetition priming of a lexical decision task. The visibility of the prime stimuli was systematically varied above and below the objective identification threshold. The obtained relationship between prime visibility and priming facilitation was nonlinear, but the results failed to confirm a nadir in priming effects at the objective identification threshold. We conclude that the objective identification threshold does not necessarily indicate the point where presumably unconscious priming effects might be inhibited by conscious cognitive processes.     

Towards Automating Decision Aiding Through Argumentation

Decision aiding can be abstractly described as the process of assisting a user/client/decision maker by recommending possible courses of his action. This process has to be able to cope with incomplete and/or inconsistent information and must adapt to the dynamics of the environment in which it is carried out. Indeed, on the one hand, complete information about the environment is almost impossible, and on the other hand, the information provided by the user is often affected by uncertainty; it may contains inconsistencies and may dynamically be revised because of various reasons. The aim of this paper is to present a model of the decision aiding process that is amenable to automation. The main features of the approach is that it models decision aiding as an iterative defeasible reasoning process, and it uses argumentation for capturing important aspects of the process. More specifically, argumentation is used for representing the relations between the cognitive artefacts that are involved in decision aiding, as well as for modelling the artefacts themselves. In modelling the cognitive artefacts, we make use of the notion of argument schemes and specify the related critical questions. More specifically, the work reported here aims at initiating a systematic study of the use of argumentation in future decision aiding tools. Our ambition is twofold: (i) enhance decision support capabilities of an analyst representing explicitly and accountably the reasons for which he recommend a solution for a decision maker and (ii) enhance decision support capabilities of an (semi) automatic device to handle (at least partially) the dialogue with the user. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does silent reading speed in normal adult readers depend on early visual processes? evidence from event-related brain potentials

Little is known about the relationship of reading speed and early visual processes in normal readers. Here we examined the association of the early P1, N170 and late N1 component in visual event-related potentials (ERPs) with silent reading speed and a number of additional cognitive skills in a sample of 52 adult German readers utilizing a Lexical Decision Task (LDT) and a Face Decision Task (FDT). Amplitudes of the N170 component in the LDT but, interestingly, also in the FDT correlated with behavioral tests measuring silent reading speed. We suggest that reading speed performance can be at least partially accounted for by the extraction of essential structural information from visual stimuli, consisting of a domain-general and a domain-specific expertise-based portion.     

Dealing with Dynamic Decision Problems when Knowledge of the Environment Is Limited: An Approach Based on Goal Systems

We experimentally analyzed decision procedures for dealing with a dynamic decision‐making problem in which only qualitative information about the deterministic dynamics of the environment was available to participants. A participant's task was to maximize long‐term profit in a computer‐simulated monopoly market featuring delays and inertia. The design enabled a goal‐system‐based procedure, whereby a participant could select one or several short‐term variables to be controlled (goal variables) and chose target values (aspiration levels) for each of them over a total of 50 periods. We report results based on a sample of 63 participants on the formation of goal systems and the process of aspiration adaptation. Our main findings are, first, that more frequently selecting goal systems that adequately reflect the causal structure of the underlying model is positively correlated with long‐term profit; second, that goal persistence, a measure of a participant's tendency to stick to the current goal system, is positively correlated with long‐term profit; and third, that aspiration levels tend to be adapted in strong agreement with certain basic principles of a benchmark model of aspiration adaptation. Our study thus suggests and provides empirical foundation for an approach to dealing with complex dynamic decision problems based on neither optimization nor learning. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Exploiting the Wisdom of Others to Make Better Decisions: Suspending Judgment Reduces Egocentrism and Increases Accuracy

Although decision makers often consult other people's opinions to improve their decisions, they fail to do so optimally. One main obstacle to incorporating others' opinions efficiently is one's own opinion. We theorize that decision makers could improve their performance by suspending their own judgment. In three studies, participants used others' opinions to estimate uncertain quantities (the caloric value of foods). In the full‐view condition, participants could form independent estimates prior to receiving others' opinions, whereas participants in the blindfold condition could not form prior opinions. We obtained an intriguing blindfold effect. In all studies, the blindfolded participants provided more accurate estimates than did the full‐view participants. Several policy‐capturing measures indicated that the advantage of the blindfolded participants was due to their unbiased weighting of others' opinions. The full‐view participants, in contrast, adhered to their prior opinion and thus failed to exploit the information contained in others' opinions. Moreover, in all three studies, the blindfolded participants were not cognizant of their advantage and expressed less confidence in their estimates than did the full‐view participants. The results are discussed in relation to theories of opinion revision and group decision making. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.